

Emerging Security Architecture in the Indo- Pacific Region: A Study from Indian Perspective

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BY

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Declaration

I declare that the thesis entitled “**Emerging Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region: A Study from Indian Perspective**” has been prepared by me under the guidance of Dr. Sudheer Singh Verma, Assistant Professor, Centre for South and Central Asian Studies, Central University of Punjab. No part of the thesis has formed the basis for the award of any degree or fellowship previously.

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Abstract

Emerging Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region: A Study from Indian Perspective

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Key Words: - *Indo-Pacific Region, Geostrategic, Geopolitical, Regional Security Complex, Regional Security Architecture, India's Maritime Security.*

The evolving Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture (IP-RSA) is the recent security phenomenon in the Asian continent. In fact, the Indo-Pacific region is a centre of the Asian security framework, primarily due to the changing power politics and the strategic tilt of major great powers from Trans-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific region. There are several geostrategic and geopolitical factors responsible behind the construction of the IP-RSA such as the US 'Asia Pivot' policy, China's 'String of Pearls' policy and One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Similarly, non-traditional security components like, narco-terrorism, human-trafficking, sea piracy, climate change and international terrorism are also deciding factors behind the construction of the IP-RSA.

The study has used the qualitative research methodology to interpret the evolving Indo-Pacific regional security phenomenon in the region. It used the analytical method to investigate the emerging new regional security dynamics in the region. The sub-structural interview technique has been used in the research to find out the deep investigations on new regional security phenomenon and its maritime security impacts on India.

In this background, the study has used the existing paradigm such as Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver's four theoretical levels of the theory of Regional Security Complex (RSC) to interpret the enhancing Indo-Pacific Regional Security Complex (IP-RSC) in the Indo-Pacific region. It has investigated such socio-cultural, economic, political and geostrategic components of the enhancing IP-RSA. Further, limitations of the enhancing IP-RSA like, religious and ethnic diversity; lack of grand economic mechanism; geographical location and absence of leading player are also scrutinized in the future perspective. However, the study has examined the Impacts of enhancing IP-RSA on India's maritime security in the

IOR. In this response, India has adopted the bottom-up approach to increase its regionalism process in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the new geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics increased India's maritime security concerns in the Indo-Pacific Maritime New Great Game (IP-MNGG). Consequently, New Delhi is responding new regional security phenomenon through strengthening its geopolitical and geostrategic position especially in the IOR. The major projects and initiatives in its foreign policy such as 'Sagar Mala' project, 'Act East Policy' SAGC, AAGC and modernisation of Indian navy are part of its wider strategy against the new maritime security threats in the IOR. Hence, the region is not remained a peaceful zone due to new power dynamics in the region.

The study has come-up with possible recommendations and appropriate investigation that Indo-Pacific region is not India's desired region, but it is an India's necessity to secure its long-time maritime security interests in the wider sphere of Indo-Pacific region. It will decide India's future destiny in the Asian continent. Therefore, the study concludes with the new possibilities and investigations about evolving IP-RSA and its impacts on India's maritime security in the greater IOR.

Researcher

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full forms
US	United States
SCS	South China Sea
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
IPFC	Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
BRICS	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
IOR-ARC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
IR	International Relation
EC	European Community
RSC	Regional Security Complex
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
ANZUS	United States-Australia -New Zealand
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
ASC	Asian Super Complex
EU	European Union
MSR	Maritime Silk Route
IP-MNGG	Indo-Pacific Maritime New Great Game
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
IPEC	Indo- Pacific Economic Corridor

FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
ZOFPAN	Zone of Freedom Peace and Neutrality
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic partnership
NDB	New Development Bank
ADB	Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank
OBOR	One Belt One Road
BCIM	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
PoK	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MGC	Mekong-Ganga Cooperation
INSTC	International North South Transport Corridor
LEP	Look East Policy
IOR-ARC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation
AEP	Act East Policy
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
BPO	Baghdad Pact Organization
MSREB	Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LEMOA	Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
AD	Anna Domini
LoC	Line of Control
IP-RSC	Indo-Pacific Regional Security Complex
CSC	Combined Security Complex
MNE	Malabar Naval Exercises
PRC	People Republic of China
UNCLOS	United National Convention on the Law of the Sea
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NM	Nautical Miles
AAGC	Africa-Asia-Growth Corridor
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
WTO	World Trade Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
OBOR	One Belt One Road Initiative
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
RFE	Russia Far East
ONGC	Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
IP-RSA	Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
UNO	United Nation Organization
PLA	People Liberation Army
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asia Free Trade Area
ASEAN +3	ASEAN plus Three
HDI	Human Development Report
IONS	Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
MST	Mutual Security Treaty
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
CSS	Coastal Security Scheme
CISF	Central Industrial Security Force
UNSC	United Nation's Security Council
BSF	Border Security Force
MPTI	Maritime Police Training Institute
UT	Union Territories
WB	World Bank

ICG	Indian Coast Guard
BE	Blue Economy
WTO	World Trade Organisation
MSLOC	Maritime Sea Lines of Communication
RDF	Rapid Development Force
BIOT	British Indian Ocean Territory
PLAN	People Liberation Army Naval
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
CISMOA	Communications and Information's Security Memorandum of Agreement
COMCASA	Communication Capability and Security Agreement
CIPEC	China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor
BCIMEC	Bangladesh, China, India Myanmar Economic Corridor
MSR	Maritime Silk Road
AIIB	Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank
IDE-JETRO	Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organisation
ERIA	Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
AIC	ASEAN-India Centre
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
IOS	Indian Ocean Symposium
WEF	World Economic Forum
GASC	Great Asian Super Complex
CSS	Critical Security Studies

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Chapter -1

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific region, in the 21st century has emerged as a center of power politics due to its geopolitical and geostrategic significance. It has remained a hub of economic activities due to its maritime connectivity between Pacific and Indian Oceans (Chacko, 2016; Bishoyi, 2015). Indeed, over the years the region has been witnessing both cooperation and competition among the major powers. Currently, the Indo-Pacific region is undergoing new geostrategic and geopolitical dynamics due to geostrategic move of the United States (here-in-after US) towards this region. The latter has introduced several policy initiatives against 'War against Terror' policy in Afghanistan and 'Asia Pivot' policy (Clinton, 2011). At the same pivotal situation, the maritime disputes of China in the South China Sea (here-in-after SCS) and its 'String of Pearls' policy around the Indian Ocean Region (here-in-after IOR) are also responsible factors to bring the geostrategic and the geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. The rise of middle players such as India, Japan, Australia, Iran, Indonesia, and Singapore has further pushed the geostrategic and the geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. These new power dynamics are constructing the new kind of notion among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries for combined regional security framework. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the emerging and debatable constructs among the circles of International relations.

The geostrategic and the geopolitical developments of any region depend on the cultural and historical contexts that define any geographical region. The 'Southeast Asia' and the 'Western Europe' region for instance are the suitable examples of collective regional integration in the world. These regions are not defining just cartographic areas but also connecting with geographical, economic, cultural, geostrategic and geopolitical entities. Similarly, 'Asia-Pacific' and 'Trans-Atlantic' regions are also suitable examples of the region. Furthermore, there are other examples of the collective regional security and economic constructions such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (here-in-after NATO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (here-in-after APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (here-in-after ARF) and

Conference on Interaction and Conference Building Measures in Asia (here-in-after CICA) which are quite activate to construct the new geopolitical identities (Singh, 2014; Lawson, 2017). Similarly, the 'Indo-Pacific' region is a newly emerging geographical entity owing to recent developments in various areas of cultural, economic, geostrategic, geopolitical and maritime connectivity among nation-states in the region. As a newly constructed geopolitical region, it is heavily debatable region among the scholars and policymakers.

To discuss the new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region, firstly, it is necessary to understand the implication of the region; regionalization and regionalism process in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. The eminent geographer, Herbertson firstly defined 'region', to find the methodological aspects in order to understand the divisional order of the systematic geography. He defined the four criteria's to understand the regional phenomena such as configuration of the earth based on geology, geomorphology; climate; vegetation and population density (Prestes, 2005). Therefore, a region may be defined as a prime geographical identity that shares these basic commonalities within certain geographical limits. Further, to achieve the regionalism, the process of regionalisation helps to bring the possibilities of new political regionalism by converting the socio-cultural and geographical characteristics in the economic and political entities (Sahasrabusshe, 2010). Regionalism, hence, is a practice of combined social, political and economic activities by states within one geographical entity.

The process of regionalism can be realized in a country, within a region or inter-governmental coordination within sovereign states in the era of global world (Heywood, 2011; Sahasrabusshe, 2010). Therefore, the region, regionalization and regionalism processes are interlinked with one another to nurture the regional identity towards geographical to political process. These basic tendencies are instrumental in the Indo-Pacific littoral countries towards the regionalism process. The littoral countries are shifting their regional desires through converting the socio-cultural and geographical continuity in the regional political unit to fulfill their traditional and non-traditional security interests in the region.

1. 1 'Indo-Pacific' Region: Conceptual Understanding

The 'Indo-Pacific' concept relatively is an evolving term in the international politics. It articulates the interests of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean littoral countries to legitimize the combined regional mechanism in the region. To define the construction of the Indo-Pacific region, it is necessary to understand certain interrogations regarding Indian and Pacific Ocean region. How is Indo-Pacific region more than a cartographic region in the world politics? Why there is a need to replace the term 'Asia-Pacific' as an Indo-Pacific region?

The Indian Ocean region is home of the enormous population approximately 35.7 percent of the world population covering the 20 percent of the earth's sea surface. It is the third largest Ocean after the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans. It is half of the Pacific-Ocean and marginally less than Atlantic Ocean (Braun, 1982). The Northwestern part of the IOR shares the boundaries with Indian sub-continent, the Arabian, and the African coast respectively. The Eastern region is bounded around the Indonesia, Thailand and North-west part of Australia. The southern part is sharing boundaries with Antarctica and Australian coasts. Moreover, almost 38 littoral states are sharing the maritime boundaries with the Indian Ocean region (Michel & Sticklor, 2012).

Despite, sharing the maritime boundaries, the region has been ignored due to superpower rivalry during the Cold-War period. However, presently the region is the fulcrum of world politics due to naval advancement by extra regional powers (Prabhakar, 2016). Furthermore, Indian Ocean region is a place of major checkpoints such as the Suez Canal/Horn of Africa, Strait of Hormuz, Bab Al- Mandeb, Strait of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits (Michel, & Sticklor, 2012). Therefore, Indian Ocean region is center of attraction for great and regional powers due to its geostrategic and geo-economic significance in the Asian political theatre.

Further, to define the Pacific-Ocean Region (here in after POR) or what may be called as 'Asia-Pacific' region, especially in the US acknowledgment. The Western part of the Asia-Pacific region is surrounding by Eastern part of IOR. The Eastern

shore confined by American maritime boundaries and Northern region extends around the Arctic Ocean. However, the Pacific-Ocean is the largest Ocean in the world, which covers almost 46% of the earth's water surface (Shafiq, 2014). The region came into the limelight in world politics due to the US acknowledgment of the term 'Asia-Pacific' region to fulfill its geostrategic interests in the Asian continent during the Cold-War period. Presently, China has emerged as a great power in the region. Apart from this, its naval modernization and unfavorable behavior to solve the SCS dispute with its neighboring countries are creating the new security dilemma for Indo-Pacific littoral countries. Therefore, these countries are shifting toward the construction of the 'Indo-Pacific' term that largely will unify the maritime interests of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean countries along with the US.

However, the construction of the word Indo-Pacific has been used in the past in various contexts. The term was initially propounded by German geographer Karl Haushofer as '*Indopazifischen Raum*' in 1920 under the circle of geographical and geopolitical discourse (Saha, 2016). The geographical term is used to identify Chinese and Indian civilizations and cultural linkage in the offshore island arcs. Later, Nicholas Spykman used the term Indo-Pacific to elucidate the Indo-Pacific region as mediators of the maritime routes for the coming sea powers in the broader rimland region. However, after the Cold-War period the term is regularly used by the Australian fisheries council to create the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council (here in after IPFC) in 1948 (Singh, 2014). The Australian Defence White Paper 2013 formally used the term Indo-Pacific region as an arc of new geostrategic connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Apart from this, the US policy-makers considered the IOR as a part of its maritime strategy to secure maritime interests in the region.

The former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, used the term 'Indo-Pacific' during her visit in Honolulu in October 2010, to describe the newly constructing region as the theatre of Asian politics. Clinton links the Indian and Pacific Oceans as geostrategic contiguity among the US and Pacific alliances. Further, the former US President Barack Obama also used this term during his visit to Australia in November 2011. He mentioned that the region has new hopes for geostrategic and geo-

economics proximity from the Indian to Pacific-Oceans (Upadhyay, 2014). Apart from this, the term has been mentioned in the US official reports and statements. Currently, the US policy-makers are considering the Indo-Pacific region as a part of its broader strategy in the Asian continent after replacing the term Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also used the term in Indian Parliament while refereeing to the 'confluence of two seas' in 2007. In the line of this, Prime Minister Abe increased the regular visits with its neighboring countries such as China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Abe is the first Japanese Prime Minister who visited the all ASEAN countries within a year. Japan is also keen towards the diplomatic and security alliances with Indo-Pacific littoral countries to strengthen its maritime interests in the wider sphere of the Indo-Pacific region (Shiraishi, 2016; Godbole, 2017).

Likewise, India has highlighted the term Indo-Pacific by various means. Since World-War-II the former Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru had anticipated in his book 'The Discovery of India' in 1944 that the Asia-Pacific region would emerge as a geostrategic entity in the World politics and India will play an integral role in the new regional dynamics (Mishra, 2014; Godbole, 2017). However, Gurpreet S. Khurana firstly used the term Indo-Pacific in 2007 to refer the amalgamation of maritime interests between Indo-Japan relation in the greater Indian and Western Pacific Oceans. He explored the region from Eastern African Coast through Indian and Western Pacific Oceans, which covers the littoral region of East Asia (Scott, 2012).

Apart from this, officially the term was used by former foreign secretary Shyam Saran in 2011 for the US acknowledgment of the Pacific and Indian oceans as an 'interlinked geopolitical space'. However, India has quite different Intentions toward the Indo-Pacific region in comparison to the US, Japan and Australia. It considers the Indo-Pacific region as a geostrategic opportunity to construct the Indo-Pacific regionalism to reform its own previous foreign policy strategies (Chacko, 2012). It reflects how India has the potential to take on its role in this particular region. In this support, K. M. Pannikar claimed in the following words.

"While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital Sea. India's maritime security concentrated in this area and its freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. Therefore, no industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for India unless her shores are protected" (Ballabh, 2013).

Similarly, former Foreign Secretary, Ranjan Mathai, in February 2012, said, "our partnership is essential for building a stable, prosperous and secure Asia-Pacific region or as some here have begun to call it, the Indo-Pacific" (Scott, 2012). The former Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has also used this term in the India-ASEAN Summit in 2012. Further, on the diplomatic stage, the term has been used by former Indian ambassadors in the US like Nirupama Rao and then Jaishanker in 2014. The term has also been used by former naval staff Arun Prakesh and Devendra Joshi at various junctures. Likewise, the former chief of Defence and Intelligence Agency also focused the Indian interests beyond the Indian Ocean region to construct the geostrategic proximity with the Indo-Pacific littoral courtiers (Scott, 2012).

Thanks to globalization in the 21st century that interlinked the Ocean connectivity through trade and maritime affairs to strengthen the construction of the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the notion of sea powers has also shifted the New Delhi attention toward the Indo-Pacific region to construct the collective regional security mechanism with other powers to secure its maritime security interests. India mainly is facing the non-traditional security threats in the region from last two decades. Consequently, it has moved towards reviving its historical, cultural, commercial, and sea connectivity in the region. At present, it is also increasing its defence and security proximity in the region through bilateral and multilateral engagements with littoral states. On the other hand, the geostrategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region attracts the other major and regional powers such as the US, China, Russia, Japan and Australia. In this context, regional powers such as Australia and Japan are also increasing its geostrategic and defence engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations (here-in-after ASEAN) countries. They are also extending their

geostrategic proximity with India in the Indian Ocean region. There is a convergence of maritime security interests among middle powers such as India, Japan, and Australia in the region. As an outcome, there are also possibilities of 'Meddle Powers Coalition' in the Indo-Pacific region (Medcalf, & Mohan, 2014). To extend this geostrategic proximity, the US pivot towards the Indo-Pacific region is also showing its economic and maritime security interests in the region. However, the uncertainties' in the US policies are still confusing other regional powers especially after the announcement of the US President Donald Trump to put off the US Trans-Pacific Partnership (here-in-after TPP) in the region. Currently, there is mistrust among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries toward the US, the way it is dealing with regional issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, in some extends, Trump administration has given some positive signs to build the grand economic strategy as the 'Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor' (here-in- after IPEC) in the region. If the proposal of the new economic corridor will implement, it will further strengthen the economic and strategic connectivity among littoral countries. Moreover, the US geostrategic pivot shifted its attention toward strengthening its proximity with Japan, South Korea, Australia and some ASEAN alliances to increase maritime trade, defence and security collaboration in the region. Therefore, the region is not just a cartographical region, but it has occupied place as the juncture of geostrategic and maritime economic activities in the theatre of Asian politics.


Hence, the US has extended the term 'Asia-Pacific' to 'Indo-Pacific' to acknowledge its geostrategic access from Pacific to the Indian Ocean region. Likewise, India is also showing its interests to increase the strategic proximity with the US to make sure its maritime security in the region. However, New Delhi is more conscious about its traditional stand on strategic autonomy in internal as well as external affairs. Therefore, India has its own traditional or non-traditional security interests to acknowledge the term Indo-Pacific in the region. Even, Japan and Australian maritime security interests pushed them toward the acceptance of the term Indo-Pacific to achieve their collective security interests. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific

region is not just a cartographic region for all concerning littoral countries but it is a securitization process in the larger Indo-Pacific region. The term Indo-Pacific has been accepted by maximum littoral countries to secure their maritime interests in the region. The term region may be defined as a socio-economic, cultural and geographical portion of the earth's surface, which has different geostrategic and security concerns in comparison to other parts of the earth surface. Therefore, the classification of the concept region indicates the particular physical, cultural, economic and social identity of the earth's surface. There are different classifications and views by scholars of different disciplines. Some of geographers consider the region as natural phenomenon or organic entities, which characterize the relationship between human beings and their occupied land. It divides the physical characteristics of any particular region and categorizes the impacts of human interaction with other surrounding environment.

Similarly, to understand the region in the geostrategic extents it is concerned with commercial and trade activities including defence, security and geopolitical interests. The Indo-Pacific region is one of them, which contains physical, social, cultural, defence and security connectivity within the littoral states in the region. Currently, the Indo-Pacific term is an accepted term among the littoral countries especially after the 9/11 attack and the US geostrategic pivot in the Indo-Pacific region. The term is also accepted by most of the littoral states in the region due to the convergence of maritime interests between these countries. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific term is more relevant to define the maritime interests of the US, India, Japan, Australia and ASEAN nations in the region. It is a bit difficult to define the region as a geographical construct due to more maritime connectivity than land connectivity among the littoral countries. There is a lack of common understanding and cooperation among the academicians and international analysts to define the single entity as the Indo-Pacific region due to developing a new level of construction in the region. Since, the US pivot in the region, it has extended its maritime engagement with the Indian Ocean littoral countries especially with India. On the one hand, sometimes the term Indo-Pacific region is defined in a slight sense such as considered around the Eastern Indian Ocean, the South China Sea (here-in-after

SCS) and around the Western Pacific Ocean. The map no. 1.1 is showing the predictable boundaries of the Indo-Pacific region.

Map: - 1.1 Indo-Pacific Region



Source: GIS & ESRI Geographical Information System Software.

On the other hand, Australia and Japan have their own construction towards the region due to their own geostrategic and maritime interests (Scott, 2013). In fact, all littoral countries are comfortable to define the construction of the region as a part of grand geo-economic and geostrategic partnerships. Therefore, there are new possibilities to construct the region as a combined and comprehensive regional security entity with the amalgamation of maritime interests among the Indian and Pacific Oceans littoral states. However, the combined area of the Oceans is vast and full of complexities in nature. Instead of regional security complexities, the region is not only a geographical region, but also may be considered a geopolitical and geostrategic entity in the Asian political theatre. Therefore, to define the region within one particular definition it is very debatable and full of uncertainties due to new emerging construction and diverse responsible regional and external maritime factors

in the region. However, the vibrant definition of the Indo-Pacific region is the subtraction of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans based on land as well as sea connectivity. The region is bounded by the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Red Sea on the Western littoral and Eastern border is surrounded by the Eastern Pacific-Ocean, Marshall Islands and Hawaii (USA) etc. The central part of the region covers the South China sea, Philippines sea, Australian sea and around Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands. It nearly covers major sea routes such as the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca and Strait of Lombok and Sunda etc. The convenience of the maritime checkpoints makes the region very volatile in the Asian political theatre. It is a combined area of the Pacific and Indian Ocean region, which is home to enormous population density growing with cultural, economic and geostrategic maritime security concerns in the region (McDaniel 2012).

The Indo-Pacific region is bounded by 60th and 140th longitude in the West and East respectively. The region shares approximately 25 percent of the US, 68 percent of India's and 80 percent of China's maritime oil ship routes through the Indian Ocean region (McDaniel, 2012). The wider Indo-Pacific region is home of nearly 3.5 billion population, whereby it is following the collective Gross Domestic Product (here-in-after GDP) around \$20 trillion. It is a home of three largest emerging economies such as China, India, and Japan (Singh, 2014). These emerging economies are very conscious about their reckless economic growth due to their food, energy and maritime security interests in the region. India is the fulcrum of the region due to one of the fastest growing economies in the region.

However, narrative of the Indo-Pacific region has more significance due to the geostrategic importance of the entire region. The destiny of the Indo-Pacific littoral countries is not around the economic collaboration but it is also dependent on geostrategic and geopolitical proximity in the region. The pattern of the maritime security of the Indian Ocean countries has interlinked with Asia-Pacific littoral states. It has replaced the notion of the Asia-Pacific region by Indo-Pacific regional construction due to maritime security and defence proximity among littoral states. However, in the Indian Ocean region the Indian Ocean Rim Association (here-in-after

IORA) has already been established in 1997 to intensify the Ocean based regionalism. The member countries of the organization are from the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Australia. The IORA is one of the regional platform for multilateral economic and maritime security platform in the region. It has a very decisive role behind the construction of the Indo-Pacific security architecture in the region (Bhagirath, 2014). The actual role of the IORA is to construct the basic platform for the littoral states to provide the maritime commercial environment with secure maritime shipping routes in the region. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific region is emerging as a new regional construction due to new security alignments among the littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region.

1.2 Definition of Security Architecture

To discuss the new Security Architecture, it is essential firstly to understand the meaning of security and its different types in the international politics. However, after the two World Wars the classical approach of security has been understood within the national interests of the states and its security. The classical realists' thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes in their remarkable works 'The Prince' (1513) and 'Leviathan' (1651) respectively elaborated the traditional approach to understand the state security and its interests. Later, after the Second World-War, H. J. Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Kenneth Thompson have viewed regarding the matter of international relations with the perspective of realist and neo-realistic approaches to achieve the interests of the nation-states and their security.

The traditional conception of security is mainly deterring the military aggression in contradiction against aggressive states. To respond these threats states try to achieve the strongest military forces, deterrence capacities and balance of power with rival states. The classical concept of security is around the realist implementations of Westphalia treaty (30 January 1648) of nation-states and their security system (Walt, 1991; Newman, 2013). To this extent, the meaning of security is much broader and debatable in international politics. In order to define the concept of security, it is essential to understand the definition of security and its various dimensions of traditional and non-traditional security. The figure no. 1.1 is exploring the types of traditional and non-traditional security. As H. J. Morgenthau scrutinized that, the

struggle for power is a core element of international politics. The Nations always remain ready to achieve their national and security interests in the global politics (Morgenthau, 1948; Snyder, 2012). The concept of traditional security is based on state and its survival as a political community to secure national interests.


The core part of the traditional approach of security studies is considered as securing the state from any external and internal threats. It is focused on the military and warfare strategies to secure the sovereignty and integrity of the state. It has directly affected the human life by traditional warfare strategies and invasion by one state to other states (Beri, 2007; Lawson, 2017). Further, to extend the concept of the security, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver considered the military dimension with other broadening issues such as economic, social and environment. However, the Critical Security Studies (here-in-after CSS) such as Walsh school of security studies and the Frankfurt school of security studies rejected the power accumulation by the states to deal with the economic, social and environmental issues. The Copenhagen school of security studies too argued on deepening the concept of non-traditional security from military to other approaches such as social, economic, cultural and environmental security issues. The school has also examined the concept of security by adopting the neo-realistic, regional and global approaches to study the security issues. The non-traditional security threats like human trafficking, drug trafficking, economic disparity, food and health security, global warming, international terrorism, community security, cyber Security and poverty remain basic debatable issues in the security study. These non-traditional security threats affected

Key Definitions of Security

- Ken Booth considered that “Security and emancipation two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order produces true security. Emancipation theoretically, is security” (Booth, 1991).
 - According to Human Development Report-1994 (UNDP) that human security is “first safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and second it means protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the pattern of daily life, weather in homes, in jobs or communities” cited from (Collin, 2017).
 - A security complex defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan & Weaver et al., 1998).
-

the human life with the indirect consequences. It is around the indirect security concerns such as from the non-state actors, which indirectly affect the people's life by several illegal tactics (Javed, 2008; Newman, 2013; Lawson, 2017). Therefore, the security means, the absence of all kinds of threats and fears at the level of individual or public mind related to traditional or non- traditional security threats. It includes various aspects of life, such as military, social, economic, political, cultural, psychological and environmental issues etc. It is related to the levels of an individual, community and the entire civil society. Therefore, the term security is more vibrant and debatable among the scholars of international relations and international security studies.

Figure: — 1.1 Types of Security



Source: Javed, U. (2008). The Changing Trends of Security: Influence on South Asia. *J.R.S.P.*, 45(1), 59-73. & Bishoyi, S. (2015). "Geostrategic Imperative of the Indo- Pacific Region: Emerging Trends and Regional Responses." *Journal of Defence Studies*, 10(1), 89-102; Srikanth, D. (2014). Non-Traditional Security Threats in the 21st Century: A Review. *International Journal of Development and Conflict*, 4, 60-68.

Further, the term 'Security Architecture' was initiated in the International Relation (here-in-after IR) during the Cold-War¹ period. It was the catchphrase used by western scholars referring to the Asian economic mechanism after the Cold-War period. Later, Amitav Acharya has transplanted this word to understand the normative role of institutions in the regional security architecture across the Asia (Shambaugh, 2004). Currently, the architecture phrase is often in predominant use in the group of academicians and policymakers. To construct the idea of security architecture seems to be more reliable and significant specially to define the Asian regional security arrangements and demarcation of geographical and structural functional possibilities in the Asian political theatre. The demise of former USSR transformed the security environment of Europe and Asian continent that forced to search the new possible regional security construction in the new political environment. Therefore, the concept was coming to the attention with the applicability on Post-Cold-War Europe with establishment of European Union (here-in-after EC) in 1993.

The idea of regional security architecture has started with European developments, which later used by Asian scholars such as Jusuf Wanandi, Barry Eichengreen and Amitav Acharya to refer to the regional security architecture in Asia (Tow & Taylor, 2010). The complex nature of European security architecture included the arrangement of security and non-security issues with overlap functional specializations in comparison with Asia-Pacific security architecture by less complex and traditional arrangements (Mauil, 2005).

However, there is a distinguished level to predict the economic and security measurements for denoting the level of regional security architecture in the Asia. The economic security mechanism in the Asian continent is distinct from the broader institutional architecture. The security architecture is sometimes considered as strategic interaction or collaboration. The term is sometimes employed interchangeably to refer to the regional, institutional architectures such as 'Asian security architecture', 'Asia-Pacific security architecture' or 'East Asian security architecture' due to unclear vision about overarching geographical boundaries. The

¹ The term Cold- War used by Walter Lippmann in 1947 to refers the ideological war between two superpowers.

'security architecture' term is also used interchangeably sometimes with the words 'framework' and 'mechanism'. However, the US remains at a predominant position to construct the regional security architecture in the Asian continent due to its long-standing alliance system in the region (Mearsheimer, 2001; Shambaugh, 2005; Tow & Taylor, 2010). The US 'hub and spokes' alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region constructs different type of design of regional security architecture in the Asian political theatre. However, there is possible anxiety among the academicians and scholars to elaborate the term security architecture in the international politics. William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor stated the primary definition of 'security architecture' in the following words.

“An overarching, coherent and comprehensive security for a geographically-defined are, which facilitates the resolution of that regions policy concerns and achieves its security objectives’ (Tow & Taylor, 2010).”

The word Security Architecture is a unification of two words security and architecture. The word security refers to the absence of traditional and non-traditional security threats and architecture word denotes the structural mechanism of a specific region, which builds the combined security architecture. It cements the security of a particular region, which is concerned with one another's socio-cultural, economic, political and geostrategic concerns as one unit due to their economic, geographical and security dependency in the region.

The security architecture is defined as a widespread bounded geographic region, which largely facilitates and implements the policies as a political unit for achieving their regional security objectives (Xiaoping, 2011). Therefore, security architecture means a particular geographically, culturally, economically and politically interdependent confined region, which has different geostrategic and security concerns in comparisons to other regions of the world. Similarly, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the emerging regional security architecture in the region due to enhancing economic, cultural, political and geostrategic proximity among the Indo-Pacific countries in the region. Therefore, the construction of the Indo-Pacific regional

security architecture can be predicted through adopting the existing theoretical models.

1.3 Exploring Regional Security Complex in the Indo-Pacific Region through Existing Security Paradigm

In order to understand the emerging Indo-Pacific regional security architecture, firstly, it is essential to explain the old security architecture in the region and its different regional and sub-regional security complexes in the Cold-War period. Further, to define the emerging regional security architecture, it is essential to understand that what is Regional Security Complex (here-in-after RSC) theory? Therefore, RSC means that a group of states whose security linkages with each other in the name of national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). It refers to the specific regional issues and crises that have different geostrategic and security concerns from other regional security architecture.

The RSC theory is a supportive component to understand the regional framework of security complexes in the region. During the Cold-War period, the South Asian region suffered from regional security complex. It has faced the internal security complexes due to three major Indo-Pak traditional wars. On the other hand, the Southeast Asian region has also faced the different regional security complex. It had different security concerns from the South Asian regional security complex. The Southeast Asian region has faced the internal security complexes during the Cold-War period. The region was divided into two different ideologies. One was a communist-led group (Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos) and the other was a Western-oriented group (Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia) (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). On the other hand, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (here-in-after USSR) led the post Second-World-War world order.

Both superpowers carried different strategies behind the different ideological background to establish their hegemony in the world politics (McWilliams & Piotrowski, 2012). The antagonism between two superpowers has divided the world into the bipolar world. The US has increased its provocation in the Asian security architecture through its multilateral approach. It has strengthened its position in the

Indo-Pacific region with several treaties such as South East Asian Treaty Organization (here-in-after SEATO) of 1954, to increase its geostrategic appearance in the Southeast Asia and Central Treaty Organization (here-in-after CENTO) of 1959 to increase its influence in the Middle East to delimit the Soviet influence in the region. Further, the US has increased its geostrategic involvement in the Indo-Pacific region through major treaties such as the United States-Australia-New Zealand (here-in-after ANZUS) in 1951. It has strengthened its strategic appearance in the IOR and developed the Island of Diego Garcia to establish its geostrategic presence in the IOR. The Island helped to peruse the US regional interests in the IOR. However, in the Asia-Pacific region, the US has already signed the defence and security treaties with Japan (1951), Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953) and strategic proximity with some other ASEAN countries. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has also increased its influence in Western Europe through the Warsaw Pact signed in 1954 (MacDougall, 2017).

The Soviet Union has also invaded Afghanistan to expand its domination over the region. The old security architecture in the region was built by the US and former USSR. They were the main actors behind the construction of the regional security framework in the region. However, in 1967 Southeast Asian nations established the ASEAN as a regional institutional mechanism to increase the economic and geopolitical proximity in the region. Further, to strengthen the regional cooperation, these countries also established the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (here-in-after APEC) in 1989 to upsurge the Intra-regional economic interdependence in another part of the world. Moreover, to deal with the hardcore security issues in the region, the ASEAN countries established the ASEAN Regional Forum (here-in-after ARF) in 1994 to deal with the core issues of security (Nayak, 2013; Heiduk, 2014).

Similarly, South Asian countries have also established the regional institutional mechanism such as the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (here-in-after-SAARC) on 8 December, 1985. These countries have established different strategic security mechanism to deal with traditional and non-traditional security issues (Keasvapan, 2012). Some other sub-regional institutional frameworks such as

the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (here-in-after BIMSTEC) in 1997 and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation in 2000 were established. In the Cold-War period, security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region was under different regional and sub-regional frameworks. The countries of the Indo-Pacific region established the institutional mechanism to ensure their economic and strategic presence in the region. Therefore, the US, USSR and China played the major role as factors to design the security architecture bestowing their own national interests. The region has been facing the new strategic dynamics especially after China's rapid rise since the last two decades. It has increased its geostrategic pivot by adopting the 'String of Pearls Policy' to develop the ports and infrastructural developments in the region. It has also antagonistic nature in the SCS due to its maritime disputes with Japan over Senkaku/ Diaoyu Island; Vietnam over Parcel Island and Malaysia over Spratly Island. Therefore, the US has improved its strategic and diplomatic proximity in the South Asian and ASEAN countries. The US is tilted towards the Asia-Pacific region to sustain its 'forward-deployed diplomacy'² (Clinton, 2011).

Meanwhile, the Obama administration has announced the 'Asia Pivot' policy in 2011 to counter the Chinese insistence in the SCS. President Barack Obama announced the Policy in November 2011 in the Australian parliament. He stated, "The United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping the Asia-Pacific region and its future" (Manyin & Stephen, et al., 2012). Thus, the geostrategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region is shifting the paradigm of power politics from Trans-Atlantic towards the Indo-Pacific region. The region is under the new emerging dynamics due to China's rapid rise since the last two decades. Therefore, Barry Buzan has called the situation as Asian Super Complex (here-in-after ASC) that means combining the interests of different regional security complexes (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). Hence, the ASC has emerged due to China's accusation in the SCS and the IOR as well. It has created the maritime security dilemma among the Indo-Pacific countries.

² Forward deployed diplomacy means that the US continuing increase its diplomatic assets including highest- ranking official, development exports and continue assets to special countries which geo-strategically important.

Therefore, the Indo-Pacific countries are coming close to increase geostrategic proximity due to their maritime security concerns. The combined security framework among these countries is redesigning the strategic security architecture in the region. The new regional paradigm is focusing on strategic and military alliances within the regional and global powers. India is also strengthening its defense and security engagements with Indo-Pacific littoral countries from last two decades. According to the Ministry of External Affairs Report 2014-15, New Delhi, stated that “India is strengthening its economic and strategic cooperation among the ASEAN countries. Apart of this, Army Chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag visited Vietnam as a part of deepening high-level defense and strategic proximity between the two countries. Indo- Vietnam signed the \$100 million line of credit between two sides. Continuously, India is increasing its exchange of regular visits between the defense forces with Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia and Philippines in the region”.

It is also strengthening its strategic proximity with other regional powers such as Japan and Australia to build the new security architecture in the region. Recently, India has signed the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia. Canberra has joined the Malabar naval- exercise with India, Japan, and the US in the Indo-Pacific region. On the other hand, Japan has also signed the security pact with India in 2008 due to Japanese territorial conflict with China over the Sankaku Island. Therefore, some ASEAN countries and regional powers such as India, Japan, and Australia are playing a very effective role to design the new security architecture due to China’s antagonism nature in the region.

1.4 Indian Perspective

India has leading position over geographical, historical, economic and cultural linkage in the Indian Ocean region. It has almost 76% population and covers the 73.25% of total South Asian land (Pandit, 2014). It enjoys its prominent position by giant size and its traditional-warfare capabilities. Consequently, the external powers cannot ignore its importance in the region. Particularly, the US wants India's contribution and its active involvement to counter Chinese naval domination and its antagonism in the SCS. However, India has different security concerns in the region.

It has been facing various traditional and non-traditional security challenges such as drug trafficking, narco-terrorism, climate change, sea piracy, nuclear proliferation, terrorism and a question on the maritime security since last two decades. Henceforth, India has its own perspective towards the creation of new security architecture. The Indian government is strengthening its Southeast Asia policy through reviving its 'Look East' policy in to 'Act East Asia policy'. India is strengthening its geostrategic engagement with the ASEAN countries to break the circle of Chinese 'string of pearls' policy in the region. It is also strengthening its geostrategic collaboration with the South Asian countries to strengthen its sphere of influence as a responsible regional power. The Narendra Modi government is reviving the 'Sager Mala'³ policy to upsurge the infrastructural development in the coastal belt of Indian states. India is strengthening its strategic proximity with other democratic powers such as the US, Japan and Australia in the region. India has completed eighth edition of Malabar Naval exercise series with these countries in the North Western-Pacific in July 2014, Bay of Bengal in January 2016 and recently Malabar Naval exercise was held on June 2018 on the coast of Guam in the Philippines Sea (Pandit, 2014; Gandy, 2018). On the other hand, Beijing wants to counter the US pivotal strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

So, it has increased the military expansion around the SCS against the US geostrategic appearance in the region. Beijing has also proposed the Maritime Silk Route (here-in-after MSR) to freeze the disputes with Southeast Asian nations. It also invited India to join the MSR to build the peaceful and cooperative mechanism in the Asian continent. However, India is doubtful about Chinese MSR project in the wider sphere of the Indo-Pacific region (Krishnan, 2016). Therefore, New Delhi has different policy choices either to move toward the US proposed 'Indo- Pacific Economic Corridor' (here-in-after IPEC) or to join the Chinese MSR project. Beside this, it has also neutral stance to construct the new security mechanism with middle powers (India, Japan, and Australia) in the region. However, the middle power coalition

³ The policy of 'Sager Mala' was first time announced by NDA (National Democratic Alliance) government in 2003. Presently, it renewed by Narendra Modi government to boost the modern ports surrounding the India's coastal belt.

cannot survive without blessing of the US (Singh, 2017). Nonetheless, India has a constructive sign towards the new security architecture due to its geostrategic and maritime security anxieties in the region. It wants to pursue its strategic autonomy in the IOR. Therefore, New Delhi is strengthening its bilateral and multilateral engagement with ASEAN countries in the region. There are common non- traditional security threats for India and ASEAN countries such as climate change, drug trafficking, narco-terrorism, sea piracy, international terrorism and maritime security in the region. The bipolar rivalry between two major rival powers has created the disturbance for India and ASEAN countries to ensure their maritime security framework in the region. Therefore, the region is under the new volatile situations due to the active involvement of great and regional powers in which India is the center of attraction due to its geostrategic location in the region.

1.5 Statement of the Problem

The study has addressed the fundamental geostrategic and geopolitical factors behind the emerging IP-RSA in the Indo-Pacific region. The new geostrategic and geopolitical development such as the US 'Asia Pivot' policy, China's 'String of Pearls' policy and OBOR Initiative led to traditional and non-traditional security concerns for the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. It has also addressed the existing traditional and non-traditional security issues, which are responsible for emergence of the combined regional security phenomenon in the Indo-Pacific region. Due to emergence of Indo-Pacific regional security architecture, India is facing the more dynamic changing in the region. India has geostrategic and geopolitical implications in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

It has also traditional and non-traditional security concerns such as narco-terrorism, human trafficking, sea piracy and climate change etc. Therefore, research has also addressed the further research problems to deal with India's maritime security concerns in enhancing IP-RSA. The study has addressed two basic research problems; first the geostrategic and geopolitical developments, which led to the new regional security phenomenon in the region. Secondly, India's perspective about new regional security phenomenon and its maritime security impacts on India especially in the IOR.

1.6 Research Objectives

The study is based on three fundamental research objectives, which provide the direction to entire research within one systematic order. Therefore, research has achieved the three following research objectives.

- To evaluate the geostrategic and geopolitical factors in the Indo-Pacific region that led to the emergence of a new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.
- To analyse India's perspective on the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.
- To examine the impact of the emerging security architecture on Indian security in the Indian Ocean region.

1.7 Research Hypotheses

The study is based on following hypotheses.

- The developing geostrategic and geopolitical factors in the Indo-Pacific region such as China's string of pearls policy, the US military presence in the greater Indian Ocean region, narco-terrorism, sea piracy and human trafficking around the region are driving force to the emergence of new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.
- The impacts of the emergence of the Indo-Pacific security architecture on Indian security in the Indian Ocean are driving force to India's active involvement in the new security architecture.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research methodology is always based on the nature of the study. This research helps to understand the evolving regional security phenomenon in the Indo-Pacific region. The research has started with an understanding of the ontology of the research. Then, inter-relationships of ontology of research with epistemology of research help to assume the existing variables and theoretical knowledge of the regional security frameworks of the Indo-Pacific region. The research has followed the

qualitative research methodology of the research to conduct the deep investigations and understanding of the emerging new regional security architecture in the region. The research has also used the analytical method of research through adopting the semi-structured interview technique to acquire the viable and productive output of the research. Therefore, the entire research is based on interpretive research paradigms to understand the deep investigation of the emerging Indo-Pacific regional phenomenon and India's larger security perspective especially in the IOR.

1.8.1 Ontology of Research

The ontology of the research is beginning stage of any research in the social science research. It claims about what exists or looks the social reality. It is concerned with what constitutes the social reality to interpret the new social phenomena in the social science. Same as in this research the ontology of research is based on existing geostrategic and geopolitical factors of the Indo-Pacific region. These factors are responsible foundations behind the larger part of the study. The enhancing regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region is new regional security phenomenon to predict the security framework in the Indo-Pacific region. The new regional security phenomenon is around the geostrategic and geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region, which also invites India to increase its active participation in the region. Hence, the ontological position of research investigated the geostrategic and geopolitical factors behind the construction of the new regional security architecture and India's perspective in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

1.8.2 Epistemology of Research

The epistemology of research has a relationship with the ontology of the research. As such, ontology of research brings the clarification about what is there to know the existing regional security phenomenon in the Indo-Pacific region. The epistemology of research helps to understand the geostrategic and geopolitical factors of the enhancing regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, the research has adopted the interpretive research position to understand or interpret the evolving regional security phenomenon in the Indo-Pacific region. The interpretive research is an umbrella of social sciences research to understand or


interpret the new phenomenon in the social world. It is also considered as a post-positivism approach in the international relations studies. It helps to understand the new phenomenon and its enhancing impacts on the society and political environment. It interprets the reality through the sense making process. Therefore, to understand the nature of enhancing Indo-Pacific regional security architecture, study used the interpretive paradigm to understand the new phenomenon and idea of enhancing IP-RSA in the region. It interprets the new regional security phenomenon through making the sense experience to interpret the new social, cultural, economic, political and security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

The existing regional theoretical framework of the regional security complex has described by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver through theories such as Regional Security Complex (here-in-after RSC) and Asian Super Complex (here-in-after ASC). They analysed the regional security complexes within different regional security frameworks. These theories help to understand the contextual framework of new regional security architecture in the region. These theories also help to interpret India's perspective under new regional security constructions. The study analysed enhancing new regional security architecture by testing these theories in the Indo-Pacific region. The study also highlighted the new power dynamics in the region due to emerging geostrategic and geopolitical factors. Therefore, the epistemology of the research helps to understand the evolving new regional security phenomenon and India's maritime security concerns in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

1.8. 3 Qualitative Research Methodology

The study adopted the qualitative research methodology to acquire the knowledge to understand the background behind the emerging regional security architecture in the region. The qualitative research methodology, which is, involved in-depth investigation of knowledge through adopting the semi-structured interview technique, text and document analysis for enhancing new regional phenomenon in the region. The adopted methodology helped to interpret the new phenomenon behind the construction of the Indo-Pacific region. The following figure no. 1.2 is showing the structure of research methodology carried in the research.

Figure: - 1. 2 Research Methodology



Source: Prepared by Researcher

The study used the analytical method to analyse the geostrategic and geopolitical factors behind the construction of the new regional security phenomenon in the region. The analytical method helps to analyse the official documents and statements of experts and government sources. To analyse the enhancing regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region the study has used the semi-structural interview technique for taking the interviews from the related research area experts. Therefore, the semi-structured interview technique helped to use the analytical method to viable and valid outcome of the research. Further, the study has used the primary as well as secondary sources in the research to understand the new regional security construction in the region.

1.8. 4 Primary Sources

The primary sources carried through semi-structured interview techniques and using various primary governmental reports and official documents and statements. The semi-structured interviews have taken through email and telephonic recording sources to obtain the expert's views on the construction of enhancing Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. The interviews also provided the outlines on India's perspective and impacts on India's maritime security due to evolving new regional security architecture. The following list of experts interviews from various academic institutions is mentioned below.

- I. Rajesh Basrur, Coordinator of South Asian Programme at Nanyang Technological University Singapore (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies), Area of Expertise- Indian Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons Issues, (Singapore).
- II. Lakhvinder Singh from 'The Asia Institute' Seoul, Area of expertise Northeast Asia, (South Korea).
- III. Abhay Kumar Singh, Research Fallow at Indian Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA). Area of Expertise- Maritime Strategy, (INDIA).
- IV. Mohammed Khalid, Department of Evening Studies Political Science, Panjab University Chandigarh. Area of Expertise, Geopolitics of Indian Ocean Region, (INDIA).
- V. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar from Madras Christian College, Chennai. Area of Expertise, Strategic Studies and International Relations, (INDIA).

Along with these interviews of experts, the study has also used the other primary sources such as External Affairs Ministry of India annual reports, Home Ministry of India annual reports, Ministry of Defense India annual reports, Ministry of Commerce and Industry Government of India, Australian Defense White Papers and Republic of Korea Defense White Papers etc.

The study has also used the SIPRI annual database, Global Fire Power Database, US Department of Defense Annual Reports, China's Ministry of National Defense White papers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Diplomatic Bluebook-


2017, Trafficking in Persons Report- 2018, International Maritime Bureau-report 2016 and Indian Maritime Doctrines-2009 etc. Further, the study has used the primary News Papers cutting related to research that helped to understand the idea of combined Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. The newspapers cutting such as 'The Hindu' and 'The Indian Express' are used in the research to examine India's strategic and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific countries. It also helps to understand India's Indo-Pacific vision in the upcoming years. The study also included the other sources such as official statements by competent authorities and various foreign policy documents to maintain the primary authenticity of the work.

1.8. 5 Secondary Sources

Furthermore, the secondary data of study have collected from published reference books, research articles from various research journals, e-journals, Magazines, News Paper's articles and online websites series. The research has also accessed various working papers from various educational and research institutions such as Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (here in after IDSA), Observer Research Foundation (here in after ORF), Indian Council of World Affairs (here in after ICWA), National Maritime Foundation, Carnegie Centre for International Peace, RAND Corporation, Chatham House, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (here in after NII), European Policy Centre (here in after EPC), Vivekananda International Foundation, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australian Defense Collage, STIMSON CENTER and Taiwan Center for Security Studies etc. The study also included the web sources such as one-line magazines, articles and other one-line web sources.

The data of research scrutinized and collected, in a systematic and organized manner. The sincere attempt of the research has achieved the fundamental objectives of the study through investigating these primary and secondary sources. Therefore, available data and sources related to research helped to reach the rational and unbiased outcomes of result. The qualitative research methodology helped to investigate the geostrategic and geopolitical factors behind the background of the Indo-Pacific region. It investigated the deep understanding of the evolving Indo-Pacific regional security architecture especially from the Indian perspective.

Figure: - 1. 3 Sources of Research



Source: Prepared by Researcher

1.9 Significance of the Study

The security architecture defined as a widespread bounded geographic region, which largely facilitates and implements the policies with concern states in achieving their regional security goals. Therefore, in case of Indo-Pacific region, it is under the new structural changing due to power landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. The significance of the study helps to understand the phenomenon of the enhancing Indo-

Pacific regional security construction under the new security dynamics in the region. The study examined the common traditional and non-traditional security components of the Indo-Pacific littoral countries that led to the foundation of the new regional security architecture in the region. The enhancing security architecture of the region is motivated by the amalgamation of economic, cultural, strategic and security interests between the US, India, Japan, and Australia with ASEAN countries.

The study also investigates India's perspective in the enhancing regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. It also helps to identify India's top-down and bottom-up approach of its regionalization process in the greater IOR. The study also helps to identify India's central position in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game and its geostrategic role behind the construction of the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. The study examined the impacts of the enhancing new security architecture on Indian maritime security in the Indian Ocean region. It also finds out India's future maritime security perspective especially in the Indian Ocean region. The study identified India's maritime security components in the IOR after this new regional security construction in the region. The research is also going to substantive contribution toward understanding the new regional security phenomenon among the intellectual and academic circle. Therefore, the research is quite useful to understand India's recent maritime security and its perspective in the greater IOR. It also helps to guide or motivate the policies of the Indian government in the upcoming decades.

1.10 Limitations and Delimitations of the Research

The research has inspected the new power landscape from Trans-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific region within the new regional security framework. It has examined the converging as well as diverging factors of the emerging new regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. It has also examined India's perspective under the broader geostrategic and geopolitical parameters. Hence, the research has certain limitations due to the dynamic nature of enhancing new regional security architecture in the region. The evolving regional security framework is more complex in nature due to conundrum among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries related to the common minimum framework to balance the US, China maritime competition in the

Indo-Pacific region. The new regional security framework is still as a surprising element in the Indo-Pacific littoral countries due to the new type of geostrategic and geopolitical proximity among the regional and great powers in the region. The evolving nature of the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture has also limited the scope to understand India's open stance due to dynamic nature of new security architecture. Furthermore, the open and flexible approach of the Asian regionalism especially in the Indo-Pacific region has increased the strong restraint to predict the promises of the enhancing regional security architecture in the near future. It is not an established construction likewise EU, therefore research not come-up with absolute possibilities of new regional security architecture, it is based on current premises that can change according to future shape of power politics within the region. Further, during the study researcher do not able to take the direct foreign experts interviews especially from the academic and diplomatic circle due to limitations related to funding and time constant period. Hence, the researcher has taken emailed and telephonic interviews through using the sub-structured interview technique.

The research has its significance due to its dynamic and evolving nature of the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. Therefore, in terms of policy-making process research is helpful to understand the enhancing regional security architecture in Indian perspective. The study has also extended the larger scope for Indian policy-makers to understand the India's maritime interests in the IOR within the new security architecture. The study also examined India's fundamental approach behind the construction of the new regional security architecture. Therefore, a study has larger scope to nurture Indian policy-making process in the right direction. Along with this, the research also has larger scope in the academic research to explore and extend the debate on enhancing new regional security architecture in the upcoming years. It has also scope to explore India's perspective in the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture to understand India's maritime interests in the larger academic circle. Therefore, the study will mark landmark substance to understand the Asian regionalism process especially in the Indo-Pacific region. The study is also going to contribute in the larger academic and intellectual circle to understand the new regional security patterns in the Asian security studies.

1.11 Organization of Thesis

Chapter-1: Introduction

This chapter of thesis has focused on the construction of the concept of 'Indo-Pacific' region in the late cold war period. It describes the meaning of security and its various types such as traditional and non-traditional security threats. The chapter includes the new paradigm shift in the Asian security especially in the Indo-Pacific region with considering Indian perspective in the center stage. It also includes the research objectives, hypotheses and methodology of the research.

Chapter-2: Review of Literature

The second chapter has focuses the existing literature related to old security patterns in the Indian as well as Pacific littoral countries. The literature has collected under three thematic themes. 1). Existing Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific region 2). Enhancing New Security Architecture 3). Indian Perspective. Further, the available literature helps to find out the knowledge gap related to evolving regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.

Chapter-3: Emerging Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region: An Analysis through Existing Paradigm

The third chapter of the thesis is fundamental chapter of the thesis, which examined the construction of enhancing regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. The existing security paradigms such as the Mahan doctrine of maritime sea powers and Spykman rimland thesis help to understand the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific region. Further Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver's theories of the RSC and ASC helped to understand the regional security construction in the Indo-Pacific region. In this chapter, research come-up with new findings that new security dynamics and geostrategic and defence proximities in the littoral countries led to new enhancing IP-RSA in the upcoming years. The chapter has also analysed that traditional and non-traditional security threats construct the IP-RSC due to common traditional and non-traditional maritime security concerns of Indo-Pacific littoral countries. It also examined the converging and diverging factors behind the construction of the IP-RSA. Therefore, chapter brings the new clarity about the enhancing new regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.

Chapter-4: Indian Perspective on the Emerging Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region

This chapter of the thesis scrutinized the Indian perspective in the enhancing IP-RSA. The chapter understands the India's different phases of extra-regional layers of its regionalism in the Asian continent. It also analyzed India's role in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game and its central role to predict the construction of the IP-RSA. The chapter concluded with the India's diverging and converging factors in the enhancing IP-RSA.

Chapter-5: Impact of the Emerging security architecture on Indian security in the IOR

The fifth chapter of the thesis investigated the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the greater IOR and India's central role in the region. The chapter is also analyzed the India's existing maritime security components such as security of its maritime territory, maritime sea line of communication and its concerns on the blue water economy in the greater IOR. The chapter also measured the potential maritime security threats for India notably after the enhancing IP-RSA in the IOR. It also inspected India's reactive orientations over the maritime security threats due to enhancing regional security construction in the region.

Chapter-6: Conclusion


The last chapter of thesis concluded with the scrutiny over the enhancing regional security construction in the region. The chapter concluded the entire thesis with an understanding of the enhancing IP-RSA. It gives the concluding argument of India's perspective and impacts of IP-RSA on the India's maritime security in the IOR. Lastly, the thesis has been bind-up with possible recommendations for the consideration of academic and Indian policy-making process.

Chapter- 2

Review of Literature

The Indo-Pacific region has geostrategic and geopolitical significance due to its volatile location in the Asian political theatre. The new regional security dynamics in the region are building the new regional security architecture due to the convergence of interests in such fields as economic, strategic and maritime security interests between India and ASEAN countries. The region is a spectator of the paradigm shift towards the Trans- Atlantic to Indo-Pacific region. There is ample literature has available on the different traditional and non-traditional approaches of the regional security studies. Today the area of security studies is more wide and vibrant due to the expansion of the traditional and non-traditional security issues. The literature focused on the thematic aspects of the study within the three major themes that interconnected with each other. 1). The existing security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region 2). Enhancing new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region 3). Indian perspective.

Figure: 2.1 Review of Literature



2.1 Existing Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region

The combined Security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region is a debatable phenomenon among the academicians and international scholars. There are various regional security mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific region. The region is under the new regional security dynamics due to amalgamation of maritime interests among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. There are several international scholars those who described the regional and global perspective of the Indo-Pacific security framework.

Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap De Wilde (2003), Amitav Acharya (2014), Ellen L. Frost (2009), Peter, Katzenstein (2015), Alan Collins (2013), J. Peter Burgess (2012), Ken Both (2007), who have examined the international and regional based security studies by referencing the regionalization process of new regionalism in the Asian continent. The fundamental discourse of security architecture was started during the late Cold-War period when Asian countries felt that they need sustainable security framework to run their regional security ambitions. A part of this, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (1988) described that the South Asian region faced the regional security complexe during the Cold-War period. The Indo- Pak, three traditional wars such as 1965, 1971 and 1999 Kargil war, created the regional complexes in the region. Further, Southeast Asia also faced the internal security complex under the different ideological structure. One is under the influence of communist ideology like Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos and another is under the capitalist- led group like Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Therefore, they have designated that South and Southeast Asian region has different security frameworks in the cold- war period.

Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier (2012) also supported the same argument that there are twelve RSCs in the world such as South Asia, South East Asia, North East Asia, Middle East and Central Asia etc. Therefore, the larger scale of security interdependent is control by states and their functions in the region. Further, they support that regional powers have a more significant role in running the regional order within the region and its beyond. These regional powers shared common threats with other surrounding countries. Therefore, these countries move towards the construction of a regional mechanism.

In order to support this framework Yang Xiaoping (2011) explored South Asia as a relatively very distinctive strategic entity. The region exists around the irregularity of security architecture from three different dimensions. Firstly, regarding 'power', India is enjoying an absolute prevalence mentor in this region. Secondly, the aspect of 'mechanism', where the design flows on SAARC has a double shadowed side impact on both the economy and society. Thirdly, the dimension of 'ideas', like 'land first, sea later and military first, bread later' have long and rooted origins. He also

stressed that it might be the right time to redefine the gravity and priority between land and sea power especially in case of India. Therefore, the strategic location of IOR strengthens India's position towards the new regional security architecture. However, in support of this argument, Nihar Nayak (2013) described that South Asia as a strategic regional architecture. However, he examines that China is a factor in the South Asian RSC. The South Asian regional security framework is becoming global in nature. The cooperation between South Asian countries depends on non- traditional security issues of these countries.

The regional mechanism of the SAARC is a part of South Asia's strategic architecture, but it does not look like a strategic architecture. However, the institutional structure of ASEAN is looks as a becoming strategic architecture within the region. So, after seven years of its establishment, it moved towards the strategic cooperation to face the regional challenges through treaties like Zone of Freedom Peace and Neutrality (here-in-after ZOFPAN) and the treaty of peace and amity. Further, ASEAN countries established the ASEAN Regional Forum (here-in-after ARF) to deal the hardcore security issues.

However, the architecture of SAARC does not need to follow the same features like ASEAN. It should focused to build the structure, which deal with various aspects of security within the South Asian countries. The scholars of international security studies Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Amitav Acharya and Muthiah Alagappa focused the conceptualization of the concept of regional and sub-regional security in the Asian continent.

Furthermore, Ron Huiskens (2009) supported the same argument in favor of the East Asian regional security architecture with the shared determinations of ASEAN and Australian cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, he also supports the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (here-in- after SCO) to establish the regional security architecture in the region. He examines that SCO has the capacity to solve the regional conflicts within the organizational formation. Further, to understand the regional security architecture Michael J. Kelly & Sean Watts (2010) examined that Northeast Asia as a new regional security construction in the region. However, the security of this region was cemented by the US from the Cold- War period. It played

the very active role in the Korean Peninsula to make its strategic appearance in the region. To this addition, Simon Duke (1995) also favors the fact that Northeast Asian region is also part of Asia's regional security framework. The region is more volatile due to North Korea's policy towards the nuclear proliferation. Therefore, the Northeast Asia is remaining a very significant region to define the security of the Asian continent. Further, in the Cold-War period the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region was under the influence of great powers politics especially under the US security arrangements.

Victor D. Cha (2009/2010) also inspected the US bilateral alliances in East Asia since the second World-War. The US has cultivated its post second war relationships with the Republic of China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan under its "hub and spokes" system. This bilateralism in the East Asian security arrangements considered as a dominant security architecture in the post second world war period. The US created several bilateral security arrangements under this system to delimit the former Soviet Union influence in this region. Kei Koga (2011) also supports the US "hub and spokes" system wherein the US as a hub and other actors such as Japan, South Korea and Australia considered as spokes of the US policies.

Hence, the US remains a security provider in the East Asian security architecture for maintaining a peace and security in the region. He argued that the US still need to revitalize its diplomatic and military engagement to reconstruct the open and common regional security mechanism in the region. In line of this, Leszek, Buszynski (2011) also supported the origin and evaluation of the 'San Francisco System' and its role in the Northeast Asian regional security order. In this process, the US has signed the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines on August 1951 and trilateral alliance treaty with Australia and New Zealand in September 1951. Further, he extends his argument that the rapid rise of China and its maritime dispute with Japan over Senkakau/Diaoyu Island makes this alliance system more significance for Japan in the region. It also pushed Japan with more proactive efforts to construct the common security mechanism in the region. Gurpreet Khurana (2018) explored the different dimension of maritime regional collaboration among littoral countries of the IOR. He stated that the Indian Ocean Rim Association (here in after IORA) is not just

a maritime cooperation but it is a long time future maritime security collaboration. The countries of the region are shifting their bilateral, trilateral and sub-regional collaboration in the maritime security architecture in the region. He also stated that Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (here-in-after IONS) helps to provide the foundation to the enhance security architecture in the region. However, he pointed out several challenges in the direction of new regional collaboration due to geopolitical rivalry among the littoral countries.

In this process, K. Kesavapany (2012) also supported the grand security architecture in the region. The Intra-Asian trade and tourism India and Southeast Asian countries started from ancient time. Even, China also increased its enormous economic opportunities for its trade with ASEAN countries. There are many modern groups constructed to increase the economic opportunities between ASEAN and other countries such as there are various groups like ASEAN plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea). Moreover, the second group was developed during the East Asia Summit process by India, Australia, and New Zealand. Further, for upsurge the Trans-Pacific cooperation, these countries have established the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (here-in-after APEC) in the region. It increased the cooperation between ASEAN, US, India, Canada, Mexico and other Latin American countries. Therefore, several international scholars have examined the old regional and sub-regional security frameworks of the Indo- Pacific region under the different security frameworks.

2. 2 Enhancing New Security Architecture

The Indo-Pacific region is one of the volatile region in the 21st century. The region is facing the new structural change in the power politics, especially after the 9/11 attack. A part from this, the US invaded in Afghanistan through the declaration of war against terror policy. Moreover, to counter the Chinese active involvement in the region the US declared the Asia-Pivot policy to increase its strategic presence in the region. The region faced the power landscape towards the Trans- Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, it faced the new structural dynamics of power politics in the region. There are several International scholars and academicians such as Rory Medcalf (2014), K. V. Bhagirath (2014), Sawarn Singh (2016), David Michel & Ricky

Passarelli (2014), Lawrence William Prabhakar (2016), C. Raja. Mohan (2012), William T. Tow (2009), Brahma Chellaney (2018), Amitav Acharaya (2014) and Gurpreet S. Khurana (2007) who supported the Indo-Pacific regional security construction within different regional security perspectives. In this line, K. V. Bhagirath (2014) highlighted the narrative of the Indo-Pacific concept and focuses on the littoral region of the Indian and Pacific oceans. He examined the enhancing economic strength between Indo-Pacific littoral countries that led to the collaboration for the peaceful and secure Indo-Pacific region.

The region has geostrategic importance due to economic, political, social and cultural divergence among the littoral countries. However, he supports India, Australia and Indonesia's major role in the IOR-ARC to construct the Indo-Pacific regional security framework. Suresh Mehta (2014) also supported the views that Indian Ocean region is a cohesive region, which explores the geostrategic and diplomatic relation among the littoral countries beyond its boundaries. He referred to the Indian Ocean region and Western Pacific as a common Indo-Pacific entity. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific region is the theatre in the twenty-first century. The region is center of attraction for the external as well as regional powers due to its geostrategic, economic and geopolitical significance in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

Sandy Gordon (2009) further explored the cross-border collaboration between SAARC and ASEAN countries to delimit the transnational crime and terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region. The regional cooperation between two regional organizations is a sign of the securitization process in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. The new type of regionalism process is bringing the new regional security framework in upcoming future. However, APEC is a one of the emerging example of regionalism process in the Southeast Asia from last two decades. In contrast, of this Saman Kelegama (2000) has examined that the function of the APEC regionalism process is not impressive. He suggested that it has limitations related to liberalization and open regionalism process. Further, he argued that APEC should follow the deep economic integration process for regional economic framework. Further, Rory Medcalf (2014) explained the different dimension of the concept of Indo-Pacific to define the Australia's strategic interests in the region. He also conveyed the Australian vision for

term Indo-Pacific and its participation and cooperation with other powers such as the US, Japan, China, India and ASEAN countries in the region.

In this contrast, Chengxin Pan (2014) pointed out that the term Indo-Pacific perceived as geopolitical realities of China and India's maritime competition and their economic rise across the Indian as well as Pacific Oceans. The concept also indicated the new geopolitical juxtaposition of the US, Japan, Australia and India against China centric regional order. However, Antara Ghosal Singh (2016) examined India's perspective over China's OBOR initiative. She analysed that in the OBOR initiative, India has some sovereignty concerns over CPEC economic corridor through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (here-in-after PoK). However, on the other hand, she also supported that Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (here in after BCIM) economic corridor that will breadwinner for Sino-Indian win-win Cooperation.

Similarly, Sawarn Singh (2016) also argued that Indo-Pacific region is in the new geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics due to the rapid rise of China. He narrated the India's perspective over the term Indo-Pacific region, which remain the US is a main security provider in the Indo-Pacific region. He argued that the US is inclined toward India to seeking its role as a 'net security provider' in the Indo-Pacific region. New Delhi is reaching out with the US and its Pacific alliances around the Indo-pacific maritime domain.

On the other hand, it is increasing the economic linkage with China and its initiated economic networks such as a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (here-in-after RCEP), New Development bank (here-in-after ADB) and Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (here-in-after AIIB). Therefore, there is indication from India's side that its relations with the US and China is remain balanced under the new security dynamics in the region. David Michel & Ricky Passarelli (2014) inspected the diverse opinion about broader involvement of regional and great powers in the Indian and Western- Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific region is the center of attraction for regional and global powers. Due to the geostrategic importance of the Indo- Pacific region, it is becoming the fulcrum of the diverse set of regional and great powers like the US, China, Japan Australia and India in the region. Say for instance, the US has shifted its foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region

to increase the geostrategic presence in the region. In the same direction, India is also increasing its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region to increase its regional interdependence on commerce and trade network. Therefore, these countries of the region are facing non-traditional security challenges such as maritime security, human trafficking, narco-terrorism, sea piracy, climate change and maritime terrorism. Therefore, India has resilient security concerns in the region.

Further, it has focused on strategic and regional security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries under its bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. It has increased its security ties with countries such as Japan, South Korea and Australia in the region. India has engaged with the US, Japan, Australia, and South Korea by naval exercises to ensure its strategic involvement in the Indo-Pacific region. However, William Lawrence S. Prabhakar (2016) also supported the argument that the Indian Ocean littoral countries are facing a traditional and non-traditional security threats in the region. He further analyse the role of extra-regional powers such as the US, Russia, China, Japan, France, UK, Israel, Iran and Southeast Asian countries.

Robert Kaplan (2010) revealed that the Indian Ocean region is one of the pivotal region in the Asian political theatre. He considered that China is increasing its naval expansion around the greater Indian Ocean region. However, C. Raja. Mohan (2012) examines that geostrategic significance of the US, India and Japan naval exercises in the Asia-Pacific region is resisting this larger extension. He describes different perspective of these exercises that may influence the Sino- Indian relation in the near future. The rapid rise of China and its alternation towards the South China Sea would construct the new restraints in the region. He has also focused the changing security arrangement in term of nuclear doctrines, and the emerging interest of missile defence programs between the Sino–Indian relations. India's new geostrategic thrust in the Pacific Ocean will create the 'security dilemma' between China and India's relations. On the other hand, Charles R. Wright (1994) inspected the four types of basic security issues in the Asia Pacific region. He inspects the development activities of economic and political sphere remain have security issues in comparison to Cold-War period. He scrutinized the security issues in the Korean peninsula, SCS maritime territorial dispute, weapon of mass destruction and

proliferation, relative growth of China and Japan in contrast of relative decline of the Russia and the US in the region. Further, William T. Tow (2009) extended this argument in the different dimension that regional powers have nexus with the global security architecture. He extends his assessment that the Asia-Pacific region is becoming the most volatile region in an emerging new international order. There are three main powers such as China, India and Japan and other two external powers such as the US and Russia is playing an active role in this entire region.

The combination of the regional economic growth, religious and cultural diversity of this region creates the new scrutiny for building this entire region as a center of global politics. He granted the thought of 'offensive realists' Jhon Mearsheimer that global security is equilibrium between state powers to exercise their power in particular region. There is such an example like the US and China causing hegemonic war in the Asia- Pacific region. He also agreed with the thought of Barry Buzan that Asian regional security dynamics are creating the links between global and regional levels. Therefore, Asian security politics have 'regional-global nexus' from last few decades. Further, he indicated that Asia-Pacific regional security has interlinked with international security architecture.

To support the role of major powers in the region, Derek McDougall (2016) mentioned the role of some powers such as the US, China, Russia and Japan. He also considered the role of India and other European powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He examined the role of regional and international organizations to shape the post-cold war strategic and security environment in the region. However, David Scott (2012) considers the Sino- Indian maritime security dilemma under the new security framework. He supports the new assessment of the trilateral series of the Indo-US- Japan that coined the new term 'Indo- Pacific Economic Corridor' during the strategic dialogue meeting in May 2013. It creates the new dynamics in the Indo- Pacific region, which China is feeling the antagonism due to new strategic geometry. It extended the Sino-Indian maritime competition in the Indo-Pacific region. India's 'Look South' and 'Look East' policies have a strong strategic consideration in the 'Indo-Pacific' region. India has geostrategic, geopolitical and economic concerns in this particular region. It also has a strategic importance of term 'Indo- Pacific' due to

its historical, cultural and geographical connectivity with Southeast Asian nations. Moreover, the term 'Indo-Pacific' ensure India's geostrategic and geopolitical designs of its new foreign policy in the region.

Further, to support this argument Sung-Joo Han (2002) also examined the new dynamics especially after the 9/11 major incident and its influence in the international security as well as Asian security architecture. He interlinked the regional with international security mechanism. Therefore, post 9/11 the situation has increased the involvement of major world powers such as the US, China, Russia, to build a 'system of the concert' to overcoming their rivalries and conflict of interests in the region. Further, he inspected important fundamental security questions for the post 9/11 Paradigm shift and relations of the US and other Asian powers. Since this major incident, power has shifted towards the Indo-Pacific region, and it makes this region as a theatre of great power politics. In the same direction, Subhash Kapila (2012) has also supported the argument that the new power landscape is shifting the world attraction towards the region and increases the economic, political and geostrategic significance of the region to restructure the International order. Besides, the strategic global shift towards Asia has signified the US relative decline. It will create the multipolarity with Asian powers and replace the unipolar world order.

Furthermore, the Ellen L. Frost (2009) has also backed the argument behind the backlash of Asia's regional architecture by referring the rise of China, India and Japan, in term of economic and military sphere to lead the construction of the new regional security architecture. He also carries the argument that existing circumstances push the small states towards the coalition against the stronger powers. Further, in liberal international perspective these countries may move towards the collective security organizations. Nonetheless, the small states of the region may continue to maintain its military alliances with the US. However, he cleared that there is no chance for "Asian NATO" in the region. He examines that Asian leadership is searching the Asian type of regional order in the region. Say for instance, ASEAN, ASEAN +3, EAS, ERF and ADB etc. Amitav Acharaya (2014) also favored this argument and rejected the 'hegemonic regionalism' such NATO in the Asian contexts due to lack of influence of unipolar powers in the Asian order. He

understands the relative decline of the US unipolar world order notably after the 9/11 attack and failure to solve the Syrian, Ukraine and Afghanistan crisis. He stated that end of cold war reduced the idea of hegemonic regionalism especially in the Asian region. It gives the chances for Asian countries to come with open and autonomous regionalism in Asia. Even, there are other sub-regional institutional arrangements among the Asian countries. Say for instance, ARF is regional construction, which brings all great powers together in the region. Further, ASEAN has a different background of regional cooperation by weak states of Southeast Asian countries. On the same hand, SAARC, SCO, BRICS are different regional organizations led to the regionalization process in the Asian order.

In line of this, Brahma Chellaney (2018) inspected that the Indo-Pacific region is a concert of Indo-Pacific democracies notably after declaration of the concept of “free and open Indo-Pacific” by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Therefore, he admired Japanese engagement in the region especially in the SCS to counter the Chinese dominance over the maritime claims. He also inspected that Japan, India Indonesia and Australia came together to construct the free and open vision for the Indo-Pacific region. Japan and India both have combined and cooperative engagement with third world countries in the free and open Indo-Pacific region. To this extend, India-Japan-US Malabar naval exercises are also one of the significant component to defend the freedom of navigation and trade activities in the Indo-Pacific region. However, in this process Brahma Chellaney (2018) further the critically examined the free and open Indo-Pacific region. He scrutinized that Indo-Pacific strategy facing challenges due to unclear vision to deal with the SCS dispute, Trump administration uncertainty and its isolationism and lack of balance strategy among the quad countries. Therefore, enhancing new regional security architecture is more acknowledged and debatable construct in the Indo-Pacific littoral countries.

2. 3 Indian Perspective

The Indo- Pacific region is one of the dynamic regions in the 21st century. The region is facing the new paradigm shift towards the Trans-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific region from the last two decades. India has a distinctive maritime security concern in

the region due to its geostrategic, economic and geopolitical links in the region. Therefore, India has its different perspective toward the new security architecture in the region. However, there are many international scholars such as Kanti Bajpai (2012), Rajesh Rajagopalan and Varun Sahni (2008), G.V.C. Naidu (2012), David Scott (2012), Arvind Kumar (2014), Priya Chacko (2014), C. Raja Mohan (2012), Robert D. Kaplan, (2014) who discussed on India's regional and extra-regional security perspective in the region. In this process, P. V. Rao (2013) examined that India is improving its naval capabilities not only in the IOR but also in its beyond.

He legitimized that Indian navy is currently not just an influential force to secure India's maritime interests but beyond it also carries the goodwill gesture for surrounding neighboring countries in the region. He draws the argument that the Indian Maritime Doctrine 2004; Indian maritime strategy 2007; Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009 is the documented evidence to explore the Indian Navy vision and policy-framework to counter the maritime threats in the IOR. Further, in support of this, G. Ram Reddy discloses that maritime security also concerned with India's national security and its sovereignty issues. He separated India's traditional and non-traditional security issues in the greater IOR. Therefore, maritime dimension of Indian foreign policy cannot ignore like past regimes.

Further, in line of this, David Brewster (2010) also supported India's greater maritime strategy in the IOR. It has great power aspiration and maritime competition with China. Therefore, it is developing the infrastructural development around the Strait of Malacca, Persian Gulf and littoral parts of South African continent. He also focused India's key security relationships and Sino-India strategic rivalry in the greater IOR. However, Rajesh Rajagopalan and Varun Sahni (2008) have given the balancing line of thought that Indian policymakers should rebalance the security framework and deal the US and China within equal approach. Further, to support this argument, Kanti Bajpai (2012) has also suggested that India should attentive to balance the economic and defense framework among the US and China in the region.

However, Barry Buzan (2013) also supported the fact that the US and China's geostrategic alteration within Southeast region is concerning issue in the future of East Asian security developments. Further, Jabin T. Jacob (2012) also examined the

views that the US active involvement in the Asia-Pacific region and China's global emergence are addressing the new security dynamics in the region. However, India has its own geostrategic importance behind the new Asian security construction. The two countries could not decide the enactment of ideas on other parts of the world. Therefore, India wants to comprehend and moderate regional architecture, which include the great diversity of the entire Asian region. It has the vision to construct the democratic security architecture in the entire Asian region. Moreover, Walter C. Ladwig (2009) also focused India's emerging engagement with Southeast Asian nations. He examines that India is a central power to maintain the balance of power along with the US, China, and Japan in the region.

To understand India's policy landscape towards the regional cooperation G.V.C. Naidu (2012) highlighted the significance of India's 'Look East Policy' in the defense and strategic point of view. He supports India's historical background and examines that Southeast Nations look towards India as a power that could play a balancing role in the region. Therefore, the convergence of maritime security interests between India and Southeast Asian nations was the beginning of new strategic cooperation. Sanjay Singh (2014) also supported the further argument that the consideration on Indo- Pacific region shows India's significant achievement of its 'Look East Policy' and its geostrategic proximity in the Asia- Pacific region. India's policymakers are trying to create regional security arrangements to address the traditional and non- traditional security challenges in the region. The term Indo-Pacific is recognition of India's geo-strategic and geopolitical strengths in the Indian Ocean as well as Pacific-Ocean. Therefore, India is exploring its bilateral and multilateral engagement with ASEAN countries from last some decades. David Scott (2012) also highlighted India's geostrategic, geo-economic position in the Indo-Pacific region. He inspected that India's Indo-Pacific strategy is combined discourse of its 'look south' and 'look east' policies in the region. Further I. P. Khosla (2012) also supported the common conscience between India and Southeast Asian countries about their common culture, religion and civilizational linkage in the region. Both, India and ASEAN countries are facing common threats from terrorism, sea piracy and narco-terrorism in the region. He also highlighted the importance of defence and the

strategic relation between India and Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, it is essential that both India and ASEAN countries increase their strategic proximity to establish the comprehensive strategic security architecture. In this context, Robert D. Kaplan, (2014) also examined the historical, cultural and religious anxiety of the Champa⁴ empire with surrounding kingdoms. He described the early presence of India's ancient empires and their historical and cultural influence by comparing the Cham monuments with Khmer empire sculptures in the twelfth century. He reinforced India's historical presence notably around the SCS, led to the new economic and strategic possibilities among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries.

Moreover, Priya Chacko (2014) expanded the concept of Indo-Pacific to understand the change and continuity in Indian foreign policy after acknowledging this term in the foreign policy discourse. She prolonged the idea of NAM with New Delhi's new pivot towards the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, Dan McDaniel (2012) examined the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the Indian and Pacific oceans. The Indian Ocean has four major maritime highways to fulfill the demand for energy sources for depended economies. Almost, 80 percent of Chinese, 68 percent Indian and 25 percent of the US ships are carrying oil in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, India has its geostrategic, economic and security concerns due to its geostrategic position in the region.

Further, Anurag G. Thapliyal (2016) also examined India's efforts for the multilateral security architecture in the broader Indo-Pacific region. He highlights India's engagement with regional groups such as SAARC, ASEAN, ARF, IORA etc., He also pointed that the concept security has new holistic commencement due to new security collaboration among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. The traditional and non-traditional security challenges bring most of the littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region ever close. It is creating a different type of regional mechanism in the region. Arndt Michael (2013) has examined that how India has shifted its foreign policy trends toward regional cooperation during the end of the Cold-War period. In this background, India extended its engagement beyond the South Asia. It is a

⁴ Champa Empire was a collection of independent cham politics around the coast of present Central and Southern Vietnam. It called in Sanskrit '*nagara Campa*' and '*Cham Pa*' in Vietnamese.

founder member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (here-in-after IOR- ARC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (here-in-after BIMSTEC), the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (here-in-after MGC). Therefore, it shows that India has a will to make strong regional cooperation and security architecture in the region.

Andrew C. Winner also supports that India has transnational security concerns in the Indian Ocean region. He highlights India's trade move through the Strait of Malacca and across the Indian Ocean region. On the same hand, he stressed on other countries, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nation's maritime interests and their recent shift towards this particular region. Dhruvajyoti Bhattacharjee (2017) also supported the fact that India has political, diplomatic, defence and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. He examines that the first phase of India's (here-in-after LEP) 'Look East Policy' was to increase the political, diplomatic and people-to-people connectivity in the region.

The second phase of Indian policy was to strengthening the economic, defense and security cooperation with other nations of the region such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea etc. Mainly, the third phase of India's LEP was to increase the geographical proximity with these countries and increase the regional and sub-regional cooperation in trade and commercial activities. He examines that currently, India has entered into the fourth phase of LEP that was upgraded as (here-in-after AEP) 'Act East Policy' during the India-ASEAN Summit in November 2014. In favor of this, Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has announced that the government has the plan to draft the five-year action plan to increase the connectivity and cooperation in diverse areas in the region.

In addition to this Prime Minister has also advocated India 'Look East' and 'Link West Policy' to increase the broader conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific region. Further, Manish Chand (2014) also assessed that India has upgraded its policy as an 'Act East Policy' (here-in-after AEP) is around strengthening the three Cs (Commerce, Culture and Connectivity) policies to increase the economic, cultural and land connectivity with the ASEAN countries. He examined that completion of the

Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo highway project will link the India-Myanmar-Thailand multifaceted ties in the region. The new Indian government has committed to fulfill the goal of regional integration through these three pillars.

Ashok Sajjanhar (2016) also supported India's 'Act East Policy' vision to strengthening its geostrategic and defence proximity with ASEAN countries. He examines that India's AEP and the US Asia Pivot Policy are strengthening the Indo-Pacific security framework for contending the Chinese assertiveness in the region. Further, in line of this, Gurpreet S Khurana (2007) examined that Indo-Pacific region is 'maritime lifeline' for India due to its more dependency on maritime routes for fulfill its energy hunger through commercial and trade activities. He also revealed that Indo-Japan relations also depend on their maritime cooperation in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

On the other hand, C. Raja Mohan (2012) suggested that India should resolve traditional or non-traditional issues with China. Both should start the bilateral maritime security dialogue that would allow an open discussion on the each other national and security interests in the IOR. He also examines that Chinese assertiveness around the IOR has created the security dilemma for India that how India deal with Beijing in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, there is a challenge for Indian security in the region that how India deal with Beijing within new institutional frameworks in the region. He also suspicious about the India that new institutional framework may lead to Indian security interests or create the trouble for its strategic autonomous policies in the region. Further, Colin Geraghty (2012) also supported that India is an independent-minded actor in the Indian-Ocean region. The new security framework in the region can affect its security in the Indian Ocean region. However, on the other hand, Arvind Kumar (2014) inspected the challenges behind the creation of Indo-Pacific security architecture in the region. Currently, there is a convergence of maritime security interests between India and ASEAN countries due to China's accusation in the SCS. There is a challenge related to acceptance of Indo-Pacific term from the Chinese side. Beijing is also not comfortable with the emerging security architecture in the region. However, India and ASEAN countries have different policy

choices to increase their geo-strategic and defence proximity to build the new security architecture in the region. Therefore, India has strong security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in the Indian Ocean region.

2.4 Critical Analysis: The above literature has focused on the Indian and Pacific-Oceans as a different security frameworks during the Cold-War period. It has focused on the diverse security complexes in the South and Southeast Asian nations. However, the security frameworks of the Indo-Pacific region built by the US and former USSR in the cold-war period. The literature has focused on the regional security architecture in the South and Southeast Asian region within the different institutional frameworks. However, due to China's assertiveness has shifted the geostrategic, economic and maritime security paradigm of the region. There are some countries in the region, which have aligned in such fields as trade, commerce, defence, and maritime security interests.

The study has largely ignored due to new structural dynamic changes in the region. It has also not focused on the regional powers emergence and their extra-regional bid in the Indo-Pacific region. However, literature completely missed the evolution of the Indo-Pacific region as an evolving Institutional mechanism in the region. The literature has completely missed the background of the new strategic security framework in the region and India's role as a central power in the emerging security architecture. The literature has also missed the impacts of emerging security architecture in the Indian security, especially in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, a study has upcoming relevance due to its contemporary nature to understand the changing institutional mechanism in the Indo-Pacific region. The study is going to contribute the conceptual clearness about emerging security architecture in the region and help to understand the perspectives of Indian foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region.

Chapter- 3

Emerging Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region: An Analysis through Existing Paradigm

During the Cold-War period, the history of the Indo-Pacific region constructed around the rivalry of two superpowers the US and the former USSR. Hence, due to ideological war between two major entities the world politics has divided in the bipolar movement. The entire Asian continent confronted the security coercions due to power politics between two superpowers. South Asia, North East Asia, and South East Asian region were the core center of attractions for both superpowers (Bull, 1977; Kumar, 2015). However, there was no construction of the concept such as the Indo-Pacific Region (here-in-after IPR) due to no reference strategy about common regionalism process. The most of the countries of this region were newly independent from colonial rulers and fashioned to join the Non-Alignment Movement (here-in-after NAM)⁵ to form the new identity of the third-world countries. The building of the NAM occurred after the Bandung conference in Indonesia on 1955, which six countries participated from the African continent, and rest twenty-three from the Asian continent. Later, the official beginning of the NAM was on track from the Belgrade Summit on 1961, to balance the bipolar demarcation of the world order (Rauch, 2008).

These semi-periphery countries were reliant on the core or developed countries due to lack of technological and infrastructural developments among these countries. Hence, both superpowers tried to subjugate the NAM countries by political and ideological propaganda. Both superpowers have fascinated to create the potent ideological milieu around these countries to brand the ideological hegemony in the world politics. The US has strengthened its position in the Asian security arrangements through its multilateral approach. It signed the major treaties to increase its geostrategic proximity with other part of the world. Firstly, the US signed the CENTO or Baghdad Pact Organization (here-in-after BPO) to increase the mutual security arrangements with oil producing countries such as Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and

⁵ NAM is a group of Third- World countries that do not aligned with or against any superpowers during the Cold-War. The most of states of this group belong with third World Countries.

Pakistan to counter the Soviet influence in these countries. However, later, it dissolved due to continuing withdrawal by Iraq in 1959 and Iran in 1979. Further, the second major treaty occurred among the Southeast Asian nations and the US, called South East Asian Treaty Origination (here-in-after SEATO) signed on September 1954 in the Philippines. The main purpose of this treaty was to shrink the communist influence in the Southeast Asian region. It has failed at the 30 June 1977, due to internal conflict and disputes among the member states to use the SEATO military in the region. However, it has strengthen the US geostrategic and geopolitical manifestation as a major actor in the Southeast Asian security (Lemmons, 2012). Further, the other major treaty ANZUS was also signed in 1951. It was the pro-active step by the US to intensify its geostrategic and security commitment towards the Asia-Pacific region.

On the other hand, former USSR has strengthened its geostrategic proximity with the Eastern and Central European countries through the treaty of Warsaw Pact in 1955. The leading purpose of this pact was to counter the US lead North Atlantic Treaty Organization (here-in-after NATO) influence in the communist countries. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs led to superpowers individual ideological and military ambitions in the bipolar world order. The Cold-War rivalry between two superpowers also influenced the security of the littoral states of the IOR. However, the UN General Assembly has declared the IOR “for all time as a zone of peace” (Vivekanandan, 1981). Hence, the shrinking space of the British geostrategic appearance has given the opportunity for the US to fill the power Vacuum in the region.

The US has developed the military Airbase in Diego Garcia to check over the Soviet presence in the Middle East and IOR. Even, it has played a significant role later in the US military missions such as Gulf-War and ‘War against Terror’ policy in Afghanistan (Parmar, 2014). The US construction and military advancement of the Diego Garcia Island, Barbara in Somalia to Mombasa and Kenya pushed the Soviet Union to respond the US military presence in the Red Sea through Aden and Dahlak Archipelago. It considered the US presence in the IOR as a threat due to its dependency over the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. To confront these

developments, the USSR invaded in Afghanistan in 1979 to daring the US geostrategic manifestation in the region (Lee, 2013). Thus, it was enlarged the tension between two superpowers changed the notion that the Indian Ocean Region is all time zone of peace. The South China Sea dispute and Persian Gulf instability also affected the commercial and maritime sea routes security in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. On the other hand, Soviet Union responded to the US geostrategic arrival with several security alignments in the region. It tilted toward the South Asian region and signed the 'Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation' in August 1971 with India. India was comfortable to sign the treaty and increase its quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union due to the US closeness with China and treating Pakistan as a major Non-NATO ally. Thus, it pushed both countries to strengthen their commercial, military and security alliance to counter the US geostrategic appearance in the region. India got advance military and naval technology from the Soviet Union to toughening its maritime security of coastal boundaries.

The Soviet Union has found India as a permanent ally, which has huge market opportunities to export its weapons and other goods in the region. Nevertheless, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, remain Russia is following the same legacy of bilateral strategic relations. Therefore, both superpowers tried to take advantage of their ideological background and influenced the littoral countries of the IOR. Therefore, due to these ruthless purposes several countries of this region such as India, Sri Lanka Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia have joined the NAM for showing the neutrality in bipolar world order.

Meanwhile, with the waves of regionalism the Southeast Asian countries have established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (here-in-after ASEAN) in August 1967 to increase the collective efforts for cultural, commercial and regional integration in the region. Similarly, South Asian countries also established the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (here-in-after SAARC) in December 1985 to increase the regional cooperation among the South Asian countries to diminish the influence of superpower rivalry in the bipolar world order. However, after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union the US emerged as the sole power under

the uni-multipolar⁶ world order. It tried to maintain its domination in the international affairs through increasing its multilateral rendezvous with regional and lesser regional powers in the South Asia region. It increased its geostrategic proximity with Pakistan to balance the Indian emergence in the region (Huntington, 2004). Therefore, during the Cold-War period, the construction of the South Asian security dissimilar from the Southeast Asian region such as Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver have outlined the regional security paradigm in the different regional or sub-regional security complexes. During the Cold-War period, the security of the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions were under the influence of both superpowers.

Both the US and Russia (former the Soviet Union) remain a deciding players to lead the security mechanism of the region. However, over the last two decades, China is trying to replace Russia through backing its maritime influx in the SCS and its more determined project Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt (here-in-after MSREB). Beijing is also more antagonistic due to the US naval port development and appearance of military troops in the SCS. Therefore, it is also responding the US strategic appearance by developing the naval ports and infrastructural developments around the greater Indian Ocean region. Further, it is also strengthening its naval capabilities and aircraft carriers to secure its maritime interests in the region. Thus, the beginning of the 21st century shifted the attraction of great powers towards the Asian continent, which two major powers front of foremost enmity especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

In this background, this chapter is fundamental chapter of the entire research, which addressed the first hypothesis of the research to find out the geostrategic and geopolitical components, which is responsible for enhancing new regional security construction in the Indo-Pacific region. The chapter also achieved the first objective of the research, which provides the foundation to entire study. It has also investigated the convergence and divergence factors behind the construction of the enhancing new regional security architecture in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific region.

⁶ Uni- Multipolar World Order means that when World politics dominated by one superpower and others major powers.

3.1 Indo-Pacific Region: Exploring Historical Linkages

The geostrategic and geopolitical development of any region is determined by historical, cultural and commercial connectivity of any geographical regions in the world. As for instance, South Asia (Indian sub-continent), 'Southeast Asia' and 'Western Europe' one of the suitable examples of collective regional integration in the world. These regions are not defining just cartographic areas, connected with various entities such as geographical, economic, cultural, geostrategic and on geopolitical issues. As a new geopolitical and geostrategic construction, the Indo-Pacific region is also heavily debatable among the scholars and policymakers.

The Indian Ocean region is one of the suitable instances of the historical people movement from the Indus Valley civilization to another part of the world. The ancient Egypt had begun its commercial activities in the Red Sea and East African coastal areas around 5000 years ago. Same as Mesopotamians civilization also commercially interlinked with Southern Arabia and Indus Valley civilization. It was not limited only around the commercial activities but also included other influential aspects such as socio-cultural interchange of ideas and values among the different civilizations. Furthermore, in the middle part of India the King Ashoka the grandson of Chandragupta expended the Maurya Empire around the Hindu Kush Mountain to Bay of Bengal. The boundaries of the Maurya Empire extended around the Taxila in the North West; Suvarnagiri touched with the Southern India and Eastern part shared the Kalinga (Odisha) to the Bay of Bengal region. It was the first empire in the Indian history, which established itself as a first political entity of Indian small states.

It was the extraordinary achievement by early Indian history to increase the transport and communications around the Indian sub-continent. The Kautilya advisor of Chandragupta wrote a classical political work '*Arthashastra*'⁷ elaborated the role of King and its relationship with various surrounding nation-states (Kaplan, 2012). Therefore, the Maurya Empire has extended the cultural and economic link around Afghanistan and other surrounding small empires. The western shore of the Indian

⁷ The '*Arthashastra*' is ancient Indian textbook of Statecraft & economy written by Kautilya or Vishnugupta.

Ocean region was the economic lifeline of the region due to maritime commercial relation with the Middle East and Iranian empires. There was the same significance of the IOR due to people movement away from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean littoral. The great Alexander also fortified this geographical contiguity and extended Greek involvement around the Hindu Kush Mountains. The Greek and Arabian traders have expanded their maritime association from the Red Sea to the Indian sub-continent (McPherson, 1984). Therefore, Greek, Roman and the Middle East Empires connected with the Indian sub-Continent, not only even in the commercial purposes but also shared the socio-cultural and civilizational values. Similarly, the eastern shore of the IOR also equally interlinked with Malay World. The various present states of India such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Gujarat, Odisha and West Bengal are still carrying the commercial and cultural legacy with Southeast Asian countries.

The teaching of Buddhist and Hinduism has remained importance to create the civilizational links among Indian sub-continent and Southeast Asian countries. There are still major examples of existing cultural linkage with South East Asian countries such as construction of world largest monument complex Angkor Wat temple (Image no. 3.1) in Cambodia in the 12th century. It was built by Khmer King Suryavarman which shown the architect of Khmer Art and its cultural influence in the region (Kaplan, 2014). Currently, the temple is a symbol of Cambodia's National pride and attraction for millions of a tourist in the region. The Port of the Kra-isthmus is another remarkable instance to cognize the Indian cultural influence in the Malay and Southeast Asian region. There were such empires in the Southeast Asian region, which inclined toward associations with Indian civilization like the Champa Empire in South Vietnam and Sri Vijay and Sailendras in Indonesia (Sakhuja & Khurana, 2016; Kaplan, 2014).

The history of Malay World interlinked by cultural and commercial activities of the great Hindu and Buddhist empires. Further, there are noteworthy examples of Buddhist teaching such Ananda Temple situated in Bagan in Burma which was built by King Kyanzittha of the Pagan Dynasty in 1105 Anna Domini (here-in-after A. D.). Therefore, the Buddhist and Hindu teachings was increased its influence among the common people of the Malay World.

Image: - 3.1 Angkor Wat Vishnu Temple in Cambodia




Source:http://www.trekearth.com/gallery/Asia/Cambodia/West/Siem_Reab/Angkor_Wat/photo606277.htm

Image: - 3. 2 Hindu Temple in the East Java



Source: McPherson, Kenneth. (1984). *Processes of Cultural Interchange in the Indian Ocean Region: An Historical Perspective. The Great Circle*, 6 (2), 78-92.

Image: - 3.3 Buddhist Temple in Burma (Myanmar)



Source: McPherson, K. (1984). Processes of Cultural Interchange in the Indian Ocean Region: An Historical Perspective. *The Great Circle*, 6 (2), 78-92.

Nonetheless, the beginning of the Islamic teaching and invasion by Islamic empires in all over the world in the 7th A. D. was also influenced the cultural and religious inheritance of these countries, marks the deep inclinations toward Islam and Islamic teaching among people of Malay World. However, the Vijayanagar Empire resisted the Muslim invaders from Northern India, but opened a door for them to maritime commercial activities in the Indian Ocean maritime region. It provided the opportunities for Muslim merchants to extend their Islamic teaching in the eastward of the IOR. Subsequently, the Muslim merchants were increased their settlement from the Middle East, Tamil Nadu, and Sri Lanka to Sumatra and Java Islands.

However, later in the fifteen century Indian and Arab Muslim have created a distinct identity as independent states in the Malay World. Hence, the Malay World influenced by Islamic merchants and traders remained assimilate with the Buddhist and Hindu teachings along with the Islamic teaching in the region (McPherson, 1984). Therefore, the religion played a sentimental role to decide the historical, commercial and cultural role among these states. In the Indian Ocean region, the religion has

played the crucial role to decide the historical construction of this particular region. Hence, in the words of Auguste Toussaint, the differential level of the Ocean history can understand in the two levels such as 'Pre-Gaman' and 'Post-Gaman' period. The maritime tip around the Southern Africa by Vasco da Gama in 1498 was a basic dividing line of the Ocean history of the IOR. First, trade and cultural expansions such as by the Middle East, Persian, Roman and Greek empires around the African and Indian sub-continent characterized the early Gaman period history.

Second, the Post-Gaman period expanded the western powers hegemony and their maritime competition in the Indian Ocean region. The Portuguese has secured the most prominent position in the Indian Ocean region under the leadership of second Portuguese Alfonso d' Albusquerque who was the main architect of Lisbon's empire in the Indian Ocean region. He has executed the geostrategic plan to capturing the Islands and littoral states for shipping and trade activities. Say, for instance, he has established a Military station on Ceylon, increase dominancy on Malacca and Hormuz Spice Islands and made Goa as a Portuguese headquarters.

The Portuguese empire based on maritime power, which controlled Mozambique and Mombasa on the eastern coast of Africa and the Persian Gulf. However, the Dutch has captured the Lisbon market and chose Java as a first operational archipelago for a principal base for its military operations. The Dutch and British have determined towards several alliances with the indigenous empire to replace the Portuguese dominance around the Arabian Sea, Persian Sea, East Africa, Malacca, Sri Lanka, and several Indonesian islands filled the geostrategic vacuum in the region (McPherson, 1981). Later, the British East India Company has make stronghold on the IOR after replacing Dutch and French in the region. British influenced the Malay World by increasing their geostrategic manifestation in Singapore in 1819. On the other hand, British have also enlarged their grip on the Suez Canal in 1839. Meanwhile, British Empire runs nearby Somaliland to make assured its strategic presence in the African coastal belt (Dowdy & Trood, 1983). Gradually, the British Empire has integrated the Indian sub-continent as a political entity in the region. It also followed the Alfred T. Mahan legacy of 'Command of Sea' which also increase the geostrategic importance of the IOR. Therefore, the British

East India Company explored its geostrategic presence nearby the central and Eastern part of the Indian Ocean to control over the islands of the IOR. Therefore, since the 19th century, the British Navel expansion was impetus the destiny of maritime routes in the IOR. During the World-War-II, the great Japanese Empire was challenged the British naval hegemony in the region. However, since the British withdrawal from India on 15 August 1947, some littoral states got independence and some were in the process of independent nation-state. Therefore, the US has filled the power vacuum after withdrawal of the British Empire from the IOR (Majeed, 1986). Later, during the Cold-War period the US has played the major role to define the security mechanism in the Indian Ocean region. It also increased its alignment with Pakistan as a major Non-NATO ally and developed the strategic Diego Garcia strategic port in the IOR.

Since, the disintegration of the former USSR, China has replaced Russia in the Indo-Pacific region. However, Russia has remained crucial role to shape the security mechanism of the region. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver called such circumstances are fluctuating the way of the regional integration toward the Asian Super Complex (herein after ASC) due to China's unfavorable behavior to solve the maritime disputes with littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region. It created the regional security complexities among not only the ASEAN countries but also other surrounding countries Such as Northeast and South Asian countries. Hence, there are multidimensional factors such as historical, cultural, commercial, strategic and maritime security issues are driving force behind the construction of the Indo-Pacific regional security collaboration among these countries.

3.2 Indo-Pacific Region: Geostrategic and Geopolitical Importance

The scrutiny of the existing historical paradigms is helpful to understand the contemporary geostrategic and geopolitical issues in the Indo-Pacific region. The existing security patterns always play a very decisive role to understand the surviving nature of states and their behavior to achieve geostrategic and geopolitical interests. The historical and geographical linkage among the nations is also play a very crucial role to construct the new security architecture in any part of the world. While, the geographical antiquity in any region of the world is increase the regional

juxtapositions as the world hot spots due to their topography, climate, land and sea connectivity among the nation-states. So, the levels of the present major world crisis in such regions Eurasia, Europe, Africa, Middle East, and Indian sub-continent can understand based on geography and its retaliation. To understand the contemporary conflicts and new geostrategic contiguity among the states it is necessary to measure the level of geographical revenge and physical inevitabilities of nation-states in the world politics. Likewise, the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region is one of the major geographical and Political contiguity among the Indian and Pacific Ocean countries to secure their maritime security interests.

The region is the theatre of great game politics due to new geostrategic and geopolitical engagements among the major and regional powers in the region. There were two major powers such as USSR considered as land power and the US as a sea power. Say for instance, during the Cold-War period both superpowers focused on their sea connectivity and their maritime security interests in the region. However, the former USSR has emerged as a land power and the US has followed the sea power notion. Currently, same as both India and China are also focusing on the same type of notion to fulfill their geostrategic interests through the land as well as sea routes in the Asian continent. Currently, China's proposal of OBOR to increase the port development around the circle of the Indo-Pacific region has also shown its geostrategic commitment to emerging sea power in the world politics.

In this contrast, India has also adopted the new maritime strategy to secure its maritime interests by adopting the inclusive approach with the US, Japan, Australia, and other ASEAN alliances to overstretch its maritime security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The sea is the common destiny for both India-China in the Indo-Pacific region. Both India and Chinese navies are trying to extend their sphere of influence nearby strategic and maritime commercial sea routes, jeopardize the situations towards the new maritime security calculations (Mohan, 2012). Therefore, the impression of strategic schools of thoughts is more debatable among the scholars of international relations and strategic community to understand new strategic and security calculations in the region. There are three major traditional and modern schools of strategic thoughts in the international relations studies. The first traditional

school of strategic thoughts was dominated by the teaching of Carl Von Clausewitz, which called as the continental school of strategic thoughts. Second, the traditional school of strategic thought followed the Alfred Thayer Mahan's legacy as a maritime or command of the sea. The third school established by Italian thinker Giulio Douhet called as an aeronautical school of strategic thoughts. Furthermore, the modern school of strategic thoughts such as astronautical special operations and unifying school of thoughts (Collins, 2002). French Vice-Admiral Raoul Castex (1878-1968) and German Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener (1875-1956) established the continental school of the naval strategy in the 19th century.

The purpose of the continental school of thought is to fortify the land power and destroy the enemies' strength to help of sea and air powers. The ultimate aim of the continental school of strategy is to defeat the opponents through land warfare strategy (Evens, 2004). The school considered the land is a core part of conflicts among nation-states rather than control over air and maritime lines of the communication. Therefore, the notion of the land power is around the land warfare tactics and strategies to resist the enemy states. Meanwhile, Alfred T. Mahan beginning of the 20th century has explored the notion of maritime or command of sea strategic school of thought, which focused on geostrategic objectives rather than traditional and tactical victories. He believes that the maritime powers need to command at sea through tactical and strategic winning efforts rather than competitions with its contests (Mahan, 2010).

The US polices has inspired by the Mahan's notion of sea power, it enlarged its navel accessibility to increase the maritime communication lines to strengthen its geostrategic position in the world politics. Presently, India is also following the same maritime notion to increase its geostrategic and geopolitical motivations in the Indo-Pacific region. To establish itself as an emerging maritime sea power India is focusing on modernization of the Indian navy. It is focusing on Alfred T. Mahan's prediction on real pragmatic ground that "country that capture the Indian Ocean region will lead the Asian continent". Therefore, to strengthen it's maritime position it has impetus towards the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. New Delhi is also increasing its geostrategic proximity with its eastern and western neighbors, through expanding its

horizontal connectivity in contrast with China's vertical pivot toward the Indo-Pacific region (Kaplan, 2010). Therefore, the maritime or command of sea strategic school of thought is core existing Paradigm to understand the geostrategic positions of major or regional powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Mahan's paradigm is also backing students of international relations to understand the notion of sea power to achieve their maritime goals. Although the command of the sea does not mean to occupy any territory for the land warfare strategies, it is an ability to move the maritime interests without any external influence (Corbett, 1911). Therefore, command of sea powers has basic purposes to prevent the geostrategic and geopolitical threats around the maritime routes and boundaries to secure their maritime security interests.

On the other hand, land power notion is remain significance due to the trans-continental railway and road connectivity in the Eurasian region. The expansion of Russian (former USSR) railways from its Western part of Wirballen to Vladivostok eastern belt was the best example of the land power, which holds the geostrategic position in the central part of the Euro-Asian region. Russia has also replaced the Mongol Empire and shifted toward the nearest regions such as Scandinavia, Poland, Turkey, India, China and Persia to fulfilling its dreams as a central figure of the continental power. Russian occupation of Manchuria and British army appearance in South Africa was a significant example of the sea and land powers expansion in the world politics.

The Mahan Vs Mackinder's notion between sea and land powers turned eventually in the favor of continental power that challenged the hegemony of the British Empire (Mackinder, 1904). Therefore, the full development of the modern railway was strengthened Russian geostrategic position as a continental power. The heartland theory has separated the natural seats of world powers into three major regions. (a). The pivotal area or called as the heartland region, which Russia and less than decade Germany has over dominance through the construction of railway and transportation in the entire Euro-Asian region. (b). Outer Crescent region, which covered the Oceanic region such as the North American continent, South American continent, and Oceania and the South of African Saharan region. (c). Inner crescent region, which covered both partially continental and Oceanic area of the earth. It

includes the European coastal land, Asiatic Monsoon land, and Arabian Middle-Eastern desert land (Kruszewski, 1954). Mackinder has replaced the notion of land and sea powers depiction to understand the continental politics under different geostrategic investigation. He has feared about future alliance of two continental powers such as the Western European land power Germany and Eurasian dominant power Russia. Mackinder has identified this major potential threat to Great Britain, which was later counter by the British Empire to increase fleet-building empire over the Caspian and Black Sea (Venier, 2004). During the Second-World-War, Hitler also tried to occupy the heartland region, which was uncompleted due to strong mutilation by the Russian Red Army.

The heartland region was one of the theatre of major power politics during the Second -World-War. However, later Suez Canal has opened the opportunities to sea powers such as the Great Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan, and the United States those who belong to outer and insular cores of the earth. The pivotal area of the heartland region is significant not only in the Second World War, but remain contains the geostrategic importance for upcoming regional powers. Say for instance, to understand the present liable approach by inner crescent countries such as India, China, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are remain following both sea and land powers notion in the region. India has launched its “Connect Central Asia” policy and developing Chabahar port in Iran to increase its horizontal geostrategic position among the Central Asian republics.


On the other hand, China is also snowballing its geostrategic appearance in the Central Asian Republics through constructing the railway and transport communication in the region. It has also launched its ambitious project OBOR as a part of its grand strategy to increase its geostrategic appearance in the heartland region. Eventually, it has a potential to future continental power due to land connectivity with central Asian republics. Therefore, Chinese policymaker has focused both lands as well as sea power conception to increase geostrategic and geopolitical position in the world politics. On the other hand, Russian reemergence after the disintegration of the former USSR has filled its geostrategic and geopolitical

gap among the central Asian countries. Russia has adopted the vertical approach towards the heartland region to link itself with sea routes in the inner crescent region. It has tough geostrategic and geopolitical proximity with inner crescent countries such as India, China, Iran and now Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the heartland theory has given us clear understanding not about the pivotal region but also included the geostrategic importance of the inner crescent region.

There is dissimilar view over Mackinder theory of Heartland by several geostrategic and security analysts. Say for instance, Nicholas H. Spykman proclaimed that Mackinder demarcated a desert region of Africa as a Continental region which inaccessible to other sea powers. Further, there is a contradiction between the Spykman and Strausz-Hupe views about the Mackinder boldness about the Continental power Russia. Whereby, spykman showed his annoyance about Britain and Russia was the main essence of international relations (Dugan, 1962). Moreover, Spykman also disagrees with Mackinder greater pivotal region and his future classification over it. Spykman asserted that the historical pivotal region was Mackinder's inner crescent region; not pivotal region, thereby he called it as a Rimland region. He combined the command of sea idea of Alfred T. Mahan and Mackinder's notion of the Continental power thereby he focused on the combined representation of the Rimland region in the world politics.

The region is accessible through sea routes, whereby oil and natural resources availability more than comparable to the Mackinder heartland region. In fact, Spykman has understood the significance of the Rimland region due to its sea connectivity with three major continental Islands such as Africa, Eurasia, and Asian region. He has expected the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the Rimland region in the upcoming bipolar world order. Therefore, he was familiar with the geostrategic role of the Rimland region and predicted, "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world" (Spykman, 1944). The map 3.1 is showing the Spykman's Rimland region.

Map: - 3. 1 Spykman Rimland Thesis



Source: Spykman "Geography of peace (1944)".

Further, he has modified the Mackinder idea of the pivotal region and classified Rimland region as a main historical pivotal region in place of heartland region. Spykman has also recognized the significance of the emerging Asian century and the role of Inner crescent countries, especially China and India in the 21st century. He has accepted the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific region to decide the upcoming destiny of the Asian continent. In fact, his Rimland thesis has represented the wider Indo-Pacific region whereby a new power landscape occurred during the Cold-War period. Thereby, in the current circumstances the Indo-Pacific region is under the new regional security examination due to new power landscape from Trans-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific region. The existing paradigm of Spykman Rimland thesis is one of the suitable reflections to understand the geostrategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region. The region is the fulcrum of the attraction for great and rising powers due to available maritime sea routes in the region. In fact, the

Spykman Rimland region is a representation of combine geostrategic importance of the three major Oceans such as Indian, Pacific and Mediterranean Seas. Presently, China is reviving the maritime sea routes through launching the OBOR initiative and India's geostrategic and geopolitical commitment toward the Indo-Pacific region is approving the Spykman prediction over a pivotal region.

Both India and China are inner crescent countries, which have the potential to lead the upcoming world order. Therefore, both emerging powers have committed to their notion of sea and land powers in the new world order. In fact, the external powers such as the US, Russia and EU have strong maritime dependency over the region. Notably, the US has still larger role to determine the regional security order in the region. It has considered the Indo-Pacific as a suitable term to linkage its maritime interests with India, Japan, Australia and its ASEAN alliances. Therefore, the US and its Pacific alliances understood the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of the Rimland region to achieve common maritime security interests.

3.3 Indo-Pacific Region and Existing Security Paradigms

The existing models of security studies have developed especially in the Cold-War period due to continue use of realist approaches to inspect the international affairs. The main contributors of this tradition were Hans Morgenthau, Thomas Schelling and Henry Kissinger etc. Thereby, the key focus to understand the international security studies is by adopting the interdisciplinary approaches such as geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic studies of international relations. The realistic pattern of the study was nearly around the national interests and security of the states within the realistic model. Later, there was non-traditional approaches has developed to understand the Asian security mechanism. There are different schools of security studies, which described the altered approaches to understand the level of the security studies. The classified schools of international security studies are such as, a). Paris School of Security Studies (b). Welsh or Frankfurt school of security studies (c). Copenhagen School of Security Studies, etc.

3.3.1 Paris School of Critical Security Study

The Paris School of critical security study is academic discipline in the field of security studies. The school has taken the motivation from the Michal Foucault and

Pierre Bourdieu works. The basic teaching of Michel Foucault's works has played a major role in deciding the key establishment of the Paris school of security studies. Foucault has examined the role of power and knowledge to control the society through the institutions. Similarly, the great socialist Bourdieu and his writing also influence the Paris school of security studies to understand the dynamics of power in the modern society. Thereby, further several academic thinkers such as Didier Bigo, Ayse Ceyhan, Anastassia Tsoukala and Elspeth Guild have associated with this school to understand the security studies in the post-modernist and post-structural frameworks. Didier Bigo was leading exponent of the Paris school of security studies whereby he elaborated the critical framework of the security studies in international relations. Therefore, the Paris school of security studies is a major exponent of the critical security studies in the international relations.

3.3.2 Welsh or Frankfurt School of Critical Security Studies

Further, the Welsh or Frankfurt school of critical security studies one of the major academic disciplines to understand the critical security studies in the international relation. The Welsh school also called emancipatory realism, whereby security studies linkages with critical theory insight from Frankfurt, Marxism and Gramscian writing of critical security studies. The Welsh school has also related to the theoretical framework of the construction of reality in the society and role of knowledge to examine the reality or truth in the society. The school has separated the exercise of power and security as two different frameworks in the international relations, whereby it can focus on the progressive emancipation of the society (Nunes, 2017). The main exponents of Welsh school of critical security studies were Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, those who considered the security as an associate with emancipation instead of the mechanism of any nation-state (Browning & Donald, 2011). The Welsh school of security studies has articulated the security studies around the individual and communities. The expansion of individualism and the global world has increased the possibilities of this critical school of security studies to understand the emerging world society in the new political order (Booth, 1991). The liberal conception of the word security has examined by international organisations such as the UN that increased the significance of critical security studies in


perspective of individual and civil society (Hynek & Chandler, 2013). Therefore, emancipation of the concept of security is basic approach of the Frankfurt school of critical security studies. Further, Herbert Marcuse, Louis Althusser, Kenneth Both and Richard Wyn Jones extended the emancipation tradition of critical security studies.

3.3.3 Copenhagen School of Security Studies

The third one is the Copenhagen school of security studies, whereby the core focuses on the social aspects of security studies. It is the academic disciplines, which originated from Barry Buzan's landmark work "*people, States and Fear, The National Security Problem in International Relation*" in 1983. The school has scrutinized the security studies within regional security complex approaches. The main theorists such as Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap De Wilde associated with the Copenhagen school of a security study. They defined the structure of international security studies under the three basic theoretical outlooks after a Post-Cold-War period, followed by such as neorealist, Globalist and regional theoretical perspectives. The neo-realist perspective of security was state-centric, whereby nation-state tried to maintain their national interests and security through traditional warfare tactics. It was confined around the narrow range of security conception in the bipolar world-order. However, in the globalist theorist perspective, the level of security can understand within different approaches such as transcultural, trans-economic and political range of international relations.

The Copenhagen school of security studies has agreed with the approach of Lake and Morgan whereby, the level of conflicts and cooperation determined by regional cooperation rather than depending on traditional and military warfare tactics. Buzan, Weaver and Wilde are the main exponent of the regional approach to understanding the structure of the international security studies. To explain the regional security framework in the Indo-Pacific region, Buzan has inspected the security structure of the region within the various classifications of regional security complexes. The Buzan has used the separate approach to understand the security arrangements of the Asian continent within altered regional security complexes such as Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Middle East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and North Asia, etc. (The map no. 3.2 is showing the Buzan's theory of RSC).

Map: - 3. 2 Buzan's Regional Security Complex Theory



Source: Buzan, B. & Ole Weaver. (2003). *Regions and Powers: the structure of International Security*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

The classification of these regions defined under different regional security complexes and sub-regional complexes due to internal or external demographic dynamics. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver both have modified the real definition of the RSC theory in their next famous work "*Regions and Powers: the structure of International Security*" in 2003. They defined the RSC theory as following words.

"A set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan & Weaver, 2003).

Therefore, the manifestation of the idea of RSC theory has defined within different regional parameters of the international security system. The Barry Buzan has classified the four basic classified levels to define the RSC in any region of the world. (1). The states and in their domestic generate vulnerabilities (2). State-to-state relations (3). One region's interaction with other neighboring regions. (4). Role of

external powers. These four basic parameters are convenient to understand the evolving new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. The new security architecture is also constructing by geostrategic and security alignments among the great and regional powers in the region. The region is within new geostrategic and security clustered due to fulcrum of such great powers, the US, China, Russia and EU along with regional powers likewise India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Indonesia.

The other fundamental reason behind this new regional security building is traditional and non-traditional security threats faced by littoral countries in the region. Nonetheless, more substantive reason behind this new regional construction is China's rapid military rise, and its unfavorable behavior to solve the major disputes with its neighboring countries such as Himalayan boundary dispute with India, Sankaku Island dispute with Japan and SCS disputes with four ASEAN countries. These unresolved conflicts has increased the insecurity among these countries is driving force behind the legitimize possibilities of the emerging regional security architecture in the region. Further, there are also such non-traditional security threats like narco-terrorism, human trafficking, climate change, water and food security issues vital components behind the growing possibilities of the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. Therefore, the four classified levels of Copenhagen School have supported the basic trends of the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture.

3.3.4 Revisiting Buzan's Theory of Regional Security Complex


Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver were realized the glimpses of emerging regional security architecture, when they have scrutinized the upcoming Chinese military rise, and its unfavorable attitude towards solving the SCS dispute with ASEAN Countries. During the Cold-War period, the Indo-Pacific region scrutinized within the three full-fledged regional security complexes like the Northeast, Southeast and South Asian RSCs. The regions were full of cultural diversity and geographical potentials within the appearance of great power rivalry in the region. The rivalry between superpowers has penetrated the security dynamics of the Northeast and Southeast Asian regions, embroiled toward the Cold-War theatre. However, the triumph of the communist party in China after the long civil war in 1950 has created

the new security dynamics in the Northeast, Southeast and South Asian regions (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). It has also increased the amalgamation of maritime security interests between the Southeast and Northeast Asian RSCs. Therefore, after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the vacuum of power has filled by China in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Southeast and Northeast Asian RSCs have faced the pivotal position towards the sub-complex units along with Australia, embroiled the combined formation of the East Asian RSC. Meanwhile, South Asia has maintained its geographical departure as a dissimilar RSC. Meanwhile the rapid rise of China has increased the more interregional security dynamics and built the atmosphere of China center Asian Super Complex (ASC). However, India within the South Asian RSC has also increased the more complex situation through breaking the bipolar security pattern in south Asia. It has increased its military investment to counter China's assertiveness rather than follow its traditional bipolar rivalry with Pakistan in the South Asian RSC (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). Therefore, these power dynamics is pushing the south Asian RSC towards the sub-complex unit or merge with East Asian RSC.

The recent reformation in the Indian foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific region especially after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came in the power has deepen India's geostrategic and diplomatic role in the region. New Delhi has increased its geostrategic and defense partnership with Japan, Australia, and ASEAN nations to convert the South Asian RSC in the sub-complex unit. Currently, the South Asian RSC is merging with the East Asian RSC, whereby India has most probabilities to play a very crucial role in this new regional security construction in the region. The waves of regionalism and globalization spread the huge opportunities even for other littoral countries of the region to move towards the economic, political, defense and security interdependence among each other. The map no. 3.3 is showing the Post-Cold-War scenario of RSC. On the other hand, military modernization by China's People Liberation Army (herein after PLA) has also increased the maritime security dilemma among the neighboring states such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and ASEAN countries.

Map: - 3. 3 Regional Security Complex in Asia Post-Cold-War



Source: Buzan, B. (2003). Security Architecture in Asia: the Interplay of Regional and Global Levels. *The Pacific Review*, 16(2), 143-173.

Therefore, enhancing strategic and defense alignment among the middle powers in the region especially in India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are pushing factors behind the construction of new regional security mechanism to balance the China-centric ASC in the region. Therefore, all littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region are moving towards the new regional

security constructions due to new security dynamics in the region. Similarly, the US is still a security provider in the existing East Asian RSC by finding the new geostrategic proximity with India in the IOR. In fact, the US has also acknowledged the term Indo-Pacific due to India's rise and its geostrategic involvement with other regional powers in the region.

3.3.5 Indo-Pacific Regional Security Complex (IP-RSC)

However, the Buzan has considered the rapid rise of China and its engagement with surrounding regions construct China centered approach in the region. However, after the fifteen year of his famous text (2003) the regional security formation is changing due to the rise of regional powers such as India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam in the region. Further, the institutional mechanism of ASEAN has also engaged with the strong commitment of regional peace and security in the region. It is playing the central role along with these regional powers to balance the China's rise.

The basic argument is behind the new regional security formation is partially assumed by Buzan, with China and its movement outside the world. However, presently India has broken its past hesitation by converting its 'Look East' policy in 'Act East Policy' within changing security formation in the region. It is intensifying its geostrategic and geopolitical influence by applying the horizontal approach, whereby it is responding to China's port developments around the circle of the Indo-Pacific region. It is also growing its geostrategic and geopolitical configuration with extra-regional powers, led to the construction of the new security regime. New Delhi has replaced the bipolar enmity in unipolar developments in comparison of Pakistan in the South Asian RSC.

Hence, it is the fact that recent security dynamics are pushing India to discontinue traditional RSC and move towards strong geostrategic and geopolitical alignment with East Asian RSC. India's geostrategic and geopolitical alignment with East Asian RSC is converting the South Asian region as a sub-complex division. Therefore, to reassessment over Buzan's cataloging of ASC is more complex due to the emergence of regional powers in the region. Thereby, the evolving new regional security construction may be the Indo-Pacific region, which fortified by littoral

countries of the region. Therefore, the regional security dynamics is responsible behind the construction of the Indo-Pacific Regional Security Complex (here-in-after IP-RSC) in the region. The future possibilities of enhancing IP-RSC can inspect through Mahan maritime doctrine and Spykman's Rimland thesis, whereby both predicted the geostrategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region in favor of the rising Asian century. Similarly, it is also fact that the IP-RSC would not only a China-centered, but it also reflects on the movement of surrounding regional powers and their extra-regional tactics. Thereby, these regional powers will balance emerging China with the US geostrategic pivot in the region. However, the new regional security construction will not possible without the participation of the great powers. Nonetheless, the unique construction of the IP-RSC is broader and open which is attracting other surrounding RSCs such as the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia RSCs, due to the wider sea and land connectivity of the enhancing IP-RSC.

The new regional complex is wider in term of geographical and sea connectivity and depends on amity and enmity of regional powers. Further, the region also covers the major checkpoints like Mozambique Channel, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Harmonz, Strait of Sunda, Strait of Lombok and Persian Gulf. It is a fulcrum of power dynamics for regional and great powers to forecast their maritime sea destiny in the near future. Buzan's four basic variables helps to assess the essential structure of the IP-RSC, whereby new security dynamics can testify through the implementation of these four following variables such as boundaries; anarchic structure; polarity and social construction of the RSCs. To examine the IP-RSC, it is differentiating its boundaries along with the sea, space and cyber security connectivity with surrounding RSCs. It has less dependency on geographical contiguity, considered extreme maritime security interests, whereby littoral countries are committed with each other to legitimize the international sea laws in the region. The structure of the IP-RSC is shaping by several different units and their combined efforts. The IP-RSC is also constructing the different security patterns of amity and enmity among the states by introducing the new social construction of the region. The Buzan's structure of the RSC is around these four basic portrayal classifications.


However, the essential structure of the IP-RSC does not essentially depends on Buzan's four basic variables; it also includes the emergence of regional powers and their bid to play the extra-regional role with surrounding RSCs. The stability of any RSC depends on their internal or external power transformation from time to time.

The IP-RSC is a standard RSC, whereby polarity defined by the emergence of regional powers to favor the multi-polar design of security. It is not China-centered RSC. It has dependency on the emergence of regional powers and their configuration of amity and enmity within and outside the region. Thereby, China is facing enmity from regional powers especially by Japan, India, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines along with the US. The IP-RSC is not centered RSC like the US as a superpower in the North American regional security complex and Central Asian RSC is centered of the Great power Russia (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). Therefore, in the IP-RSC there is also the probability of the assimilation of the Middle Eastern RSC, Horn Proto-complex and South African RSCs as sub-complex divisions, within the cluster of the IP-RSC.

The basic argument behind shift is the sea connectivity among these existing RSCs, whereby littoral countries interlinked with various common issues such as cultural, commercial, strategic, traditional, and non-traditional security concerns. The argument justifies at the back of enhancing IP-RSC, whereby the region interlinked with major sea routes from the Arabian to the Pacific Oceans. The assessment on IP-RSC is around the maritime-based interlinked geographical clustered region, whereby littoral countries of particular regions interlinked with securitization and desecuritisation process, and their security issues cannot scrutinize or resolve without the participation of each units of the region (extension of Buzan RSC). The littoral countries of the region are interlink with each other not just within the geographical clustered, but also in term of geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic connectivity in the region. The evolving new regional security complex is not just a similar outline like as Buzan has described the features of the RSC, it is more than regional boundaries, interdependent on sea, space, cyber and other traditional and non-traditional security issues. It is an extension of the existing model of RSC theory, shifted the new debate of regional security formulation, whereby

littoral states and their sea connectivity considered most basic geographical identity than land connectivity. The entire Rimland region is the more significant figure to decide the structure of the IP-RSC.

Figure: - 3.1 Mapping the IP-RSC through Buzan's Four Levels of RSC Analysis



Source: Prepared by Researcher

The IP-RSC can inspect by implementing the Buzan's four levels of analysis. The following four levels are helpful to understand the basics of the IP-RSC. (1). State vulnerability and domestic security issues (2). Intera-regional relations between units (3). Inter-regional relations with surrounding regions (4). Role of extra-regional powers. The figure no. 3.1 is showing four basic levels of analysis to understand the

structure of the IP-RSC. These levels of analysis also interconnect with each other to legitimize the precise picture of the IP-RSC.

3.3.5.1 State Vulnerability and Domestic Security Issues: The state vulnerability and its domestic security issues are basic factors to decide the future survival potentials of any RSC in the world security matrix. Say, for instance, Afghanistan is an Insulator State, situated among the Central Asia, South Asia, and Middle Eastern RSCs. It is a theatre of the great power politics due to its geostrategic location in the region. It is facing the continue survival security threats from Taliban on the back of Pakistan winding support (Chandran, 2016). On the same hand, Pakistan is itself facing several threats related its internal democratic structure that invaded several times by military regimes. Probably, Pakistan land-based terror groups also associated with Kashmir militancy in India increased the non-traditional security threats for India. Both, Afghanistan and India are facing Combined Security Complex (here-in-after CSC) from Pakistan based terrorist groups such as Thrik-i-Taliban Pakistan involvement in Afghanistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Indian Mujahedeen terrorist organizations foremost intervening Jihadi Groups create the non-traditional security threats for India in the South Asian RSC.

However, Pakistan is itself a victim state by facing several terrorist attacks by terrorist groups. It also blamed India and Afghanistan, for their secret agencies involvements in Baluchistan and Sind provinces (Khan, 2016). However, it is also a fact that Pakistan is heaven of terrorist groups in the South Asian region, which undermined the democratic process in Afghanistan including other South Asian countries.

Hence, the security dynamics within Afghanistan and its geographical position within two major RSCs is the deciding factor of security complexes in the IP-RSC. The next directional part of the analysis in a new security complex is Myanmar state, which called as a gateway to link the South Asian RSC with East Asian RSC. Currently, the democratic transformation in Myanmar after the long Military regime is a major power landscape led to new possibilities in the region. However, it is still in a surviving position to handle the domestic issues such as on Rohingya's resettlement and its geostrategic position in the circle of a golden triangle, whereby it is a hub of

opium production in the region. Further, there is also a challenge for Myanmar to keep the balance between two rising powers such as India and China in region. Similarly, Nepal is also insulator state situated between two rival powers sustaining the power equilibrium in the region. It is also facing survival security threats from Maoist insurgency within the country, decrease after the 2008 assembly election, which is the deciding factor in Nepal's political power landscape from monarchy to the democratic process. However, it is still a survival mode due to Madhesi dissatisfaction about the new form constitution. Furthermore, in the Southeast Asian region currently, Thailand is facing the political turbulence within the country replaced the civilian government by the military junta in 2014.

The region is also a hardship example of new political vandalism in North Korea, due to ruler Kim Jong-Un who has adopted the hard line to achieve the nuclear bomb, which threatens the US maritime security along with Japan and South Korea's maritime security interests in the Pacific Ocean. To analyse the IP-RSC and its pulling factors around the African and Middle-Eastern RSCs are debatable security concerns due to the appearance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (here-in-after ISIS). Iraq and Syria both are facing CSC, due to the geographical expansion of ISIS in both regions. Even, its wider connectivity has expanded over the internet in the entire Indo-Pacific littoral countries, which created the security dilemma among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. Therefore, state vulnerability and domestic Security Issues are creating the new security complex in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

3.3.5.2 Intra-Regional Relations between Units: The intra-regional relation between the units is the deciding factor to construct the new regional security complex in any region of the world. There is also the complex nature of intra-regional units within the IP-RSC. The current analysis are about the traditional polarity between Indo-Pak relation has shifting towards one-sided India's rise and its extra-regional reconciliations with other RSCs led to the new security calculation in the region. The new security dimensions have also changed the New Delhi attentions towards traditional to non-traditional security threats. Currently, India is focusing traditional as well as non-traditional security threats such as sea piracy, narco-terrorism, human

trafficking, and global warming etc. India's aspiration as an extra-regional power has replaced Indo-Pak traditional rivalry, into Indo-China competition in the maritime affairs. Indeed, Indo-China unsolved Himalayan boundary disputes also increases insecurities within Indian policy-makers, pushed New Delhi towards the formation of new security arrangements in the region. The Sino-Pak geostrategic alignment for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (here-in-after CPEC) from the Western province of China to Gwadar Port of Pakistan has created the more mistrust among Indian leaderships due to its access through disputed territory of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (here-in-after PoK), claimed by India. The huge mistrust has jeopardized the traditional Indo-Pak rivalry towards the Sino-Pak rivalry with India in the region. Similarly, the South China Sea (here-in-after SCS) dispute is also determining factor to predict the future probabilities of the IP-RSC in the region.

The dispute over the two strategic archipelagos like Spratly and Parcel Islands has led the antagonism among the People Republic of China (here-in-after PRC) and other claimant states such as Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei (Liu & Spangler, 2016). The dispute has started especially after the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (here-in-after UNCLOS) which define the limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone (here-in-after EEZ) 200 Nautical Miles (nm) after 1982 (Shicun, 2013). Hence, before this declaration, China has fought a war with Vietnam in 1974 over Parcel Islands, whereby Beijing occupied a large number of small islands, reefs, and banks in the SCS. Likewise, Beijing has also opposed the international tribunal decision on its claim over 'nine-dash line', which favors the Philippines claim over several small reefs and Islands (Phillips, 2016). Therefore, unified regional security complex within the IP-RSC is mobilizing the littoral countries towards new regional security construction. The consistent regional complex has taken a shape as a theater of multilayered divergence as well as convergence possibilities among littoral countries. On the same hand, there is also a multilayered dispute in the Middle-East sub-complex, whereby Israel and Middle Eastern countries like Syria-Iraq and Egypt engaged direct war, and Lebanon and Jordan both have engaged within defensive doctrine after the 1948 war. The region has faced the serious conflicts for claim over historical holy city of Jerusalem. The conflict between

Israel and Palestine on holy city has currently taken a serious regional instability concerns, especially after the US declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Currently, unilateral move by the US president Trump to shift the US embassy Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem has increased the more skeptic political gambit in the region (Goldenberg, 2017). It has also increased the mistrust within middle-east countries about the US role as mediator to solve this serious conflict in the region. Therefore, the multilayered convergence and divergence between the units in the region construct the constant possibilities of the IP-RSC. The social construction of the IP-RSC is based on enmity and amity among the units especially their interdependence on each another. Thereby, the state-to-state geostrategic collaboration on common security issues led to the formation of the new influx of enhancing RSC in the Asian political theatre.

3.3.5.3 Inter-Regional Relations with Surrounding Regions: The inter-regional interaction of any region with other surrounding regions defines the unique classification of any RSC. To examine the new regional security construction in the IP-RSC is more complicated or multilayered forms due to dissimilar from Buzan's classification on RSC. Firstly, Buzan has described that East Asian RSC is a result of the fusion of the Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian RSCs, due to the Cold- War entity between two superpowers. Since, the disintegration of the former USSR, the region has faced the serious threats due to China's emergence and its unfavorable attitude to solve the SCS dispute with ASEAN countries. Therefore, Buzan has argued that the rise of China is pushing factor to create the China-centered ASC.

However, under the present security dynamics, India is playing a pivotal role due to its bid to extra-regional power in the region. It has also non-traditional security issues led to the new regional security arrangements along with the US, Japan, Australia, and other ASEAN partners. India's pivotal role towards the East Asian RSC has fragmented its traditional regional hesitation led to the South Asian RSC towards the sub-complex division. The unification of the East Asian RSC and South Asian RSC is not borderline of the IP-RSC. It is pulling RSCs such as the Middle East, South African and Horn pre-complexes. The geographical and maritime sea

connectivity among these RSCs is pulling factor behind the sub-complexes in the near future. Secondly, the emergence of middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region such as India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Iran and Saudi Arabia are another reason behind the IP-RSC in the region. Say, for instance, India and Japan have signed the special strategic and global partnership treaty for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Both India-Japan is developing Chabahar port with Iran to increase the maritime connectivity in the Middle East. Both have also proposed the vision document for Africa-Asia-Growth Corridor (here-in-after AAGC) to increase their geostrategic and geo-economic presence in the Middle East and African RSCs (Bhatia, 2017).

Further, both India-Australia have also increased their strategic partnership to maintain the peace and prosperity in the region. There is also India's collaboration with Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt and Sudan to increase the geostrategic engagement with these countries. The confirmation of the IP-RSC would depend on the shaking efforts of the middle powers and their geostrategic and geopolitical commitment with surrounding RSCs. Therefore, the middle power coalition from different RSCs is the driving force behind the IP-RSC.

3.3.5.4 Role of Extra-Regional Powers

The role of the Extra-regional or global powers in the IP-RSC is more diverse and antagonist in nature due to the Cold-War rivalry between the US and the former USSR. The role of global powers within the regional structure of the IP-RSC is more significant to understand, especially after the disintegration of the former USSR. Since this major breakdown, Russia and European Union have increased their geostrategic arrangement along with existing US hegemony in the region. However, China is a part of the IP-RSC due to boundary disputes with other surrounding units within the region. Mohammed Khalid has stated argument that "currently the US and China are major powers, which playing wider role in the region. However, Russia remains also a major actor after disintegration of the USSR (M. Khalid, Telephonic interview, November 27, 2018). Therefore, the extra-regional powers such as the US,

Russia, and the European Union are also have decisive role including China in the IP-RSC.

3.3.5.4.1 The US as a Major Actor: The mid of the 20th century the US has been filled the power vacuum by replace the British hegemony in the world politics. The US has increased imperial overstretch through its multilateral doctrine, whereby it has promoted the geo-economic, geo-strategic and military alliances within all part of the world. It has also increased the stronghold on world economic institutions like the World Bank, World Trade Organization (here-in-after WTO) and International Monetary Fund (here-in-after IMF) etc. The Indo-Pacific littoral countries were also influenced by the US-sponsored economic and military alliances. During the Cold-War period the US has been played the central role as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific region through the SEATO of 1954, CENTO of 1959 and the treaty of ANZUS in 1951 (Lemmons, 2012). The treaties have signed by the US as the part of the 'Truman Doctrine' to counter the geostrategic expansion of the communist regime. The treaty of SEATO has signed in Manila in 1954, later it has dissolved in 1977 due to confusion about using the combined military action especially in the Vietnam War.

The US treaty of ANZUS with Australia and New Zealand has been also pro-active step to discontinue the Soviet influence in the South of the Pacific Ocean. The CENTO is one of the other collective organizations that built in the Cold-War period to decrease the Soviet influence in the Middle East oil producing countries. Unlike the NATO, it did not built any unified military structure with CENTO countries. Furthermore, it also signed the especial bilateral defense and security treaties with some Pacific littoral countries such as Japan and the Philippines in 1951 and with South Korea in 1953 through as a part of its 'hub and spokes' system. Washington is still playing the central role to provide the security of these countries in the Korean Peninsula. Approximately 1,492,000 troops with 10 aircraft carriers, 72 submarines 2224 fighters and bombers of the US still presence in the region (Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea-2014). Currently, the US has adopted pivotal policies toward geostrategic and diplomatic alignment within East Asian RSC along with overstretching maritime partnerships within South Asian RSC, especially in establishing the peace process in Afghanistan. Likewise, the current US policy

landscape towards the South Asian region, especially with India is a defining figure of the IP-RSC. There is an amalgamation between the US 'Asia-Pivot' policy and India's 'Act East Asia' policy. The Indo-US geostrategic proximity in the Indo-Pacific region would open the door to possibilities of new maritime security regime in the region. The Nexus will also fascinate the South as well as Middle Eastern RSCs countries towards the IP-RSC. Therefore, US is still security provider in the Indo-Pacific region, whereby it is playing very crucial role in the security of the Indo-Pacific region.

3.3.5.4.2 Russian Re-emergence: The former USSR has also played a very crucial role to decide the past security paradigm in the Indo-Pacific region. During the Cold-War period, it has significant influence due to its geostrategic engagement with Southeast Asian Countries especially Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Since, the disappointment of the US supported SEATO as a military organization and Japan only limited as an economic power, Masco has replaced the US-based combine regional security structure in the complex polarity (Kanet, 1977). It has also increased its economic and commercial activities with less military engagement in Southeast Asia due to less boundary engagement in the region. However, the Soviet engagement with Non-alignment or third world Countries has increased especially quasi-military alliance with India in the South Asian RSC, due to the US geostrategic partnership with Pakistan and later its major place as a Non-NATO ally.

Since, the disintegration of the former USSR, Russia has reclaimed its historical legacy in the Commonwealth of Independent States (here-in-after CIS) likewise, British Commonwealth whereby still Russia has its respective position in term of geostrategic and geo-economic contiguity. It has a strong hand behind the establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Origination (here-in-after SCO) with China and Central Asian republics, extended after the full membership of India and Pakistan in 2015. The institutional milieu of the SCO has increased and discussed the security issues of member states along with delimit the role of the NATO in the region (Bhattacharjee, 2017). Further, Russia has also declared the Russia Far East (here in after RFE) policy towards its eastward to revive its eastern borders to its proximity with China and other Pacific countries. The US declaration of the "Asia-Pivot Policy"

(2011) in the Indo-Pacific region is one of the major reasons behind Russia's geostrategic alignment towards its East. Second, Ukraine crisis and the failure of the NATO-Russia military and political exchange program in 2014, led to Russia towards geostrategic contiguity towards its East. It has diversified its energy routes to increase contiguity with China, Japan and some extent of ASEAN countries. Both, Moscow-Beijing has started to organise naval exercises in the Asia-Pacific region in 2016 to show their combined maritime interests in the region. However, in recent trends, China is claiming its leadership role in Southeast Asia but Russia is still playing the role as a potential actor in the region. Therefore, the Russian realignment strategies with China and its pivot toward its east is also a deciding factor of the IP-RSC.

3.3.5.4.3 Role of European Union: European Union is also playing a very crucial role to forecast the new security paradigm in the region. Since, the establishment of the European Union (here-in-after EU), it has a unique example of regional integration within the one political unit. However, in the case of Asian security architecture, scholars have considered the soft regional integration due to the movement of globalization in the world politics. They rejected the EU type of regional integration, which is based on political arrangements. The Asia-Pacific is following the same patterns of the 'Open-Regionalism', which has focused the market integration rather than the political integration (Berkofsky, 2005). However, last some years the region is an example of new security and defense based regional alignments especially in the Indo-Pacific region. The experience of the EU type regional integration is hard to possible in Asia due to the cultural, religious geographical diversities in the region.

However, the flexible or open regional integration is also gives the strength for Asian regionalism to maintain their institutional autonomy for developing economies. Nonetheless, the EU is playing the crucial role to address the non-traditional security issues in such fields alleviating poverty, sea piracy, fighting against terrorism and global warming. The ASEAN countries have realized the role of the EU contribution in the regional securitization process and its experience about stronger regional integration will help to strengthen the region (Weber, 2013). Further, the EU and ASEAN countries have established the new plan to increase the close regional

proximity within both organizations. China and India are two major factors, which are diverting the attention of the EU in the region. Further, from the last two decades the EU has also increased the commercial and economic activities with Indo-Pacific countries to increase confidence measures between to regional institutional mechanisms. The EU is playing a role as an extra-regional power in the region, which is sharing the mature experience of regional integration with ASEAN countries. Therefore, the EU is playing the crucial role behind the formation of the IP-RSC.


3.4 Emerging Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region: Possibilities and Potentials

The enhancing possibilities of the regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region could legitimise through investigation over the converging interests among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries in the upcoming years. The possibilities of the enhancing Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture (here-in-after IP-RSA) can examine by several such determined components like historical and cultural components; economic and commercial components; Ocean based maritime regionalism; middle power coalition and traditional and non-traditional security components. In this support, Lakhvinder Singh director of the Asian Institute at Seoul stated, “there is scope for new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region in the near future (L. Singh, emailed interview, August 14, 2018)”. However, in contrast to this argument, Rajesh Basrur stated, “there is a move towards the creation but it is not yet possible in near future. The reason is that the region too wide and not strongly interconnected yet. Possibly, if there is a more substantial emergence of the ‘quad’ this might happen (R. Basrur, emailed interview, September 14, 2018)”.

Further, Mohammed Khalid also said, “it is too early to say that new security architecture will be built in the upcoming years. However, there is the possibility is remained in the near future. He also specified that India and its maritime interests could not ignored in the evolving new security construction due to its Northeastern part has geographical contiguity with the Southeast Asian countries or sometime considered it is as a part of the Southeast Asian region. Khalid also stated that India’s navel infrastructure development in the south of the Andaman Nicobar Islands, which is nearby Indonesia, increasing India’s geostrategic and maritime commercial

activities around the Indo-Pacific region. (M. Khalid, telephonic interview, November 27, 2018).” Therefore, there are not a common opinion among the scholars and strategic expert’s behind the construction of the Indo-Pacific security architecture. However, there are some converging factors among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries led to the new construction in the region. The below figure no. 3.2 is mentioning the supporting components of the enhancing IP-RSA.

Figure: - 3. 2 Supporting Components of the Enhancing Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture (IP-RSA)



Source: Prepared by Researcher

3.4.1 Historical and Cultural Components: Historical and cultural connectivity among nation-states is the defining figure for any new regional integration in the world politics. The EU is one of the instance to understand this kind of regional integration, which has not connected only in the economic unit, but it has also far better political arrangements in a particular region. On the Other hand, the Asian continent is theatre of the altered security arrangements due to a variety of historical, religious and cultural movements in the region. The cultural and historical extents of the Indo-

Pacific region can examine through the colonial and post-colonial period. Mainly, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the region which covers the variety of historical and cultural diversity. The Indian Ocean Region has central sea routes in the region to connect the Middle Eastern sailors and traders with Malay World or Southeast Asian region, predominant with cultural waves of Buddhism and Hinduism. Say, for instance, cultural and historical link with such vibrant littoral regions like the Middle East, East Africa, Indian Sub-Continent, Malay World and Australia legitimised the debate on new regional security construction (McPherson, 1984). The cultural fusion within the society or region is the fundamental level to examine any new evolving regional security construction of any region of the world.

The Indo-Pacific region is a significant example of cultural and religious fusion from its diverse historical background. The region is mixed of the Indian, Chinese, and Arabian culture later influenced by western colonial powers. The fusion of historical and cultural harmony among the peoples opened somewhere the door for spiritual and economic openness among the peoples towards the open regional integration, which has also potential to welcome the fusion of any other culture or civilizations in the future. Therefore, cultural and historical interchange among the people-to-people movement from different regions is a supportive component to construct the new regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.

3.4.2 Economic and Commercial Components: The enhancing IP-RSA is based on economic and commercial activities of the littoral states of the region. Certainly, the Indo-Pacific region was the central pivotal region of the great sea-based maritime empires and their commercial activities through the Indian Ocean region. Earlier the emergence of such Mesopotamia, Greeks and Indus civilizations were also established very significant commercial societies around the Hindu-Kush Mountains and around the Indian Ocean region. Further, the great Alexander has also strengthened the vibrant Mediterranean and Indian Ocean nexus due to the availability of maritime commercial routes in the region. Mainly, the imports and exports of the goods between the two regions were textiles, cotton, silk, spices rare timbers including African slaves. Later, the Mediterranean merchants shifted their


commercial activities through the Indian subcontinent in the Malay World (McPherson, 1984). Along with this, the Indian traders also extended their trade activities towards its eastward, increased the commercial maritime linkage with Malay as well as Chinese traders in the region.

However, the western colonial powers such as Portuguese, Dutch, French and lastly the British East India Company have taken over control on maritime commercial activities in the region. Since, the post-colonial period, the Indo-Pacific littoral countries construct the flexible regionalism, whereby the regional mechanism is welcome the nexus with surrounding regions. The geostrategic significance of the Indian Ocean region and its interrelationship with surrounding regions in such fields like cultural, historical trade and commercial movements of the people decides the future extension of the region (Cohen, 1978). There is a sub-regional collaboration with the Indian and Pacific Ocean Region. However, both oceans have interchangeably regional collaboration through regional and sub-regional grouping in the region.

The South Asian countries established the SAARC for regional and cultural cooperation. There is also an Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (here-in-after IOR-ARC) has established to increase the regional cooperation among Indian Ocean Rim countries. On the other hand, the South East Asian countries also established the different regional cooperations like the ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (herein after ARF) etc. ASEAN is one of the regional forum, which provides the integrated economic platform for all ASEAN countries within the region. Furthermore, the ARF provides the platform of discussion for common political and security dialogues for member countries to build the confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region (Suri, 2016). Therefore, geostrategic proximity between India and South East Asian countries increased the possibilities of the new regional security construction in the upcoming years. However, the examination of India's commercial and trade activities with some ASEAN countries in table no. 3.1 is showing a mixed response from the years 2013 to 2018. Say for instance, with Brunei, Myanmar, Philippines and Laos India's trade trends are stagnate in comparison then others


ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam has increased from 2013 to 2018. Further, in case of trade balance between India and ASEAN countries the table no. 3. 2 is showing India’s mixed response such as with Vietnam, Philippines and Singapore, it has surplus trade balance and rest of ASEAN countries it is importing more than exports.

Table: - 3. 1 Total Trade Trends among India and ASEAN Countries in the Years 2014-2018. (Exports-Imports)



Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India

Table: - 3. 2 Total Trade balance between India and ASEAN Countries in the Years 2014-2018 (Export – Import)



Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India

Therefore, in terms of trade balance between India and ASEAN countries, India has not that much surplus, trade indeed of more geostrategic pivot towards the region. However, India is trying to revitalize its trade and commercial activities with these countries to strengthen its geo-economic and geostrategic proximity with these countries.

Further, the most recent occurrence of sub-regional collaboration is the Gulf Cooperation Council (here-in-after GCC) in the Middle East that established in 1981. The cooperation has increased the proximity within member states to deal the common economic, political, social and military engagement in the region. However, the Middle Eastern sub-regional cooperation also increased commercial links with the Indian sub-continent and Southeast Asian countries (Dowdy & Trood, 1983). The regional and sub-regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region is open in nature, which member states of one region have interdependence with other regional groups. Therefore, the possibilities of the IP-RSA have increased especially after the revival of the maritime commercial routes among the littoral countries of the Indian and Pacific Oceans region. The littoral countries of the region have increased the economic possibilities for Free Trade Agreement (here-in-after FTA) in the region. However, last two decades have faced the new trends of amity and enmity within littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region.

The countries like Japan, South Korea Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, India, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have increased the economic, political and strategic interdependence within the region. Likewise, the US has also involved in the region to construct such possibilities like Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (here-in-after IPEC) with participating India, Japan Australia and its ASEAN alliances in the region. On the same hand, regional powers such as Japan in the east, India at the center and Iran in the western shore of the Indo-Pacific region, jointly inaugurated the Chabhar port one of the significance example of cementing possibilities of the triangular partnership in the IP-RSA. However, on the other hand, China is reviving its historical routes through a grand economic strategy of One Belt One Route (here-in-after OBOR) initiative in the region. Therefore, there are fewer possibilities of the rigid


regionalism like NATO or European Union, tremendous possibilities of flexible or open expanding regionalism in the IP-RSA.

3.4.3 Ocean-Based Maritime Open Regionalism: The basic level of examination of the IP-RSA is to mapping the dependency of the littoral countries on Ocean based maritime connectivity and its security, rather than limit around the traditional land-based geographical regional security issues. The Indo-Pacific countries are reconnecting with each other especially in term of economic, political, strategic and on traditional and non-traditional security issues. The traditional and non-traditional security concerns of the littoral countries are common due to interlinked maritime boundaries in the Indo-Pacific region. All littoral countries of the region favors the Exclusive Economic Zone (here-in- after EEZ) to apply the maritime sea-based international law's in the region. The legitimization of the EEZ in the region is the ultimate preference of the littoral countries to create the free and secure future of sea-based maritime trade and commercial activities.

The Ocean-based maritime open regionalism explores the new possibilities of the regional collaboration in the Indo-Pacific littoral countries in the region. It also includes the security of several checkpoints in the IOR, which provides the access to shipping routes from the Middle East to the Pacific Ocean. There are major checkpoints in the IOR, which provides the access for world crude oil shipping routes for containers in the region. There are Strait of Hormuz and Malacca are major checkpoints in the region, which containers are shipped the crude oil estimated 15.3, 11.0, million barrels per days through the IOR. Further, there are also other famous checkpoints in the region such as the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, Strait of Mozambique, Strait of Sunda and Lombok. These checkpoints are one of the busiest maritime routes in term of crude oil shipping routes. The figure shows the geo-economics, geostrategic significance of these checkpoints not in term of maritime accessibility but also expand the possibilities for open regional integration between two major oceans in the Indo-Pacific region. Another major argument behind the back of open maritime regionalism in the IP-RSA is the legitimization of maritime EEZ by the United Nation Organization (here-in-after UNO). The littoral countries are willing to

implement the open maritime access on these major checkpoints without external fear. Currently, the Malabar Naval Exercise in the Bay of Bengal is one example to express the India-Japan-US triangle proximity in the region, for open maritime access in the Indo-Pacific region. The exercise one of the ever-massive naval exercise in the IOR, which India's aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, JS Izumo of Japan's largest helicopter destroyer and the US aircraft carrier USS Nimitz engaged as a part of the operation (Haramatsu, 2017).

Map: - 3. 4 World Crude Oil Shipping Routes



Source: Maritimetraffic.com

The triangular proximity is increasing with other ASEAN countries, indicating the greater geo-economic and geostrategic alignment in the region. The operation also indicated the enhancing glimpses of the IP-RSA, which is based on open maritime ocean connectivity and security. Therefore, the ocean-based maritime open connectivity in the Indo-Pacific is comprehensive consistent effort to construct the IP-RSA.

3.4.4 Middle Powers Coalition: One of the pivotal points to decide the central figure of the enhancing IP-RSA is the emergence of middle powers and their bid to play the role as an extra-regional power in the region. The rise of Asian powers such as China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam etc., are major

explanations behind the new security complexities and regional collaboration in the Indo-Pacific region. On the same hand, in the Middle-East RSC, there is Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel has strong bid to play a role as an extra-regional powers. Therefore, these powers are realigning with Indo-Pacific countries to secure their geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests beyond the regional boundaries. On the other hand, China's assertiveness as a rising superpower in the Asian Continent and the US uncertainties about its role as a further security provider in the region led the Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and other ASEAN countries towards the middle power coalition in the Indo-Pacific region. These countries also remain with their traditional security patterns, some are part of the NAM and some are still playing the role as a part of the US alliance.

The middle powers cooperation can possible in military capacity building, strategic and security engagement, regional economic collaboration, technological and intelligence sharing whereby major powers such as China and the US could exclude out of this complex theatre (Mohan, 2014). However, China's vertical shift in the Pacific and IOR is a key reason behind the middle power coalition in the region. To deal with Chinese assertiveness in the region, these powers is coming close towards new regional juxtaposition, which also welcomes somewhere the US role behind the back of the IP-RSA. The declaration of the US 'Asia-Pivot' policy is one of the parts of logical examination of the US policy landscape towards the Indo-Pacific region, which Washington is reproaching its existing alliances (Japan, North Korea, Philippines etc.) in such areas like cultural, economic, strategic and military perspectives (Clinton, 2011).

Furthermore, in the 13th annual summit between India and Japan also take a central stage for "free and open Indo-Pacific" region. Both countries agreed for the promotion of democratic values and rule based Indo-Pacific maritime region. India and Indonesia have also shared the vision for the maritime cooperation to free and open Indo-Pacific region. Indonesia also agreed to give a naval access for Indian navy over Sabang Port, which deepens the footprints of Indian navy around the Indo-Pacific region.

Modi, Abe back 'free Indo-Pacific'

Defence ties dominate summit talks

PALLAVI AIYAR
TOKYO

India and Japan outlined a vision for strengthened bilateral relations at the 13th annual summit here on Monday.

Enhanced strategic and defence cooperation dominated the talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzo Abe.

Japan's formulation of a "free and open Indo-Pacific" received a central place in the vision statement is-

sued at the end of the talks, with both sides stressing their "unwavering commitment to it." The concept is usually seen as a response to China's growing dominance in the region.

Speaking to the press after his talks with Mr. Abe, Mr. Modi said the India-Japan bilateral relationship was invested in upholding the rule of law and democratic values.

TOKYO TALKS STRESS
DEMOCRATIC VALUES ▶ PAGE 10

Source: Aiyar, P. (30 October, 2018). Modi, Abe back 'free Indo-Pacific'. *The Hindu*, retrieved from <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-abe-back-free-indo-pacific/article25364481.ece>.

India, Indonesia discuss Indo-Pacific cooperation

In a first, Navy ship berths at Sabang

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
NEW DELHI

Taking forward the India-Indonesia shared vision on maritime cooperation in Indo-Pacific, an Indian team visited Sabang in Indonesia on Wednesday to "discuss steps for mutual collaboration." At the same time, in a first, Indian ship INS *Sumitra* berthed at Sabang Port close to the Malacca Strait for operational turnaround.

"The hosting of the India-Indonesia Investment forum in Aceh and the visit of the Indian delegation and INS *Sumitra* port call at Sabang, were important follow-up outcomes flowing from the understanding reached during the recently concluded visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Indonesia," the Indian Embas-

sy in Jakarta said in a statement.

Mr. Modi and Indonesian President Joko Widodo announced the shared vision on maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific during Mr. Modi's visit in May.

Indonesia has recently agreed to give India access to its port for operational turnaround which will increase the Navy's footprint in the region. "INS *Sumitra* sailed from Port Blair to Sabang, where it will take provisions and fuel before going for further deployment in the Indian Ocean," the statement said.

The Indian team was led by Ambassador to Indonesia Pradeep K. Rawat and included officials and business delegates from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Source: India- Indonesia Discuss Indo-Pacific Cooperation. *The Hindu* (12 July, 2018), retrieved from <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-indonesia-discuss-indo-pacific-cooperation/article24401794.ece>.

India, Vietnam to work jointly for free, open Indo-Pacific

SHUBHAJIT ROY
NEW DELHI, MARCH 3

INDIA AND Vietnam Saturday decided to deepen defence and security cooperation, even as they resolved jointly for a free and open Indo-Pacific based on rules-based regional security architecture. This comes in the wake of increasing assertiveness by China in the region, from South China Sea to the South Asian region.

This was decided after the bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the visiting Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang on Saturday.

Vietnam is one of the key neighbours of China, and has resisted Chinese claims in South China Sea.

"One of the pillars in our strong relationship is defence and security cooperation," Modi said, after the talks. "We already have strong ties between all branches of our armed forces. Now we have decided to strengthen our cooperation in the field of defence production. We will explore possibilities of co-production and transfer of technology in the defence sector."

Quang said that security and defence cooperation between the two countries is already "sound", and they will work towards capacity building, training, and UN peacekeeping. The security dialogue between the two countries will be conducted and they will work closely on regional



Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Vietnam President Tran Dai Quang at Hyderabad House in New Delhi. Amit Mehra

security challenges, including on "maritime security and cyber security", he said.

Modi also said that both sides expressed commitment for an open, efficient and rules-based regional architecture and to expand bilateral maritime cooperation further. "We will jointly work for an open, independent and prosperous Indo Pacific region where sovereignty and international laws are respected and where differences are resolved through peaceful means."

"We reaffirm our close collaboration to support India to further its relations and multifaceted connectivity with ASEAN attaching high importance to the maintenance of security, maritime safety and freedom of navigation and over flight, settlement of disputes by peaceful means on the basis of international law including UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea)," Quang said.

Quang said it is important to respect the diplomatic and legal process in resolution of the dispute. The two strategic partners inked three pacts providing for cooperation in nuclear energy, trade and agriculture, besides deciding to boost ties in oil and gas exploration.

During the talks, Modi said India and Vietnam agreed to deepen trade and investment ties in sectors like oil and gas exploration, renewable energy, agriculture and textiles. He said the two sides will also look for trilateral partnership in oil and gas sector.

Source: Roy, S. (2018). India-Vietnam to Work Jointly for Free Open 'Indo-Pacific'. *The Hindu* (March 4, 2018), retrieved from <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-vietnam-to-work-jointly-for-free-open-indo-pacific-5085164/>.

Trade, security key to ties, PM Modi tells 'foremost partner' Australia



PM Narendra Modi with Australian PM Tony Abbott at the Melbourne Cricket Ground, Tuesday.

PVADINATHAN IYER
MELBOURNE, NOV 15

TRADE, investment and maritime security cooperation were at the core of a 24-minute address that Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered to a joint session of the Australian Parliament in Canberra on Tuesday.

Modi described India and Australia as "foremost partners" in the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region. Australia, given its location, was at the junction of the cross-currents in the region, he said, and held the key to its future.

engaged in this part of the world, we welcome its growing role in driving this region's prosperity and shaping its security," the Prime Minister said.

A day after Beijing signed a comprehensive trade deal with Canberra, opening up its huge domestic market to 95 per cent of Australia's exports at zero tariff, Modi offered Australia "immense opportunities" to participate in India's progress. Prime Minister Tony Abbott hopes to sign a similar free trade deal with India by 2015, and has said that he and Modi would make it happen together.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

▶ MORE REPORTS, PAGE 15

FIVE PACTS SIGNED

ON SOCIAL SECURITY: Will provide social security superannuation benefits to those who have been residents of the other country.

ON TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PERSONS: Will lay down procedures for transfer of sentenced persons.

ON COMBATING NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING: Will develop strategies to dismantle transnational narcotic related threats.

ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ARTS AND CULTURE: Will deepen understanding and promote art, cultural activities.

ON TOURISM: Will encourage training and investments in hospitality sector.

Source: Iyer, P. (2014) Trade, Security Key ties, PM Modi tells 'foremost partner' Australia. *The India Express* (19 November, 2014), retrieved from <http://epaper.indianexpress.com/377802/Mumbai/19-November-2014#page/1/1>.

Nonetheless, the India and Vietnam also strengthen the defence and security cooperation for free and rule based regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. During the joint declaration in New Delhi Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that “Vietnam is main key player behind the connectivity between India-ASEAN relations in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific region”. Therefore, above mentions newspapers sources gives the strong examination that middle powers especially Japan-India-Australia-Indonesia and Vietnam has combined equal military, economic and geostrategic capabilities to balance the Chinese economic and military rise in the Indo-pacific region.

Furthermore, in case of Australia, it has signed the social and narcotics trafficking, security pacts with India in the region. It also engaged with South Korea and Indonesia in the circle of the SCS dispute, to balance the Chinese assertiveness in the region. Say for instance, Australia has started the military-to-military engagement in the region, joint task group conduct and training activities around the South West Pacific region (Tylor & Tow, et al., 2016; Australian Government Department of Defence Annual Report-2017-18). Therefore, the middle powers coalition, especially within India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, are increasing the future possibilities of enhancing IP-RSA, including the US as remain backdoor security provider in the regional security arrangements. The logical examination of the IP-RSA depends on the middle powers coalition and their enhancing proximity in such defense and security fields.

3.4.5 Traditional Security Components: the concept of traditional security historically evolved with the writing of Thucydides, Kautilya, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz etc. The traditional security components directly affect the human survival through traditional warfare tactics followed by nation-states against their surrounding enemy states. Since, the second World-War Morgenthau examines the structure of security of any nation-states around their national security and interests, whereby every nation-state reacts according to their national interests. Therefore, traditional security issues of the nation-states in the region also lead construction of enhancing IP-RSA. Say for instance, since the disintegration of the

former USSR, China has filled the vacuum of great power especially in the Asian continent. Nearly, after this major instance, Beijing has modernized People Liberation Army (here in after PLA) in all aspects including its naval modernization. China's reemergence and its assertiveness to solve the SCS disputes by claiming 'nine-dash line' over maritime boundaries of the surrounding countries is leading cause behind the formation of the enhancing IP-RSA. Firstly, it is fact that Beijing has fought the traditional war with Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, a serious dispute over Senkaku Island with Japan, and SCS maritime boundary disputes with several ASEAN countries such as Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. It created the suspicion within ASEAN countries, over China's notion of its peaceful rise, due to its way to handle the maritime disputes with littoral countries in the SCS.

Secondly, Sino-Indian long Himalayan boundary dispute over the Line of Actual Control (here-in-after LAC) is another major logical scrutiny behind India's horizontal move towards its Eastern neighboring countries. India has fought the traditional Himalayan war with China over LAC in 1962, which impulse the Indian Policymakers about their future traditional security arrangements in the region. Therefore, there is a policy landscape in Indian foreign policy, especially after India's declaration of 'Look East Policy' (now called Act East Asia Policy) in 1991 after the disintegration of the former USSR. New Delhi tried to fill the power vacuum in the Indo-Pacific region through increase its geo-economics, geopolitical, geostrategic and security alignment with the US, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN countries.

Third, the US has a traditional ideological rivalry with communist regime especially after the disintegration of the former USSR. It is also agreed fact that China might replace the US economic hegemony in upcoming decades. However, the US is remain playing a role as security provider, especially in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines and Indonesia etc. The US has also overstretched its maritime interests in the Indian Ocean region by acknowledging the term Indo-Pacific. It has also retained its role in the South Asian RSC through shifting its traditional geostrategic alignment Pakistan to India, whereby Indo-US both is strengthening their geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic proximity from the last decade. Washington is facilitating


the middle powers to balance the regional security dynamics against Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The geo-economics, geostrategic and traditional security matrix among India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam along with the US and its ASEAN allies are playing the central role to construct the IP-RSA. Thereby, the traditional security components in the Indo-Pacific region led to the upcoming possibilities of the enhancing IP-RSA, which provides new traditional security arrangements among the regional and extra-regional powers in the region.

3.4.6 Non-Traditional Security Components: The non-traditional security components are playing the very decisive role behind the construction of the enhancing IP-RSA. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the combined non-traditional security issues facing by the Indo-Pacific littoral countries in past decades. The non-traditional security threats usually in the non-military in nature, neither fully transnational nor purely in domestic, interlink within inter-state connections of several threats due to liberal and communicational waves of the global world. The non-traditional security threats challenged the human survival through indirect tactics by non-state actors. Say, for instance, in the Indo-Pacific region there are several non-traditional security threats such as narco-terrorism, human trafficking, sea piracy, global warming, nuclear proliferation, fighting against maritime terrorism and mitigation of poverty etc.

3.4.6.1 Narco-Terrorism: The Indo-Pacific littoral countries have faced the serious non-traditional security threats such as heroin and narcotics trafficking through major two pivotal regions, one is toward India's eastward borders called '*Golden Triangle*', and another is '*Golden Crescent*' region located with India's westward boundaries. The golden triangle region one of the combined non-traditional security threat to India as well as Southeast Asian countries. It is the region, which overlaps the boundaries of three or four countries of Southeast Asia such as Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. The narcotic smuggling is occurring within the region as well as outside the region through the sea and air routes, which affects the process of nation building of the littoral countries of the region. According to United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (here-in-after UNODC) Report 2016, the supply of heroin occurred by this

region to the surrounding regions such as Southeast Asia, Oceania, and China through the air and sea routes, which affects the ultimately human lives in the region. The mention figure 3.6 is showing the major heroin trafficking routes through the golden triangle and golden crescent regions.

Map: - 3. 5 Heroin Trafficking Flows through ‘Golden Crescent’ and ‘Golden Triangle’ Regions



Source: United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC), Report 2016.

On the other hand, a report has also examined the golden crescent region, which Afghanistan considers as another central point of heroin smuggling along with Iran and Pakistan. India’s western states such as Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan are a major victim of trans-boundary connections of drug trafficking in the region. Furthermore, the ‘Balkan route’ is one of the major historical routes for heroin trafficking through Afghanistan to western and central Europe. There is another route so-called as ‘Southern route’ via Pakistan, Iran, and the Middle Eastern Gulf region. It also includes the East African region along with South Asia and some extent Southeast Asia. The Northern route extends towards North of Afghanistan to Russian

republic via covering the Central Asian region. Therefore, the narco-terrorism one of the major common non-traditional security threat for littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region, led to the formation of the IP-RSA, to pretend the narcotic security threats from non-state actors to make the secure and healthy environment in the region.

3.4.6.2 Human Trafficking: Human trafficking is another non-traditional security threats facing by Indo-Pacific littoral countries in the region. The present day human trafficking is the face of modern-day slavery, whereby following trends is child sex trafficking, forced labor, domestic vassalage and use of child soldiers in the traditional or non-traditional wars. Say, for instance, in the Indo-Pacific region there are such countries like India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, and South Korea are major victim countries, which is facing serious human trafficking threats from last some decades (Trafficking in Persons Report-2017). The Indian Coast Guard informed these new trends of human trafficking around the Red Sea, Horn of Africa and surrounding Arabian Peninsula. There is number of refugees in the war porn countries such as Yemen, Sudan and Somalia are remain very miserable conditions that trafficked in the Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (Herbert-Burns, 2012; Suri, 2016). Therefore, the illegal human trafficking is the serious no-traditional security threats in the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. It pushed the Indo-Pacific littoral countries towards the new regional security construction to secure their maritime security interests in the region.

3.4.6.3 Sea Piracy/ Maritime Terrorism: The sea piracy is also a combined major threat to entire littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region. To examine the last two decades, record the sea piracy, especially Somali and Gulf of Aden Piracy are decreasing due to the combined efforts by naval forces in the IOR. Along with this, the idea of 'Blue Economy' led by Mauritius and Seychelles is another reason behind the multilateral engagement by naval forces to secure the maritime shipping routes in the Indo-Pacific region (Sakhuja, 2015). However, ICC International Maritime Bureau (here-in-after IMB) report- 2016 and Ocean beyond Piracy (here-in-after OBP) report- 2013, remain to scrutinize over the risk around the shipping routes in the Indo-Pacific

region. The report has also examined the new concern of the sea piracy in the Sulu Sea situated in the Philippines and East Malaysian Sea. The Sulu and Celebes Seas is a new hotspot of sea piracy, which is a victim of several successful kidnapping attempts of the sea piracy in the year 2016. It also promoted the maritime terrorism, say for instance the attacks on *SuperFerry 14* and *M Star* following the year 2004 and 2010 are a major example that sea routes are also not safe anymore from terrorism (You & Meng Wee, 2012). There is also the fact that the coastal regions are also more victims of terrorist attacks, such as 26/11 Mumbai attack one of the recent instances of maritime-based terrorism, which terrorist carried the sea route. Since 9/11 attack Al Qaeda and other its regional based terrorist groups increased their maritime domain in the Indo-Pacific region. In fact, the ISIS terrorist groups also following the same maritime strategy in the region. Therefore, the combined maritime security threats for the Indo-Pacific littoral countries by sea piracy and maritime terrorism are the reasonable cause behind the construction of the IP-RSA.

3.4.6.4 Global Warming: The last two decades are victim of the climate change and its vulnerable consequences survival threats to human lives. The littoral states, especially in the Indo-pacific region, are a victim of the increasing sea level, tropical cyclone, glaciers and rivers melting due to climate change. The Indo-Pacific region is one of the highly compressed marine ecosystems on the earth, more hazardous conditions due to unsought cyclones and storms, which are destroying the fishing boats, and other necessary aquaculture of the coastal region. Say, for instance, Myanmar coastal region ruined by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which was a major cause of 27,000 missing or dead fishing workers and loss of marine resources. Further, in November 2013 Philippines have also faced the major Typhoon Haiyan cyclone that affects the livelihood of thousands of coastal household's families (Michel, 2014). There are several others Pacific countries such as Thailand and Malaysia has faced the cyclone Jal that was the cause of major extensive human and material loss in the region. In addition to this, the coastal area of the Indian subcontinent also faced the cyclone Laila in 2010 and Hudhud in 2014, affected Sri Lanka and India's coastal states such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (Deccan Chronicle, 2016). Therefore, due to climate change and global warming, the entire

Indo-Pacific littoral countries are facing the serious marine ecological threats. On the same hand, Japan, Australia and New Zealand are also facing such marine challenges and vulnerabilities due to climate change. Some of the small Islands countries are facing the challenges of global warming and sea rise especially Maldives, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Indonesia etc. These coastal countries are increasing their several non-traditional security engagements to deepen multiple possibilities to construct the combined regional mechanism to face the marine challenges in the region. Therefore, the climate change and its upcoming unwanted consequences led to the littoral countries towards the construction of the IP-RSA.

3.4.6.5 Human Security: The concept of human security is a human center comprehensive approach to resolve the individual and social security issues of people in compare to existing state center traditional notion of security. There are several insecurities decorative by United Nation Development Program (here-in-after UNDP) in 1999, considers human security in such domains like food insecurity, water insecurity, health insecurity, economic insecurity, political insecurity, personal and environmental insecurities. Due to such insecurities, people of the Indo-Pacific countries also are not capable of lives their life with dignity, due to mismanagement of natural resources and the burden of overpopulation in the region.

In case of a South Asian region, all countries are facing the serious threats related to the food, water, shelters, poverty, nuclear proliferation, ethnonationalism, Maoist insurgencies and extremism groups (Dutt & Bansal, 2012). Say, for instance, the partition of the Indian subcontinent is part of British conspiracy, which was based on two nation theory, through this Pakistan emerged as a new nation-state after rejecting as a part of larger multicultural Indian society.

Since, the partition subcontinent was facing the several complications such as the settlement problem of refugees, ethnic and language problems, increasing poverty and unemployment ratio were major issues, bring the more insecurity among the people minds in the region. In fact, after the partition, Pakistan itself faced the internal trouble due to the emergence of ethno-nationalism in East Pakistan, which was the cause of new independent nation-state Bangladesh. The Tamil issue is also

another instance in the region, which brings the more complexities in the resettlement of the refugees in Sri Lanka as well as the Indian State of Tamil Nadu. Furthermore, UNDP's Human Development Report (herein after HDI) 2016, indicates that in the South Asian region there are several issues like gender inequalities, domestic violence, health inequalities and child mortality rate second after the sub-Saharan region.


Besides this, the population explosion, unequal distribution of natural resources, nuclear proliferation, poor condition of water and food quality and political instability are also major foundations behind the insecurities in the people's lives in the subcontinent. Similarly, in a case study of the South East Asian region, it has also faced the several human security issues, especially in the Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar Indonesia Thailand and Philippines. Say for instance, during the Vietnam War the Vietnamese people have faced the major human right violence in the region. Likewise, the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia was also responsible for approximately 1.7 million people killings.

Currently, the internal conflicts in the Southern Philippines, Thailand and religious and ethnic conflicts on Rohingya issue in Myanmar is serious human security concerns in the Southeast Asian region. Furthermore, the declaration of 'War on Drugs' by President Rodrigo Duterte in Philippines came out with serious human security concerns. According to Philippines police records 4,000 thousand people killed in the crackdown, but the actual death tally is more than it (France-Presse, 2017).

Moreover, North Korean regime led by Kim Jong-Un and some level human right violations by the People Republic of China (here-in-after PRC) is also serious human security threats in the region. There are also illegal fishing trends in the Indo-pacific littoral countries, which some time brings serious human rights violation driving force behind the backdrop of new security construction in the region. Therefore, common human security challenges and other illegal fishing trends led to the littoral countries of the region towards the IP-RSA. It creates the hope to free and secure environment for upcoming generation in the region to live with social dignity and self-respect.

3.5 Emerging Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region: Limitations

Figure: - 3. 3 limitations of the Enhancing IP-RSA



Source: prepared by Researcher

Since, the examination of supporting components of the enhancing IP-RSA, there is also skeptic atmosphere among the academics that IP-RSA will take place as strong regional security collaboration such as the EU and NATO or as an open regionalism in the region. However, in the IP-RSA, several diverse components distinguish the new construction from existing regional security constructions. The non-western or Asian conception of regional security architecture may fluctuate from Western regional security building. Therefore, behind the construction of the enhancing IP-RSA, there are some limitations that still restricting the possibilities of the upcoming

regional security architecture. The mention figure 3.3 is showing the possible limitations on the enhancing IP-RSA.

3.5.1 Religious & Ethnic Diversity: The Indo-Pacific is one of the foremost region in the global politics which is sharing the multiplex variety of religion and cultural. The region is the hub of the socio-cultural and religious philosophy, which gives the way of life towards the spiritual and internal well being. Say for instance, the Indian subcontinent is itself a place of four fruitful religious philosophies such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism etc. Later, the Islam and Christianity was spread surrounding the sub-continent by Islamic invaders and western colonial powers like French, Dutch, Portuguese and British. Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific region is also sharing the multiple ethnicities, which distinguishes in macro and micro-regional identities of the groups of people.

The Indian subcontinent itself carries the multiple ethnic, linguistic identities, which majority of the population is descended within the Indo-Aryan and other linguistic-ethnic groups in surrounding countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. On the other hand, the Southeast Asian region also a matrix of various different linguistic-ethnicities and races such as Sino-Tibetan, Chinese, Tai Kadai, Austro-Asiatic, and Indo-Aryan-Dravidian. Therefore, due to the diverse social-cultural pattern of the social structure is responsible for the rising of ethnic-nationalism, which create the complications of regional security construction in the region. The diverse nature of the ethnic-linguistic groups also impacts the socialisation process, which increase the gaps among the ethnic groups on the basis of color, creed, and language. Therefore, religious and ethnic diversity in the Indo-Pacific region somewhere limiting the scope of enhancing IP-RSA.

3.5.2 Ideological & Civilizational Deviation: The regional construction of any regions based on their inclusive development and growth of civilizational and ideological symmetry among the people of any specific region. However, the Indo-Pacific region is a matrix of civilizational linkage through historical, cultural and commercial connectivity by land and sea routes. The basic structure of the IP-RSA can understand by the discourse of clash of civilization theory given by Samuel. P.

Huntington, which helps to understand the struggle of power within different civilizations of the world. He has classified the world unconventionality under the seven or eight major civilizations and their possible interaction among them. The demarcations of these civilizations are in Western, Islamic, Confucian, Hindu, Japanese, Latin American, Slavic-Orthodox including African civilization. These civilizations have diversely standard of socio-cultural, religious, regional and ethnonationalism heterogeneities (Huntington, 1993). Therefore, in a case study of enhancing IP-RSA is also sharing the different multiplex diversity such as socio-cultural, religious and ethnic heterogeneity.

The littoral countries of the region are experiencing the convergence or divergence trends within the units, which build the vulnerable situation to construct the IP-RSA. These, diverse patterns in the Indo-pacific littoral countries are limiting the construction of common regional consciousness in the people minds. On the other hand, the Indo-Pacific littoral countries also experiencing the dissimilar nature of political, ideological backgrounds, such as Arabian or Muslim countries is sharing the mix of Islamic and parliamentary democratic patterns, some are experiencing the president or parliamentary democracy and others are still experiencing the constitutional monarchy and authoritarian ideological pattern in the political sphere. Therefore, due to the dissimilar pattern of civilizations and their socio-cultural, religious, political and ethnic groups in the Indo-pacific littoral countries are fundamental concerns to delimit the scope of enhancing IP-RSA.

3.5.3 Geographical Factors: The geographical location is the deciding factor to predict the future survival possibilities of any region of the world. Therefore, the investigating argument of IP-RSA is its geostrategic location and its significance in term of economic, political and maritime security perspective. Mainly, the enhancing possibilities of the IP-RSA have based on sea-based regional connectivity than land and space connectivity. Due to more dependency on the sea-based connectivity, the regional construction may lead to the open regionalism, which greetings other surrounding regions to join new regional construction. It generates the new uncertainties about the boundary demarcation of the IP-RSA with existing regional

security patterns. Therefore, the littoral countries of the region realized their geographical limitations to construct the new security patterns, due to open maritime access for trade and shipments activities in the region. Actually, the Indo-Pacific littoral countries are still surviving with political instability and serious law and order problems. These countries are also facing some serious boundary disputes such in the Indian sub-continent Indo-Pak unresolved Kashmir dispute, Israel-Philistine conflict over historical city Jerusalem and SCS disputes among the China and ASEAN countries. These major geographical disputes pushed these countries towards the maritime regional security collaboration in the region. However, it is not possible until the geographical boundary disputes not solve. Therefore, disputes are creating the deference behind the construction of enhancing new regional security architecture in the region.

3.5.4 The Absence of Grand Economic Mechanism: The lack of a grand economic approach is another reason for limiting the possibilities of the enhancing IP-RSA. There are fundamental deciding components of any regional security, construction in the global politics, following the sequence of proximity such as historical, cultural, commercial and security alignments. Say, for instance, the Indo-Pacific region is also facing the lack of greater economic contiguity within the region. However, there are existing regional or sub-regional economic and cultural groups such as SAARC, BIMSTEC, Mekong Ganga Cooperation (here-in-after MGC) and IORA, maintaining the common regional maritime interests in the IOR. On the other hand, in the Pacific Ocean ASEAN, ARF, APEC, ASEAN plus Three (ASEAN + 3) leading the regional maritime interests in the region.

However, these existing regional or sub-regional grouping among the littoral countries which are fulfilling their economic, political and maritime security interests, threatened by China's rise and its over territorial claim in the SCS. The Indo-Pacific littoral countries such as India, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN countries are suspicious about China's rise, due to a Japanese dispute over the Sankaku Island, Himalayan boundary dispute with India and SCS maritime disputes with such ASEAN countries like Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. Nonetheless, the US has also

pro-active over China's rise and its assertiveness over maritime disputes, impulse Washington to deepen its existing geostrategic proximity with its ASEAN alliances. Therefore, the absence of greater regional economic mechanism is limiting the new possibilities of IP-RSA. However, recently there are some trends or partnerships indicating towards greater regional arrangements among the littoral countries of the region. Say, for instance, China has proposed the OBOR initiative to revive its historical land and sea-based commercial connectivity in the region. It is seeking the new possibilities of grand regional commercial connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region.

Though, India has opposed OBOR project over sovereignty issues, as same anxieties with the US, Japan, and Australia are also do not actively participating due to dissimilar economic, political and maritime security concerns. The US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has shown the Washington interest to build the roads across Afghanistan and its surrounding countries to connect the Middle East and Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, for connecting the Indian Ocean with Pacific Ocean region Washington has proposed the 'Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor' with three major actors such as India, Japan and Australia (Hindustan Times, 2017). In the same direction, both India-Japan already signed one agreement with all African governments in the AAGC, which will develop infrastructure and digital informational connectivity with the vision of open and free Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, there are possibilities of the greater Indo-Pacific regional arrangements between the littoral countries in the near future. It will decide the future of IP-RSA that it could be a more extending version or limited around the Sino-US bipolar power rivalry. Thus, the evolving IP-RSA is diverse in nature due to two dissimilar mechanisms, which one is leading by China and another one depends on Indo-US-Japan-Australia's quadrilateral strategic partnership in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

3.5.5 The Absence of Leading Player: The US has dynamic obsession to build the enhancing possibilities of the IP-RSA. It is also a long time security provider through signing the SENTO and ANZUS treaties and its 'hub and spokes' bilateral security arrangements with Japan, South Korea, and some ASEAN countries in the region. However, rapid China's and its assertiveness in the SCS, the US has revived its

historical proximity especially after the declaration of Obama's 'Asia-Pivot Policy' in 2011. In this regards, the US has deepened its economic, political, strategic, diplomatic and humanitarian configuration with ASEAN countries, along with some extent of the bilateral relations with the South Asian countries. However, there is still uncertainties on the US leading position in the IP-RSA due to its relative decline on the prevent looming economic disparity, political crisis, global terrorism, climate change and its stand on non-traditional security issues. Especially after the President Trump's has won, the US Presidential election under the slogan of '*America First*' has created the more uncertainties among the littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region. Say for instance, since the establishment of NATO the US has played the central role to lead the Western European security architecture.

On the other hand, in the case of IP-RSA, the US is hesitating to lead the new regional construction due to its policy uncertainties especially after the Trump administration came in the power. On the other hand, the formation of the IP-RSA also depends on the middle powers rise and their extra-regional role in the region. There are such middle powers like India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Iran, and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are playing a very active role behind the construction of the IP-RSA. Though Iran and Saudi Arabia are still not actively involved in this new regional security construction, but both have intensified their geostrategic proximity with these littoral countries in the region. However, the middle powers coalition still is not able to define the appropriate regional arrangements to play the leading role in the construction IP-RSA. There is also insecurity among the littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific region that the US or middle powers coalition will led the IP-RSA in the near future. Thus, the absence of the responsible leading player is limiting the scope of enhancing regional security construction in the region.

3.5.6 Multiplex World Order: The regional security architecture of any region in the world depends on existing patterns of the World Order. Say for instance, during the cold-war period the global politics has divided in the bipolar movement, whereby two major powers played the active role to shaping the security architecture of the world politics. Since, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the US has enjoyed the uni- multipolar arrangements of the world order (Huntington, 1999). However, after

the 9/11 attack and the US relative decline in solving the Ukraine, Syria, and Afghanistan crisis have created the space of other emerging players such as China, India, Russia, Germany, Brazil, and South Africa for making the theatre of multipolar world order. However, there are different schools of thought, which have given the different interpretation about the new world order. The one group of scholars is predicting that the 21st century will lead by multi-polar world order, which diverse powers will be the centers of attraction, there will no existence of unipolar or bipolar world order.

The second group of scholars favors the Sino-US leading bipolar world order, which lead to the traditional ideological rivalry in the bipolar world order. Third, group of scholars has given the different interpretation that upcoming world order will take a shape as multiplex world order, which favors the rise of regional powers and declines the US-led world order. In spite of this, the US will still play an active role in the multiplex world order. However, the rise of multiple key actors and their complex interdependence with each surrounding major powers in the form of wider and complex interdependence in such fields like a commercial, communications and share the vulnerability of the transnational non-traditional security threats by non-states actors are fundamental components behind the creation of the multiplex world order. Say for instance in the multiplex Cinema there are altered movies are running in the several different theatres making the different shows of choices for audiences.

Hence, the regionalism has less operative in the developing world due to demand of post-liberal world, which is focus the trans-regional connectivity rather than limit around the regional boundaries (Acharya, 2014). Therefore, in the same scrutiny of the construction of the enhancing IP-RSA can also limit by the upcoming developing world, which rigid regionalism cannot play an active role due to a variety of bound and complex nature among the regional and global powers. However, the construction of the enhancing IP-RSA is in the process and there is no such calculation that coming world order will take a shape as multiplex world order. Therefore, uncertainty about the developing world order also creates the new investigation on the enhancing IP-RSA that it will construct the open regionalism or limit around the uncertainties of the developing world.

3.6 The Way Ahead

Therefore, there are converging and diverging factors working behind the construction of the IP-RSA. The international scholars and security experts are making the common examination that region is the center of the attraction for the great and regional powers due to power landscape from Trans-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific region. Further, the regionalism process in Asian continent also focused on Indo-Pacific littoral countries due to the geostrategic and geopolitical juxtaposition of regional and great powers politics. The Mahan's theory of maritime command of the sea and Spykman's Rimland thesis helps to understand the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific region. Further, by implementing the Buzan's RSC theory to understand the enhancing security architecture in the region makes full of clarities about the new security architecture.

The fundamental arguments in the chapter helps to understand the new evolving regional security architecture through implement the existing paradigms. However, some experts claimed that it is too early to say that there is security architecture is emerging but yes, possibilities cannot deny. It is also depends on regional and great power politics and their powerful alignment with other littoral states will decide the future of upcoming IP-RSA. It also depends on China's way to solve the maritime or land disputes with neighboring countries and the US reaction on Beijing's alternation in the region, will decide the future direction of the IP-RSA. Therefore, the region is full of uncertainties and possibilities to predict the enhancing IP-RSA in the upcoming years.

Chapter- 4

Indian Perspective on the Emerging Security Architecture in the Indo- Pacific Region

This chapter has achieved the second objective of the research, which deals especially with Indian perspective on enhancing IP-RSA. It examines the two different phases of India's regionalism process through adopting the top-down and bottom-up approaches in the greater Indo-Pacific region. It also investigates India's regionalism process; based on its multilateral engagement with regional and sub-regional organizations such as SAARC, BIMSTEC, Mekong Ganga Cooperation (here-in-after MGC), IORA and now IP-RSA is New Delhi's larger regionalism approach in the region. The chapter also analyzes the major and regional powers relations in the Indo-Pacific Maritime New Great Game (here-in-after IP-MNKG) and their coordination with other small countries in the region. The chapter investigates India's foreign policy approach and its upcoming challenges in the IP-RSA. It also focuses on India's convergence and divergence factors and its constructive role to define the future construction of the IP-RSA. Lastly, the chapter concludes with India's larger future vision for free and open Indo-Pacific region.

4.1 Indian Perspective toward Enhancing IP-RSA

As a rising great power desire, India has an active role behind the construction of the IP-RSA. However, it has different perspective towards the IP-RSA in comparison to the US and other regional powers. As Abhay Kumar Singh from Indian Defense and Security Analysis (here-in-after IDSA) fallow is stated that, "India has the potential to lead the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. Therefore, it needs to play a pro-active role with other relevant actors in shaping the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. He supports the just of Prime Minister Modi's speech at Shangri-La dialogue this year, comprehensively refers India's perspective in the Indo-Pacific region" (A. Kumar, email interview, August 28, 2018). Further, in favor of this Rajesh Basrur also stated that, "India has a role in the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture but largely restricted to its Indian Ocean components. It has a strategic

linkage with the US and Japan in order to counter the maritime security threats from China. However, it does not support the position of any of its strategic partners in their disputes with China; vice versa, they also do not support India on India-China border disputes (R. Basrur, emailed interview, September 14, 2018)". Therefore, India has a proactive and balancing role in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. To examine India's perspective, it is necessary to understand the classification of various phases of enhancing IP-RSA and India's role to construct the new security arrangement in the Indo-Pacific region. India's horizontal shift towards its eastward and westward neighboring countries has displayed its landslide pivot in its foreign policy. The fundamental examination of India's perspective about enhancing IP-RSA can categorize within two phases. (1). Pro-active phase (2). Contemporary phase. These are major phases, which is help to understand India's perspective in enhancing IP-RSA.

4.1.1 Pro-active Phase (1947-1991): The pro-active phase of India's foreign policy does not define New Delhi's clear stand on regional and extra-regional construction due to Nehru's doctrine of non-alignment approach which focused on peaceful coexistence and neutral stand within the bipolar world order (Malone, 2011). At the same time, Nehru had also realized the importance of India's soft power capacities to deal with neighboring countries. Since independence, he has announced that India's foreign policy will based upon peaceful coexistence with its neighboring and Southeast Asian countries, which share historical, cultural, religious and economic commonality with us. Even, he had been also enthusiastic to increase peaceful coexistence with China, Indonesia, Japan, and central Asia, including Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan and Egypt through following the Non-Alignment approach, which is dissimilar peaceful track from two extreme traditional ideological rivalries in the bipolar movement (Nehru, 1946; Somaranjan, 1993).

Nehru was clearly determined about India's future foreign policy, especially with Southeast Asian nations, based on equal coexistence and friendship rather than following the dominance configuration from history. Therefore, the historical, cultural and religious similarity between India and Southeast Asian nations led to the mutual trust and commercial proximity with the ASEAN countries in the

region. However, the historical hesitation has discontinued after the fall of former USSR, open the new possibilities for New Delhi to look at the pragmatic approach towards the extra-regional configurations with Southeast Asian countries, started with the announcement of 'look East' policy by former Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao in 1991 (Malone & Mukherjee, 2010). The horizontal shift in the Indian foreign policy towards its eastward gave the new height in India's foreign affairs in a late 20th century. It also increased the new possibilities for new regional arrangements after the fall of former USSR. The beginning phase of India's foreign policy has shifted towards its Southeast Asian neighbors based on mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence. It retains the foundation stone of enhancing new regional security construction, makes more responsible India's position as deciding factor of the enhancing IP-RSA. The mention figure 4.1 is showing the three phases of India's engagement to develop the enhancing IP-RSA.

4.1.2 Contemporary Phase (1991- till date): The contemporary approach of India's engagement to construct the IP-RSA is more vibrant and active in the region. The waves of regionalism and globalization are offering the new direction of India's foreign policy first time in history to construct open extra-regional arrangement with another region. At the same time, New Delhi is facing the security dilemma from China's expansionist policy in the Himalayan region and its assertiveness towards SCS. Beijing has modernized its military structure, increased its multilateral engagement with surrounding regional institutions to fill the power vacuum in the Asian regionalism after the fall of former USSR. It increased traditional or non-traditional security concerns for India's growing regionalism (Frost, 2008).

Meanwhile, 9/11 terrorist attack and the US instant response by launching 'war against terror' policy in Afghanistan against the Taliban bring the new security paradigm in the South Asian regional security framework (Ahmed & Mishbah, et al., 2015). On the other hand, to counter China's growing regionalism led to New Delhi towards the US, Japan, Australia and ASEAN countries to construct the new security framework in the region. The US has acknowledged the term Indo-Pacific, which has supported by Japan, Australia, and ASEAN countries. Therefore, the New Delhi has

also given the acceptance to term Indo-Pacific to fulfill its own economic, geostrategic and security interests. Therefore, the convergence of India's interests with the US and other regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and ASEAN countries extent India's role as a central power in the enhancing IP-RSA, due to its geostrategic location in the region. Nevertheless, New Delhi is also increasing its geostrategic proximity with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries by keeping the balance with its consistent defense and security partnership with Israel. Currently, Prime Minister Modi is first Indian Prime Minister ever who visited Israel in 2017 after its independence, which opened the new chapter of Indo-Israel relations.


Similarly, India has also makes balance with the Middle East allies through its first ever Palestine visit in February 2018, which Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas asked for meditating a deal with Israel to replace the alternative of the US in the region (Toameh, 2018). It has shown India's growing geostrategic and diplomatic approach towards its westward, increasing the greater possibilities of India's greater role in the enhancing IP-RSA. India's horizontal approach towards its neighboring regions is increasing the new possibilities of the IP-RSA to counter the traditional and non-traditional security threats in the Asian theatre. Therefore, India's extra-regional bid expected recognition as an emerging power makes more a consistent prediction of the enhancing IP-RSA. Therefore, currently India is a fulcrum of new regional security arrangements due to its geostrategic location and its rising aspirations in the Indo-Pacific region.

4.2 Shifting Indian Perspective: Indian Ocean to Indo-Pacific Regionalism

The waves of regionalism and globalization have started, especially in late 20th century. The nations adopted the new tendencies to increase their regional influence through formations of regional grouping such as NATO, SEATO, CENTO, OPEC and ASEAN, SAARC etc. The main purpose of these regional constructions was to achieve combined regional as well as national interests through sharing historical, cultural, religious identities within the one political unit. The process of regionalism started in the western countries and later shifted towards the Asian continent. At the same time, the trends have also opened the door for rising powers to increase their

role in the regional security constructions, which limit the scope of external player to invade in any disputed region of the world. Further, it also increased the scope of regional powers to increase their political milieu around its neighboring countries. The Indian approach to build its own political milieu in global politics based on anti-colonial sentiments of Nehruvian doctrine, which is ideological and political in nature, focused on a top-down approach to increase the close relations with newly independent Asian and African countries (Yhome & Maini, 2017).

The fundamental argument is behind the implementing of top-down approach to understand India's vision for Asian regionalism based on India's doctrine of NAM. However, after the Sino-Indian war in 1962, the myth of Asian regionalism has broken, shifted New Delhi towards semi-alliance with the former USSR, especially during the former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi regime. Later, the process of regionalism occurred during the Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi regime, while New Delhi expresses its determination to construct the South Asian Regional cooperation with its neighboring countries. It was the beginning stage of India's regionalization




process due to the insight of Soviet diffuseness in the bipolar world. Therefore, India shifted its regionalism process based on pragmatic and strategic realities rather than follow the traditional ideological and anti-colonial sentiments. Therefore, the bottom-up approach provides

the open, pragmatic approach to New Delhi to move its reorganization process towards the construction of the South Asian Regionalism. As result in a sequence of regionalism process it has established the SAARC with other South Asian countries. Later, the process of regionalism is followed by BIMSTEC, MGC, IORA, IONS as an extra-regional engagement in regionalism process. Currently, New Delhi is shifting toward the new construction of the IP-RSA.

India is more active toward the construction of IP-RSA, which can fulfill its dream to establish its regionalism process in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, the figures no. 4.1, 4.2 is helps to understand India's top-down and bottom-up approaches to achieve the regionalization process in the Asian regionalism. However, the Asian regionalism is much more diverse and open in comparison than European regionalism due to more diverse socio-cultural and religious involvements of other regional and great powers in the region.

To understand the growing India's regionalism firstly it is obligatory to understand the process of its different layers of regionalism, such as regional layer, extra-regional layer and



interregional layer of its relations with surrounding countries of the region. The figure no. 4.3 is showing India's Growing regionalism in the global politics.

4.2.1 Regional Layer (SAARC): The regional layer of India's regionalism has been in full swing since its independence. However, due to the Cold-War rivalry between two superpowers, New Delhi was the undefined position has choose the dissimilar way as a leader of third world countries through the establishment of NAM in 1961. At the same time, the trend of regionalism enlarged due to the US and USSR's multi-alignment approaches toward the surrounding regions to establish regional groups such NATO, EU, CENTO, SENTO, Warsaw Pact etc. It also gave the space for South and Southeast Asian countries to construct the new regional security arrangement late 20th century. Say, for instance, in the South Asian region, there is a regional level layer of India's regionalism, whereby India has a strong role behind the institutional construction. SAARC is one of the regional level layers in South Asia; initiated by former Bangladesh President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to construct the platform for regional integration in the South Asian region likewise ASEAN. However, Indo-Pak


both were restricted the political construction in economic, cultural and scientific cooperation due to the early and immature stage of regional integration. Later, during the time of the former Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan created the common regional conscience between India and Pakistan, pushed both countries towards the formation of SAARC under the common minimum program in 1985. Even, India as a big power in the region also made some compromises on minor issues to settling the process of regional integration in South Asia. Later, the Islamabad meeting derived the way forward to the political direction for evolving regional construction in South Asia (Tiwari, 1985). However, the regional integration process in the Asian continent, especially in the case of South Asian regionalism, is based on sovereignty based not sovereignty eroding like European regionalism (Acharya, 2003; Haywood, 2011).

At present, the SAARC countries are facing the more non-traditional security issues, especially cross-border terrorism, which is threatening the sovereignty of almost all states. Indian Prime Minister Modi has given the positive indication for regional integration by inviting the head of SAARC countries on his Oath ceremony, later created anxiety due to Uri attack in September 2016 in India from Pakistan based terrorists. Immediately, after this instance, India has boycotted the 19th SAARC summit in Nepal, followed by Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Bhutan, shown India's regional power stake, confirmed its leading power role in the region (Bhattacharjee, 2016; Muni, 1985). New Delhi also carried the surgical strike around the Line of Control (here-in-after LoC) after this major attack.

However, SAARC cannot measure only by Indo-Pak traditional rivalry, there are some achievements made remarkable history of SAARC such as ratification of the South Asian Free Trade Area (here-in-after SAFTA) in SAARC summit at Islamabad in 2004. In addition to this, further India has proposed Afghanistan membership in SAARC, whereby Kabul got full membership in 2008. Hence, Pakistan is also intended for full membership of China and Iran for greater SAARC, which may restrict India's unilateral influence in the region (Iqbal, 2016). Currently, India has launched the South Asian Satellite, which is part of its space diplomacy deepen its regionalization process in the region. Therefore, India has a active role to define the

regional construction in the South Asian regionalism. However, New Delhi also intent about its ‘Big brother’ tag, which sometimes makes uncomfortable to surrounding countries under the shadow of growing India’s regionalism. In fact, currently these small countries in the region are inviting China to counterbalance India’s unilateral acceptance in the region. Say, for instance, recently small Islands countries are inviting China for ports and infrastructural development surrounding the IOR. Instead of all these new forces at work, New Delhi still has central role to construct its regionalism process in the South Asian region. Gradually, India is strengthening its regionalism process through reviving historical, cultural, religious, geographical, economic and more recently geostrategic connectivity in the South Asian countries.

Figure: - 4. 3 Growing Layers of India’s Regionalism



Source: Prepared by Researcher

4.2.2 Extra-Regional Layer (BIMSTEC, Mekong Ganga Cooperation, IORA and IONS, MILAN): An extra-regional layer of India’s regionalism has crossed the bridge of Myanmar to increase its connectivity towards its eastward neighbors. It has also realized its limits in the SAARC, due to its traditional boundary conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir and cross-boundary terrorism issues have pushed the Indian policymakers to rethink about other possible regional institutional mechanism with its eastward neighbors. Therefore, India has established the BIST-EC (Bangladesh,

India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation) with its eastern neighbors in 1997, later converted in BIMSTEC after joining Myanmar, Nepal, and Bhutan (Sharma, 2009). The group is connecting the significant sub-regions in India such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh from Bay of Bengal sub-region, Nepal and Bhutan, from Himalayan sub-region and Myanmar and Thailand from Mekong sub-region (Yhome & Maini, 2017).

The BIMSTEC countries have decided several priority sectors such as economic, energy, technology, tourism, counter-terrorism, transport etc. It gives the opportunities to cross the bridge of South Asian regional integration towards the Indo-Pacific region. Further, India has also extended its visualization of regional cooperation towards its eastern neighbors, initiated by the MGC in 2000 with five Southeast Asian countries such Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, which is based on the Ganga and the Mekong civilizational rivers cooperation. Therefore, New Delhi has revived its historical, cultural and religious engagement with these countries from the last two decades, especially in the field of economic cooperation which reached nearby US\$ 19.31 billion in 2015 (Chaturvedi, 2017).

India has gained wider market access in these ASEAN countries that has increased New Delhi's close proximity with other ASEAN countries. Therefore, India is strengthening its historical, cultural, religious and economic proximity with Southeast countries. Similarly, towards its South, it has increased its maritime sphere of influence in the IOR. It has established the Indian Ocean Rim Association (here-in-after IORA) in 1997 with South Africa, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Tanzania, Madagascar, Mozambique countries to construct the maritime regionalism for sustainable maritime growth and economic cooperation among littoral countries of the region (Yhome & Maini, 2017). It is based on open regionalism to strengthen the open maritime trade and commercial activities in the IOR. India has an active role in this regionalization process due to its wider maritime naval presence from the Persian Gulf to Strait of Malacca. Recently, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (here-in-after IONS) has launched in 2008 to increase the regional cooperation in the littoral countries of IOR. Nonetheless, the MILAN Navy Exercise is also one of the initiative

taken by New Delhi in 1995, whereby naval exercise held in 2018. In this exercise, more than eighteen countries participated to increase the geopolitical and geostrategic compatibility among surrounding countries to face the combined maritime challenges around the IOR to free and fair access in the Strait of Malacca and Hormuz (Parameswaran, 2018; The Times of India, 2018). Therefore, India's active involvement in extra-regional groups has increased India's regionalism, process in the neighboring countries including maritime domain in the Indian as well as the Pacific Ocean.

4.2.3 Interregional Layer (IP-RSA): The interregional layer of India's regionalism has increased particularly after the fall of the former USSR, diverted New Delhi policy selections towards Southeast Asia through 'Look East' Asia policy first time in History. It was the beginning of India's regional reconciliation towards the other regions of the world. Along with this, it also carried its neighborhood policy through the declaration of 'Gujral Doctrine' by former Prime Minister Indra Kumar Gujral in September 1996. Therefore, India's approach with neighboring countries anticipated it towards extra-regional engagement especially with Southeast Asian countries to increase geostrategic and diplomatic proximity for the construction of new regionalism. The process for broader regionalism has started, especially after the 9/11 attack, made the paradigm shift in the US foreign policy towards Pakistan to India in the South Asian region. Further, it strengthened by an Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 and anti-terrorist alliance. Alongside, Indian Prime Man Mohan Singh also acknowledged the term Indo-Pacific in India-ASEAN Summit December, 2012.

Consistently, the term used by Indian ambassadors in foreign countries such Nirupama Rao, Subrahmanyam Jaishanker in the US, Vishnu Prakash in South Korea to consider geostrategic importance of the region in Indian maritime strategy (Scott, 2012). Therefore, India overstretched its traditional doctrine of NAM and enlarged its engagement with Southeast Asian countries. The proximity is not limited around the cultural, religious and economic juxtaposition, but more than such geostrategic and diplomatic engagements cement the construction of the IP-RSA. In this Process, New Delhi has signed the Joint strategic vision with the US for Indian

and the Pacific Ocean; framework for security and cooperation with Australia and strategic and global partnership with Japan (Bauah, 2016). It comes in true practice when Tri-national combined Malabar naval exercise hold by India-Japan-US in the Bay of Bengal in July 2017. It shows strength of India's maritime security diplomacy, as an extra-regional attempt to construct the Indo-Pacific regionalism in the coming years (Indian Express, 2016). India has also enlarged its defense and maritime security engagement with Australia in 2017. New Delhi has also invited the head of all ASEAN countries on Republic day parade as a chief guest on 26 January 2018. It gives more strengthen for India's extra-regional regionalism, especially from the last two decades. There are also possibilities that the access of India's regionalism would increase in the 21st century, due to its horizontal maritime connectivity towards its westward and eastward boundaries.

New Delhi is also revitalizing its economic and geostrategic proximity with Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Quarter including Israel. Furthermore, towards the African Continent, New Delhi has launched the AAGC with its strategic partner Japan to Boost the inter-regional economic connectivity with respect sovereignty and of course to counter or balance the Chinese OBOR Initiative in the region (The Hindu, 2017). Therefore, currently, New Delhi's foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's leadership brings a new paradigm shift in Indian foreign policy towards its surrounding regions, increasing India's regional approach towards regional to inter-regional process. Therefore, consistently New Delhi is supporting the evolving concept of IP-RSA due to increasing layers of its regionalism from regional to inter-regional level, which is providing the greater access for the nourishment of India's regionalism in the greater Asian theatre.

4.3 Indo-Pacific Maritime New Great Game (IP-MNGG)

The term 'Great Game' used at the beginning of the 20th century by British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly, later popularized by author Rudyard Kipling in Nobel Prize winner work *Kim* in 1904. He has popularized the term in favor to understand the background of the great game of political conflict between two great powers such as the Great Britain and the Russian empire in Central Asia. The Great


Game rivalry conquered Russia towards some parts of the Central Asia was quite happy to stay away from British India, ended around frontline of the Persia, Afghanistan and the Himalayan region of the Tibet (Yorke, 2013; Szczepanski, 2017; Aubrey, 2018). The initial inclinations of a great game started by the Lord Ellenborough in January 1830 after the establishment of new trade routes from India to Bukhara by using the Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey as a buffer zone to prevent Russia's maritime sea influence in the Persian Gulf. To attain this, the British fought four major unsuccessful wars such as the first Anglo-Saxon war in 1838; first Anglo-Sikh-war in 1843; second Anglo-Sikh-war in 1848 including second Anglo-Afghan-War in 1878, resulted in Russia to take over the control of several parts of Khanates and Bukhara. Same as in Tibet, British established their control for only two years, replaced by Qing Dynasty China later allowed into Tibet as a self-rule admiration. However, after the great game end with the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, whereby Persia was divided into the two parts, the Northern part covers from Russia and Southern zone under the British control. The convention also gave the edge to the British Empire to officially protect buffer state Afghanistan in the region. Therefore, the unique nature of the great game has increased the struggle of power between two imperial powers (Edwards, 2003; Szczepanski, 2017).

Hence, during the Cold-War the British were in regressive position due to anti-colonial movement in the region. The US has filled the power vacuum to oppose the former Soviet Union influence under bipolar movement. It increased the possibilities of the new great game, whereby the US and Russia were involved in the central Asian sphere of power influence for long-term oil, energy and of course socio-cultural and ideological hegemony. The concept of the new great game was also used to gain the sphere of geostrategic, geopolitical and security interests around central Asia, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Indian sub-continent. It also includes the Sino-Indian competition around the Southeast Asian region notably in the Mekong basin (Edwards, 2003; Mohan, 2003). Similarly, some scholars considered that after the relative decline of the US Uni-polarity, Russia and China will challenge the US hegemony whereby other regional powers such as India, Japan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would also play an active role in this grand chessboard. In the old great

game, there was one winner and one loser game but in the Indo-Pacific Maritime New Great Game (here in after IP-MNGG) may be the last great game with no winners (Hauner, 1984; Mitha, 2008). Therefore, the nature of the new great game is different from the old great game whereby, the regional or rising powers have a more active role along with the great powers politics in the region. Along with this, in new great game actors have also overstretched their wider sphere of influence through various determinants such as socio-cultural, religious, geostrategic, geopolitical, geo-economic', security and defense engagement through land, sea and space routes.

4.3.1 Theatre of the Indo-Pacific Maritime New Great Game

Figure: - 4. 4 Theatre of the IP-MNGG



Source: Prepared by Researcher

Since, the end of the old great game, the world has faced the two world- wars, which spoil the myth of the 20th century as a peaceful and coexistence time of human history. Immediately after the Second world- war the world politics have divided into bipolar movement due to Cold-War rivalry between two superpowers such as the US and the former USSR. However, after the fall of former USSR, the myth of Mackinder heartland land power has broken, and the US emerged as a sole power in the unipolar world order. The US has focused the Mahan and Spykman's notion of

maritime sea power, whereby derived the US policy choices toward the Antarctic to Pacific oceans. However, it also intervened in the IOR through constructing of the Diego Garcia port to keep deep eyes on the Soviet movement in the region. The Spykman understood the geostrategic significance of the rimland region, whereby the center of the attraction was both China and India. He understood the geostrategic and geopolitical role of these two rising spots to define the future of the Asian continent. Ironically, China's footprint towards the SCS and IOR bring more mistrust in Indian policymakers due to China's claim over the McMahon line in the Himalayan region and its overlapping claim over 'nine-dash line' in the SCS dispute. Further, it has also introduced the OBOR project to reintegrate the Asian continent whereby it is going to revive its historical, cultural, economic, diplomatic and geostrategic engagement in the region.

The maritime competition between two risings spots in the Indo-Pacific region expands the sphere of the new great game from Central Asia to Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, sometimes scholars called it 'Maritime New Great Game' or 'Indo-Pacific Maritime New Great Game' due to a wider sphere of influence by Sino-Indian naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific region. There are other regional powers like Iran, Pakistan, Japan, Australia, and some ASEAN Countries also playing a very active role in the maritime new great game (Dutta, 2017; Prakash, 2018). However, still great powers such as the US, Russia and the European Union (here-in-after EU) has a wider role in the maritime new great game in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the maritime new great game epicenter of two rising powers India and China, which are going to play a crucial role to determine the nature of the maritime great game in the region.

A part of this wider strategy, Beijing is increasing its geopolitical and geostrategic presence in the Islands nations through building ports development, such as the Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Trincomalee in Maldives and bargaining with other Islands nations like Mauritius and Seychelles in the IOR (Johnson, 2015; Upadhyaya, 2017). Approximately, these Island nations are playing China card to balance India's unilateral balance in the South Asian region. Even, Pakistan used the

China card to balance India's influence through joining CPEC, which has given the access to PLA naval activities over Gwadar port and PoK. In response to this, New Delhi is building the Chabahar port in Iran to connect Afghanistan's Zaranj- Delaram highway, which is building by New Delhi under a trilateral agreement between India-Iran and Afghanistan (Mohan, 2012; Bhattacharjee & Sivaraman, 2016). India is also playing the Vietnam card, to break down its geostrategic limitation around the Indian Ocean hereby it moved towards the maritime circle of the Pacific Ocean. New Delhi also acknowledged the term Indo-Pacific on the larger scale of international platforms, hereby other maritime power, such as the US, Japan, Australia, and Indonesia accepted India's geostrategic move in the region. Therefore, the maritime competition between India-China is overlapping the maritime interests of each other, led to the new great game towards the wider scale of the Sea-space-cyber expansions in the wider sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

The US is already way ahead from other powers in these practices, which pushed other rising power to increase their sea-space-cyber potentials to play an active role in the maritime new great game in the region. Nonetheless, some scholars considered the maritime great game between the US-China's maritime interests led to the maritime competition in the Asia-Pacific region. However, actual theatre of the Indo-Pacific maritime great game is more complex due to nature of converging and diverging factors among the great and regional powers (Seidler, 2013). Therefore, the theatre of IP-MNGG is more complex and uncertain in comparison to old great game which only two major great powers were involved to fulfill their interests.

4.3.2 Indo-Pacific Region: Grand Chessboard of Great Power Politics

Evolving IP-RSA is grand chessboard of great power politics due to their longtime geo-economic, geostrategic and security interests in the region. Say for instance, during the cold-war period the US and USSR are main influential actors to transfer the maritime security settlements in the region. Since the fall of the former USSR, Russia carried the legacy of the Soviet Union. Hence, China's rapid military rise notably after the 9/11 attack tries to fill the power vacuum in the Asian continent through its multilateral and bilateral engagements in the region. Apart from this, the

US is still a key player in the Asian security architecture, notably in the Indo-Pacific region. Nonetheless, the European Union is also playing a crucial role in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game. The countries such as England, French, Germany, Italy and several other European countries are constantly investing in the Indo-Pacific littoral countries, which are strengthening the role of the European Union in the Indo-Pacific maritime great game. Therefore, the IP-RSA is grand chessboard of great power politics whereby the great powers positioning their geostrategic influence through supporting the littoral states in the region.

4.3.2.1 The US and its Pacific Alliance System: The US and its alliance system is traditional alliance system, which provides the maritime security to littoral states of the Indo-Pacific region. During the Cold-War period, the US has initiated the 'San Francisco System' in September 1951 to increase the bilateral defense engagements with Asia-Pacific countries. The alliance network started with the Mutual Security Treaty (here in after MST) with Japan, defense treaty with the Philippines and signed the treaty of ANZUS with New Zealand and Australia. Subsequently, further alliance system expanded with the South Korean treaty in 1953, Taiwan in 1954 and with Thailand in the year 1962. Therefore, during the Cold-War period, the US increased its bilateral and multilateral defense engagements in the Asia-Pacific region. The multilateral engagement increased late cold-war period through the ASEAN Regional Forum (here-in-after ARF).

Hence, the bilateral and multilateral alignment of the US is jointly working in the Asia-Pacific region (Stuart & Tow, 1995; Tow, & Taylor, 2013). However, after the post-cold war period the US followed the same notion with some diplomatic alteration by Bush and Clinton administrations. The new alteration towards the Asia-Pacific region nearby the center of attraction to balance the geostrategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region; meet the Asia based forces to established target budget; and preserve the San Francisco system of bilateral treaties the fundamental of the Asia-Pacific security policy of the US (Stuart & Tow, 1995; Vaughn, 2007). However, after the 9/11 attack and China's rapid military and economic rise make more emphatic paradox around the SCS, shaped the multifaceted matrix of Asian political theatre.

Consequently, the Obama administration announced the rebalancing strategy called as 'Asia-Pivot Policy' in 2012. The policy focused the US Pacific strategy within the new height of its economic, political, strategic and diplomatic arrangements with its Pacific alliances to certify its 'hub and spokes' engagement in the region. The rebalancing strategy also enhanced the US attention towards India, Vietnam and considering Myanmar as a spot of a political gambit for its Indo-Pacific strategy in the upcoming years.

Currently, the US Secretary of Defence Jim Mattis has announced the Pacific command as an Indo-Pacific command (here-in-after INDOPACOM) on 30 May 2018 at Shangri-La-Dialogue (Mills, 2015; Chellaney, 2012; Clinton, 2011; The Wire, 2018). Washington has strengthened its military engagement with India against Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, both India-US promoting the economic, political, diplomatic, cultural, democratic and human right values, to play the active role in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game whereby, both are loyal toward more geostrategic and defense proximity in the region. In this process, the US has found another reliable partner after replacing Pakistan in South Asia. Therefore, its alliance system is still strong and it is remain security provider in the wider sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

4.3.2.2 Russia's Drift towards its Eastward: Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia comes out with the insistent Soviet legacy in the world politics. The former Russian President Boris Yeltsin started its pro-east strategy to confirm the power balance between East and West. In this process, he visited Beijing in 1992 and withdrawal its forces from Mongolia to increase its geostrategic engagement with eastern neighbors such as China, Mongolia, central Asian republics. It also increased its engagement with South Asia and Pacific littoral countries. Since, President Putin has taken an oath for the first Presidential term in 2000, Moscow has pivotal towards China centric approach to delimit its dependence on the European market. Therefore, President Putin declared the "Turn to the East" policy to divert its energy exports toward China and other Asia-Pacific countries. Secondly, Moscow has pivotal towards its East due to economic sections by the western world especially after the annexation of Crimea

in March 2014. Thirdly, the US Asia-Pivot policy also concerns for Moscow's 'Russia Far East' policy to make ensure its own geostrategic presence between the US and China's existing dominant confrontation (Kalachinsky, & Vladivostok, 2010; Storey, 2015; Makarychev, 2017) However, Sino-Russia both have strategic collaboration for 'Constructive Partnership' to delimit the US influence in the Asian continent. Further, Russia is also increasing its economic and geostrategic involvement in ASEAN countries to find the new energy market in the region. Therefore, it increased its economic, political and defense engagement with Southeast Asian countries (Norling, 2007; Kumar, 2015; Storey, 2015). Russia's 'Turn to East' policy shows its future pivotal role in the coming Asian political theatre. The multi-alignment policy of Russia hopes to its reemergence in the global order.

Furthermore, in the South Asian region, Russia is a longtime strategic ally of New Delhi, which provides greater access to Russia in the South Asian market. However, after the trouble between the US-Pak relations Moscow engaged with Islamabad in some strategic issues. It has also increased its alliance with Syria and Iran in the Middle East to balance the US existing unilateral presence. Therefore, Russia has a greater role in the Indo-Pacific maritime new game whereby it is also a central stage to reshape the Asian security order.

4.3.2.3 China's Vertical Shift towards the Indo-Pacific Region: China's rapid rise is fundamental driving force behind the maritime new great game in the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing has security illusion due to the longtime military presence of the US troops in the region. Therefore, it has increased its aspiration to balance or delimit the predominant role of the US as the security provider notably after the fall of the Soviet Union. Similarly, it does not want the geostrategic presence of other great powers around its maritime sphere due to its long maritime dependency on the Strait of Malacca and Sunda. The rapid economic rise of China boosts its geopolitical, geostrategic and diplomatic bargain in the international platforms. Therefore, the rise of Beijing is also strengthening China-center regional security framework in the Pacific region. Say, for instance, the vertical expansion of Beijing towards its South and Southwest countries through increasing geostrategic engagement with Indo-

Pacific littoral countries. Especially in case of the Indian Ocean region, Beijing has geostrategic proximity with the Indian Ocean Island countries through constructing several naval ports and infrastructural developments in such countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Myanmar (Kaplan, 2012; Kumar & Shah, 2018). It has started the CPEC project, under OBOR initiative whereby it enlarged its geostrategic manifestation in the IPR.

It has also started the railway and transport connectivity with ASEAN countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Laos. Furthermore, China has also focused its naval modernization due to its maritime dispute over SCS and the geostrategic appearance of the US military troops in the Indo-Pacific region. It has built its first aircraft carrier the Liaoning in 2012, further has also planned for second aircraft carrier onward 2020. In the same direction, it has rejected the unilateral decision of the international tribunal over its 'Nine-Dash line' claim in the SCS. Continuously, it is building the chain of artificial Islands around the circle of the Spratly Island whereby it is strengthening its geostrategic maritime position in the region (Mike, 2012; Kumar & Shah, 2018). Nonetheless, it has also increased its engagement with ASEAN countries through various regional platforms to intensify its vertical shift towards the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. Therefore, China's rapid rise mainly depends on its vertical move towards its South and Southwest neighboring countries and its economic, political and geostrategic engagement with these countries. Thereby, New Delhi has strong maritime security concerns about the Beijing vertical move and its assertiveness towards the Indo-Pacific region.

4.3.2.4 The European Union and its Pivot towards the Indo-Pacific Region: EU geostrategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific region is also increasing new security parameters in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game. Notably, in the economic realm, the EU increased its high-level meetings, diplomatic visits and summits with East Asian countries. The EU has signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and ASEAN Regional Forum (herein after ARF) in 2012 and joined the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (herein after ASCAP) in 2013 (Thygeson & Marc Lanteigne, 2016). The European Union is looking forward to

deepen its ties with like-minded countries in the Asian continent notably in the Indo-Pacific region. Say, for instance, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in September 2017 at the EU-India Summit has shared the common understanding of freedom, equality, and the rule of law for being a world's largest democracy and biggest economic platform for the sake of natural future alliance in the region (Heijmans, 2018). Furthermore, in the case of China's rise in the EU, it has more than economic puzzle rather than security and strategic concerns. However, it is also debated that China's rise is also probable security implications for EU in near future. The EU is also increasing its geostrategic proximity with the Indo-Pacific littoral countries in different layers of relationship in comparison to the US pivotal strategy. Therefore, the EU is also a working force in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game, whereby it has more potential to play a constructive role behind the new political gambit in the region.


4.3.3 Indo-Pacific Maritime New Great Game: Indian Position

The Indo-Pacific region is the fulcrum of the maritime new great game in which great powers are dependent on regional players and their geostrategic, geo-economics and diplomatic calculations with other surrounding powers. It is a game of the chessboard which every great powers are using regional powers and small Islands nations for their own maritime interests. Say for instance, China used the Pakistan card to delimit the US role in the South Asian region. On the other hand, the US supports New Delhi maritime expansion in the IOR to balance the Chinese assertiveness in the region. In the same case, the US has also geostrategic coordination with its Pacific alliance system to make sure the balance with Beijing alteration towards the region. In case of India, it is also an active player in the maritime new great game whereby it is trying to delimit or balance the China's rise through using the Vietnam card in the SCS and increasing proximity to Japan as a global strategic partner in the region. At the same time, Australia is also an active actor to secure its strategic interests around the larger maritime sphere of Indo-Pacific region. Further, the US is remaining a larger security provider in the region, which is providing the more deepen security for Australia (Department of Defence Australian Government, Defence White Paper-2016). Therefore, the maritime great game is

game of coordination playing with great powers such as the US, China, Russia and EU in certain classified level powers or states in the region. This coordination level of great powers with such as a) coordination with regional powers; b) coordination with insulators and buffer states; c) coordination with islands or small littoral states in the Indo-Pacific region. The coordination is based on various certain spheres such as economic, political, diplomatic, strategic and defense levels to determine maritime interests in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game in the region.

4.3.3.1 Coordination with Regional Powers: The IP-MNNGG do not looks like old great game, it is a game of coordination between great and regional powers in the

Figure: - 4. 5 The Game of Maritime Coordination



larger sphere of Indo-Pacific region. It is a new equation or trends of major and regional powers coordination to balance their rivals in the great political gambit. Therefore, in the Indo-Pacific maritime great game such major powers the US, China, Russia and EU are engaged in the region with several regional players. The main

dominant regional players in the region are India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. On the one hand, among these players notably India, Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia have good geostrategic contiguity with the US in the IP-RSA. On the other hand, Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran have decent geostrategic symmetry in the region, rest of balance in the position to deal with their regional issues. However, the equation among the regional and great powers is diverse in nature due to regional powers ambition to play a role as an extra-regional power in the region. Therefore, most of the time, such countries in the region like India, Australia, and Indonesia stand with balance or multi-alignment approach with great powers to increase their strategic autonomy in the economic and

geostrategic sphere of influence. The most interesting point in this coordination is that regional powers have possibilities to increase their sphere of influence as an extra-regional power, but great powers are dependent on regional powers coordination to ensure a balance of power in the region. The nature of coordination in economic, political and diplomatic levels between regional and great powers is the most significant driving force behind the Indo-Pacific maritime great game. Say, for instance, India as a middle power has the ambition to increase its geostrategic appearance in the region as an extra-regional power in the new theatre of great game politics. Therefore, the middle powers have a more important role in the new symmetry of power equation in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game.

4.3.3.2 Equation with Insulators and Buffer States: Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver have examined (2003) the role of insulators and buffer states to decide the equation between the different RSCs. They considered Turkey, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Myanmar as an insulator state due to their geographical and isolation in the surrounding political units' and regional equations. Although, buffer states situated between the two strong rivals' great powers which sometimes help the delimitation or freeze the conflict formation. However, sometimes the surrounding regional and great powers become more conscious about the strategic imperative over buffer states. Say for instance, in the Indian sub-continent two Himalayan states Nepal and Bhutan consider as an Insulator state due to geographical and strategic contiguity between two great powers such as China and India. Both India and China are more intent about the power equation with these nations.

However, China has future plan to increase good transport and railway access in Nepal through linking Nepal as a part of its OBOR initiative in comparison to India which has already good cultural, civilizational, transport and infrastructure link with it. In case of Bhutan, India has a greater understanding with Bhutan than China on several issues. The insulator states such as Afghanistan and Myanmar are two geopolitical unstable countries in the Indo-Pacific region whereby India has strong security concerns. On the one hand, Afghanistan one of the longtime theatre of Great Power politics during the cold-war period and still in survival position after the 9/11

attack. It is the fulcrum of great powers and regional powers due to its geostrategic location. It also marks the line among three regional political units such as South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. On the other hand, India's eastern border stretched with one of the insulator state Myanmar, which has experienced the dictatorship regime, recently altered in the democratic process. The great powers and even regional powers are interested to manage their bilateral engagement with Myanmar due to its geostrategic location between South and Southeast Asian regional political units. Therefore, the insulars or buffer states have also same geostrategic importance like other regional powers to determine the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game.

4.3.3.3 Geostrategic Proximity with Islands States: The Islands states notably in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Region are the driving forces behind the construction of the new political gambit position among the great and regional powers interests in the region. The great powers are willing to increase their geostrategic proximity in the Indo-Pacific Islands states. Say, for instance, China has increased its proximity to Islands countries such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles. In this addition, it has also increased its economic, transport and railway connectivity with Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar, and Thailand. It has also increased its footprints in the South Pacific through increasing its economic and geostrategic proximity with the Island state of Fiji. However, other regional power, such as India has responded this move very quickly by a historical visit by India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi after the former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit in 1981 (Kim, 2011; Cronin & Baruah, 2014).

China's 'String of Pearls' policy is one of the geostrategic tilt in China's foreign policy to keep keen eyes on maritime routes to shield its 'Malacca Dilemma' around the Indo-Pacific region (Kim, 2012; Badford, 2009). Hence, the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game is also carrying the socio-cultural and geostrategic proximity to these Islands states with great and regional powers. Say for instance, the US has long time existing hegemony in the Indian and Pacific oceans from the Cold War period. The regional treaties such as SEATO, CENTO, and ANZUS were an unblemished design

of the US geostrategic advent in the region. Currently, the US also needs coordination with regional and Islands states to maintain its political determination in the Indo-Pacific political gambit. Apart from this, Russia and EU are also involved in such affairs like economic, political and geostrategic engagement with the Islands nations in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, the coordination with Islands states is a more significant part of maritime great powers strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.

4.4 India's Geostrategic Position in the IP-RSA


India is an epicenter of the IP-RSA due to its geostrategic position in the Indo-Pacific region. Its one-third of the geographical part connected with maritime boundaries such as westward maritime boundaries shared the Persian Gulf, eastward boundaries touched with Bay of Bengal and southern part cover by the large scale of the Indian Ocean region. India has significant geostrategic maritime location, which possibly comes-up with such the prediction of Mahan's notion of maritime power and increased its bid of extra-regional maritime power in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific region. Hence, India's geostrategic position shifts the calculation of the regional security architecture towards India center, whereby it has the edge of its greater maritime sphere around the Indo-Pacific region. No doubt, there are other actors such as the US and China has a dominant position, but New Delhi has its own soft power approach with political and geostrategic spheres, which could not point out because of its earlier historical, cultural and economic proximity with littoral countries. The geostrategic gimmick of India's growing regionalism in the Indo-Pacific region is increasing nostalgic political Milieu towards New Delhi wherein, it has a significant role in the region. This new understanding about New Delhi's current geostrategic position makes us more logical about its converging trends in the IP-RSA. Therefore, below figure no. 4.7 is showing the main fundamental points about India's geostrategic position, converging and diverging factors in the IP-RSA.

4.4.1 Modi's Path Breaking Diplomacy: The External Affair Ministry (here-in-after EAM) of India has used this term to define a New Delhi's new approach towards its foreign affairs under 'Modi Doctrine' as a 'Path Breaking Diplomacy', wherein New Delhi shows its future commitment towards its neighboring countries notably South

and Southeast Asian countries. The Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited the head of all SAARC countries on Oath ceremony and chose Bhutan as a first foreign trip, a signal of its first phase of New Delhi's strategy of path-breaking diplomacy. It shows India's stand and geostrategic significance of its neighboring countries. The next step of this path-breaking strategy opens the doors by launching the South Asian regional satellite on May 2017 for South Asian countries except Pakistan (Muni, 2015; The Hindu, 2017). However, currently it has shifted towards more East through inviting the BIMSTEC countries in place of SAARC on again oath taking ceremony for second term in May 2019. Furthermore, Prime Minister Modi has also revived India's sphere of influence with West Asian countries through the 'Link West' Policy. Through this policy, Prime Minister Modi increased the economic, defense and geostrategic connectivity with the Middle East and EU. Apart from this, Prime Minister Modi has become the first Indian Prime Minister ever visited both Israel and Palestine with breaking historical taboo of the Indian foreign policy. New Delhi watched with the equation of Israel and Philistine relation within its own strategic autonomy (Ministry of External Affairs Report-2017-18).

Nonetheless, the equation with great powers through its multi-alignment strategy to engage with all great powers also maintained. India has increased its geostrategic engagement with the US in the Indo-Pacific region by maintaining the existing balance with old testing friend Russia. However, New Delhi has faced the Himalayan criss- cross situation over Doklam issue with China, whereby later solved by diplomatic backdoor. Moreover, in the Southeast Asian region, Prime Minister Modi has revived the existing equation with these countries by declaring the 'Act East Policy' to strengthen its existing proximity in the region. Therefore, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's path breaking diplomacy in the foreign affairs gives the ever more strengthen to the Indian foreign policy in new geo-economics geopolitical and geostrategic essence. The figure no. 4.6 is showing India's geostrategic position in the broader Indo-Pacific region and its convergence and divergence of the interests in the region.

Figure: - 4. 6 India's Geostrategic Position/Converging and Diverging Factors in the IP-RSA



Source: Prepared by Author

4.4.2 Act East Asia Policy: The 'Act East Asia' policy is one of the another geostrategic drift of the Indian foreign policy after Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of the Republic of India in May 2014. The beginning stage of the policy started immediate after the Soviet Union disintegration. Meanwhile, the New Delhi has announced the 'Look East Policy' in 1991 to increase the historical and cultural proximity with Southeast Asian countries. Presently, the main purpose behind renaming the policy is to strengthen its existing cultural, economic, political and geostrategic commitment with ASEAN countries with the expansion of other Pacific powers such as the Japan, Australia, Taiwan and North and South Korean powers. The New Delhi has focused on 'Three Cs' agenda (Commerce, Culture, and

Connectivity) to strengthen its geostrategic proximity with ASEAN countries. Apart from this, India-ASEAN countries have increased their investments with each other since last eight years, like ASEAN investments in India is USD \$ 27.9 billion and India's investment is \$32.4 billion in ASEAN countries. Further, in case of connectivity, New Delhi focused on road, transports and maritime connectivity with ASEAN countries through revitalizing its Northeastern states which a gateway to connect ASEAN countries. Say, for instance, currently, it has completed the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway part of its multifaceted 'Act East Asia' policy. Likewise, it has also increased the pitch of its 'Buddhist Diplomacy' through reviving the Buddhist tourist places, along with the rebirth of 'Nalanda University' to reviving civilizational legacy of Hinduism in Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand (Chand, 2014; Rajendram, 2014). India's 'Act East Policy' is decent matching with the US 'Asia Pivot Policy' wherein it has also faithful to strengthen its economic, political, diplomatic, military and geostrategic proximity with its Pacific alliances (Clinton, 2011).

Both, Indo-US have combined vision for open peaceful maritime routes in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the basic ethos of these two policies collaboration such as the US 'Asia pivot' policy toward its westward and India's geostrategic shift towards its eastward through 'Act East' policy is making the long-term future alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. Likewise, India also increased its geostrategic proximity with Japan and Australia wherein it has increased the middle powers coalition with Japan and Australia to advance the open maritime commercial routes around the maritime checkpoints such as the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, Mozambique channel and ten and six degree channels (Fatima & Jamshad, 2015). The fundamental ethos of India's 'Act East Policy' to deepen its existing geostrategic, geo-economic, cultural and transport connectivity in the region with expansion of its geostrategic proximity with ASEAN countries on the broader scale of Indo-Pacific region.

4.4.3 India's Security and Defense Partnerships with the Indo-Pacific Littoral States: New Delhi has increased its geostrategic partnerships with Indo-Pacific littoral countries in such fields' security, defense, civil nuclear deal and comprehensive

strategic partnerships with great powers as well as several Indo-Pacific littoral countries. It has realized its geostrategic significance and its role in the greater sphere of the Indo-Pacific region notably, after the Beijing vertical pivot towards the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the OBOR initiative also increased more security concerns for New Delhi due to its sovereignty issues over CPEC project, which is carrying through PoK. Similarly, India is also maintaining its multi-alignment policy with all great powers along with geostrategic, defense and maritime proximity around the sphere of Indo-Pacific littoral countries.

Apart from this, New Delhi has signed the bilateral and multilateral strategic partnerships with Indo-Pacific littoral countries such as the US, Japan, Australia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and ASEAN countries to strengthen its strategic, civil nuclear, defense and maritime security partnerships in the region. Therefore, the purpose behind India's geostrategic, economic, transports, railway and maritime partnerships is to revive its historical, cultural and geostrategic proximity in the Indo-Pacific region. In this process, India- ASEAN countries have started the action plan 2016-2020 to share peace, progress, and prosperity to setup the roadmap of further strategic engagement. Further, both India-ASEAN countries dedicated toward the geopolitical and security cooperation due to shared common traditional and non-traditional security concerns.

However, India has signed the Bilateral Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (here-in-after LEMOA) in 2016 with the US, which provides the space for common military standard and opportunities for both sides. India has also signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (here-in-after COMCASA) in 2018, which strengthen the more Indo-US geostrategic relation in the Indo-Pacific region. The table 4.1 is showing India's several partnerships in the sphere of the Indo-Pacific littoral region. Both, India and US has signed the 'Indo-US Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region -2015' to strengthen the geostrategic proximity in the region. India has signed the civil nuclear agreement with Australia to fulfill its energy hunger in upcoming years. It has also signed the defense and strategic security agreement with UK and France in the Indian Ocean region. Moscow has already been a long time defense partner of New Delhi from the Cold-War period.

Table: - 4.1 India's Geostrategic/ Defense/Naval Exercises/ Nuclear Partnerships with Indo-Pacific Littoral Countries

Countries Name	Type of Strategic Partnerships	Defense Partnerships	Naval Exercises	Nuclear Partnerships	Strategic and Action Missions
Indo-Japan	Bilateral/ Multilateral Partnerships	Indo-Japan Defense Cooperation	Malabar Naval Exercise	Indo-Japan Civil Nuclear Deal	Special Strategic and Global Partnership-2015; Indo-Japan Vision for 2025
Indo-US	Bilateral/ Multilateral Partnerships	General Security Of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002; Indo-US Bilateral Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 and Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018.	Malabar Naval Exercise	Indo-US Nuclear Deal- 2005	Indo-US Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean region -2015
Indo-Australian	Bilateral/ Multilateral Partnerships	Bilateral Security & Defense Partnership	Malabar Naval Exercise(Non-permanent Participant), Bilateral Maritime Exercise- (AUSINDEX), MILAN	Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement	Indo-Australian Strategic Partnership
Indo-China	Bilateral Partnerships	Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity	—	—	—
Indo-Iran	Bilateral Partnerships	Defense Cooperation	Joint Naval Exercise	—	India-Iran Geo- Strategic and Infrastructure Building

Indo-Sri Lanka	Bilateral Partnerships	–	MILAN Naval Exercise	Civil Nuclear Agreement	–
Indo-Maldives	Bilateral Partnerships	Closer Cooperation for Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization	MILAN Naval Exercise	–	Strategic Security, Economic, and development Goals; Joint Action Plan to Bolster to Defense Cooperation
Indo-ASEAN	Indo-ASEAN Bilateral and Multilateral Partnerships	Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity; India has bilateral Joint defense cooperation with Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Myanmar etc.	MILAN Naval Exercise; IORA; IONS etc.	—	Indo-ASEAN Action Plan 2016-2020; Indo-ASEAN Strategic Partnership- 2012; EAS, ARF, ADMM+, EAMF, etc.
Indo-Bangladesh	Bilateral/ multilateral Partnerships	Partnership for Blue Economy and Maritime Cooperation	MILAN Naval Exercise	Civil Nuclear Agreement	Comprehensive and Equitable Partnership
Indo-Saudi Arabia	Bilateral Partnership	Defense Cooperation	–	–	Security and Counter-Terrorism Cooperation
Indo-Russia	Bilateral Partnership	Defense and Security Pact	–	Civil Nuclear Agreement	Time Tested Strategic Partnership
Indo-French	Bilateral Partnerships	Defense and Space Security Logistics Agreement; Indo-France Joint Naval Exercise	Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Maritime Cooperation for the Indian Ocean Region	Civil Nuclear Agreement	Indo-France Joint Vision for Space Programme
Indo-UK	Bilateral Partnerships	Defense and Security Partnership	Bilateral Maritime Exercise	Civil Nuclear Cooperation	India-UK Strategic Partnership
Indo-Israel	Bilateral Partnerships	India-Israel Defense Cooperation	–	–	Indo-Israel Strategic Partnership

Source: Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) INDIA; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI); Tokyo Foundation of Policy Research; George, V. (2016). India- US Sign Military Logistic Pact. *The Hindu*, retrieved from <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/India-US-sign-military-logistics-pact/article14598282.ece>; Why India-Israel Ties are so Special? *Indian Express*, retrieved from <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/why-are-india-israel-ties-so-special-narendra-modi-benjamin-netanyahu-4732652/>.

Nonetheless, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are new actors, which have joined the theatre of great game politics through increasing their geostrategic proximity with India. Therefore, New Delhi has understood its geostrategic position in the region that provides a more significant stage in the theatre of Indo-Pacific maritime new great game. It is more pro-active in its economic, geostrategic and defense partnerships with others Indo-Pacific littoral countries to legitimize its role in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific regionalism.

4.5 India's Approach toward the Enhancing IP-RSA

To stand with its pro-active geostrategic position New Delhi is dedicated to intensify its geostartegic appreance in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific region. It seeks the Indo-Pacific is not the only term but it is a far larger and legitimized region which provides an opportunity to revive its historical, cultural, economic and geostrategic connectivity within the Indo-Pacific littoral states. Therefore, New Delhi is more active, notably after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came in the power after 2014 general elections of India. He modernized India's foreign policy approach especially with neighboring countries to define its enhancing role in the IP-RSA. India's perspective within the IP-RSA is the more defined by its classified phases of its geostrategic engagement in the region, the sphere of its enhancing Indo-Pacific regionalism, and its movement as an epicenter of the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game. These all levels have helped to understand the recent trends of Indian foreign policy and its perspective in the IP-RSA.

4.5.1 Common Maritime Future: The IP-RSA shared the greater sphere of maritime boundaries, the Persian Gulf to Strait of Malacca, South China Sea, Strait of Taiwan and stretched with America's western coastal region of Hawaii. To construct the new possibilities for comprehensive and combined regional security architecture, India has increased its horizontal pivot towards its westward and eastward neighboring countries. Further, to secure the open and free maritime routes is one of the fundamnetal cause behind India's geostrategic proximity with other littoral states in the region. In this process, India is strengthening its geostrategic proximity with the US, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN countries to implement the United Nations

Convention on Law of the Sea (here-in-after UNCLOS) to secure the existing maritime routes in the wider sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. The open and common maritime access for maritime communication and commercial shipments through major maritime checkpoints such as Cape of Good Hope, Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, Strait of Malacca and Strait of Sunda are the major priority list among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. Say for instance, throughout the Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca maritime routes roughly 32.2 Million barrels of crude oil passes per day. Therefore, rising Asian economies, notably China, India and Japan are worried about security of their natural resources and maritime routes (Albert, 2015; Karim, 2017; Pandya & Herbert-Burns, et. al, 2011).

Hence, Mahan's notion of sea power is more significant model to understand the changing mode of sea powers in the region. Say for instance, China's assertiveness is constructing the new possibilities of regional integration in the region. On the other hand, the US long-time geostrategic appearance in the region created the more suspicion notably for Beijing in the region. Meanwhile, India has its own extra-regional bid to counter the new power dynamics or play a balancing role between Sino-US rivalry in the region. However, India perceives its maritime future in free and open Indo-Pacific region rather than maritime competition in the upcoming decades.

4.5.2 Socio-Cultural and Economic Juxtaposition: New Delhi is considering the IP-RSA as an opportunity to revive its long-time historical, cultural and economic gaps among the Hinduism, Buddhist, Arabian, Sinic, and Chinese civilizations especially in the Southeast Asian countries. The region is a juxtaposition of socio-cultural and economic activities from its historical period. Therefore, presently India has a wider sphere of maritime commercial connectivity notably with Southeast Asian countries in the region. It is strengthening its existing proximity with these countries through reviving its 'Look East Policy' in 'Act East Asia' policy. Indian think tanks considered the Indian Ocean as the backyard of its maritime strategy, which is overpowering its historical, cultural and maritime security concerns. Indian strategic thinkers also inspired from Alfred Mahan's notion of maritime sea powers, wherein he said, "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. The ocean is the key to the

seven seas. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters (Pant, 2009; Allbrook, 2014)." Therefore, New Delhi is strengthening its socio-economic and cultural connectivity with South and Southeast Asian countries due to its wider sphere of maritime connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region. In fact, the socio-cultural and economic coordination within Indo-Pacific littoral countries are strengthening its position in the IP-RSA.

4.5.3 Comprehensive Sphere of Regionalism: The New Delhi's perspective toward the IP-RSA is positive due to India's aspiration to play a role as an extra-regional power in the Indo-Pacific littoral region. Therefore, New Delhi initiates the space for its extra-regional aspirations in the IP-RSA for constructing the comprehensive or combined regional security architecture, wherein it can protect its maritime routes and coastal boundaries through geostrategic and security collaboration with the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. The waves of regionalism and globalization notably after 1980-90, pushed New Delhi towards the regional or extra-regional institutional mechanism. In this process, New Delhi has started the regionalism process through establishing regional and sub-regional groups such SAARC, BIMSTEC, MGC, IORA and currently moving towards the construction of the IP-RSA.

Since, the Soviet disintegration NAM brings lesser opportunities for India to increase its sphere of influence in the region. Furthermore, it is also uncomfortable with China's concept of comprehensive or combined security mechanism for the Asian continent notably after the disintegration of the former USSR, which may harm India's growing sphere of influence (Yahuda, 2003; Frost, 2008; Zhang, 2010). New Delhi is much comfortable with the concept of the IP-RSA rather than follow the Chinese line of thought or Chinese concept of Asian security architecture. The comprehensive and combined IP-RSA is a hope for India's policymakers to carry out its own vision for Asian regionalism, wherein New Delhi has a more central role rather than other forms of Asian regionalism.

4.5.4 To Balance China's Assertiveness: New Delhi has considered the new maritime dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region as an opportunity to counterbalance China's assertiveness towards its Himalayas as well as maritime boundaries.

Therefore, on the one hand, India is strengthening its geostrategic collaboration with Japan, Australia and the US to balance China's assertiveness in the region. On the other hand, it has started its geostrategic and defense cooperation with ASEAN countries especially with Vietnam, Philippines and Singapore, which has accepted exports of the Akash and BrahMos supersonic cruise Missiles from New Delhi in the upcoming years (Siddiqui, 2018). Actually, it is a counterbalance strategy by New Delhi against the China-Pakistan CPEC project, which has objected by India due to geostrategic and sovereignty concerns over PoK. Therefore, Sino-Pak geostrategic proximity around the Northwestern region of India and growth of China's military budget risked around the Himalayan border security as well as maritime security concerns for New Delhi in the Indo-Pacific region.

Nonetheless, PLA is also announced that it will increase defense budget US\$21, 5176 billion with 8.1% growth in the year 2018 in comparison to 7% of last year growth (Global Times, 2018). In response to this, New Delhi saw the IP-RSA as an opportunity to construct the greater institutional mechanism, wherein balance or response for Beijing assertiveness in the region. Say, for instance, it is making a new quadrilateral alliance with the US, Japan, and Australia to construct the new possibilities for the IP-RSA. Therefore, India's vision for IP-RSA is a more determined step to balance new security dynamics in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

4.5.5 Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Concerns: the Indo-Pacific region emerged as a geostrategic center of great power politics especially after the declaration of Obama's 'Asia-Pivot' policy and India's 'Act East Asia' policy to counter China's assertiveness towards SCS as well as IOR. There are several traditional and non-traditional security threats like sea piracy, drug-trafficking, maritime terrorism and global warming issues faced by the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. Further, there is also a skeptic environment among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries due to great powers active involvement in pursuing their interests within the wider sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, to increase the sphere of its own interests New Delhi has also increased its geostrategic proximity with trans-national or trans-regional comprehensive institutional mechanism, which provides a common platform for

pursuing combined maritime security interests (Chellaney, 2011; Menon, 2012; Bishoyi, 2015). The traditional security arrangements also puzzles the Indo-Pacific littoral countries due to China's unilateral military rise whereby surrounding countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and India have strong maritime security concerns. Notably, in case of India, it has same maritime security concerns in the sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, India's has strengthened its bid for Indo-Pacific regionalism to fulfill its enhancing aspirations to play a role as an extra-regional power in the region (Chacko, 2012). Therefore, India has seen the IP-RSA is as an upcoming opportunity to increase its trans-regional geostrategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific littoral countries to pursue its economic, strategic and maritime security interests in the region.

4.6 Critical Analysis

While examining India's geostrategic position and its perspective within the IP-RSA there is also a critical inspection on India's perspective in IP-RSA. New Delhi is also conscious about its existing foreign policy trends and bilateral partnerships with all great powers through adopting the multi-alignment policy. There are also India's policy puzzles after recommending the Indo-Pacific as a fulcrum of its maritime strategy in upcoming years. Therefore, after active participation in the IP-RSA New Delhi will may face some strategic dilemma about its existing foreign policy trends wherein longtime Indo-Russian semi-military alliance; multi-alignment Policy with all great powers; NAM and its strategic autonomy on internal and external affairs, which were the core of the approaches of India's foreign policy from the Cold-War period. At present, there is a critical opinion among the scholars within India about the Indo-US geostrategic proximity due to the uncertain nature of the US strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific region. The fundamental puzzle in Indian foreign policy can examined under these basic classifications such as its multi-alignment policy, regionalism and the issue of its strategic autonomy in the IP-RSA.

4.6.1 Challenges for Multi-Alignment Policy: Since the disintegration of former USSR India instantly declared the 'Look East Policy' to increase economic and strategic engagement with Southeast Asian nations notably after long-time strategic and diplomatic alienation with Southeast Asian countries. Firstly, it has moved with its

own regional aspirations to play a role as an extra-regional power to fill the power vacuum after the Soviet disintegration. Secondly, Beijing assertiveness toward the SCS as well IOR is other reason for New Delhi to tilt towards the Indo-Pacific region. However, New Delhi has tracked the NAM as a strategic depth of its foreign policy to separate India from military alliance during the bipolar world order. Essentially, New Delhi has adopted the multi-alignment policy during the first tenure of the United Progressive Alliance (herein after UPA) government of India. The vision of former Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh was behind this policy to increase the economic capacities, strengthen India's relations with great powers and increase the proximity with neighboring countries to strengthen India's multi-alignment pivotal position in the international affairs (Mohan, 2005; Baru, 2014).

New Delhi has started the geostrategic proximity with all great powers and increased its active participation in constructing the global, regional and sub-regional institutional formations with surrounding neighboring countries and great powers. Say for instance, India has established the India-Brazil-South Africa (here-in-after IBSA) in 2003; joined the BRIC in 2006, later South Africa joined the group became the BRICS. Meanwhile, India is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (here-in-after SCO) which now takes a full membership along with Pakistan in 2015.

The process of multi-alignment policy of India is continue in a way with several global or regional institutions such as G-20, EAS, IONS, and IORA (Baru, 2014; Hall, 2016). Later, former External State Minister of India Shashi Tharoor explored the overview of India's multi-alignment policy that 21st century is Asia's century. Therefore, New Delhi should carry the multi-alignment policy with all great powers and take benefits of new defense and communication technologies from theme. He also added that the situation of world order is not likewise Cold-War period so New Delhi should step ahead with different global and regional institutional mechanism with active and vibrant participation (Tharoor, 2013). However, after the 2014 elections, Prime Narendra Modi has taken a bold step to revive India's foreign policy with the extra-regional aspirations to strengthen the geostrategic proximity with Southeast and Middle East countries. He is also promoting India's vision in the 21st

century in the global and regional institutions such as in UN, G-20, SCO, BRICS, ASEAN, SAARC and BIMSTEC etc. However, the new landscape in India's foreign Policy brings some substantial challenges in the front of Indian policymakers. On the one hand, New Delhi is facing the regional complexities in the SAARC mechanism due to its rivalry over unsolved Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. On the other hand, its future stands over enhancing IP-RSA are also a confusing assessment to balance its long testing friendship with Russia and to maintain the diplomatic bond with its instant neighbor Beijing. Further, New Delhi's move towards quadrilateral democratic alliance with the US-Japan-Australia is also pivotal point for the New Delhi to pursue its upcoming foreign policy in the Asian continent. Therefore, the IP-RSA created the new matrix of changes in Indian foreign policy, notably its multi-alignment policy is under shadowing the uncertain challenges in the upcoming years.

4.6.2 Challenges for its Own Sphere of Regionalism: Since, the wave of regionalism and globalization India has tilted towards the construction of global, regional and sub-regional institutional formation to increase its own sphere of regionalism in the Indo-Pacific region. To follow the path of pragmatic politics, New Delhi has given more preference to regional or extra-regional institutional formation such as SAARC, BIMSTEC, MGC, IORA, IONS to strengthen its regional or extra-regional proximity with surrounding countries notably after the end of the bipolar world order. However, the triumph of India's regionalism is challenged by domestic and external factors. India's domestic politics is more complex and challenging to maintain the strong regionalism in South Asia.

Say for instance, sometimes India's internal security is challenged by its domestic security issues such as Naxal issues in the hinterland of the country by left extremism, North Eastern insurgency and cross border terrorism in the Jammu and Kashmir are major centrifugal forces in India (Malhotra & Neelakandan, 2011; Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India Annual Report 2016-17). Therefore, the regional parties sometime forced the center government for unwilling decisions such as the Indo-Sri Lankan relation is dominated by Tamil politics; Indo-Bangladesh relation is also dominated by West Bengal and Northeastern states; Kashmir politics

and cross-border terrorism issues decide Indo-Pakistan relation. Therefore, SAARC countries have not experienced the wider level of regionalism, which is restricted around the economic or immature regional mechanism. Likewise, India's economic structure is the base structure of its enhancing sphere of regionalism. World Bank forecast that Indian economy is one of the fastest growing economy in term of Gross Domestic Product (herein after GDP) with 7.3% growth in the year 2018 (The Times of India, Jan 7, 2018). Therefore, India's sphere of regionalism depends on its economic and infrastructure development in the upcoming years. However, India is lacking that much economic Capacities which the US and China have due to their big economic reserves. However, New Delhi is determined to connect the surrounding regions, notably South Asia, Southeast, West and Central Asia. The IP-RSA is India's recent focused area to increase its sphere of regionalism in the Asian continent. It is seeking towards the opportunities of new cultural, commercial and transport connectivity with Southeast and West Asian regions to increase its geostrategic, geopolitical and diplomatic alignment in the region. On the one hand, as an epicenter of IP-RSA, India has increased the horizontal sphere of connectivity with Southeast and West Asian countries add to its own bid of extra-regional power within the sphere of IP-RSA.

However, it still does not seem ready to take a leading position in the new regional security architecture. The critical examination on India's strategic tilt towards the extra-regional regionalism seems to shift toward the western-oriented approach. Therefore, the critics of the Indian Foreign policy, suggesting that India should carry bilateral partnerships rather than follow the trends of the alliance system, whereby India was never part even during the Cold-War period. Therefore, India is still under skeptic and uncertain position to lead the IP-RSA with active participation. However, currently it is comfortable to maintain the balance approach between the maritime rivalry of the US and China in the region.

4.6.3 The Dilemma about its Strategic Autonomy: The strategic autonomy in the decision-making is a thrust area of India's foreign policy after its Independence. During the Cold-War period, India followed the principles of NAM to distance itself from military alliances in the bipolar world order. It helped New Delhi to maintain its

strategic autonomy in internal and external affairs. However, after the cold war period, New Delhi focused to explore its own regional and extra-regional engagement through several institutional mechanisms. Along with that, New Delhi is also conscious about Chinese assertiveness on the Himalayan boundary disputes and its maritime appearance in the IOR. Therefore, New Delhi is following the quadrilateral alignment with the US-Japan-Australia to counterbalance Beijing militarization process in the SCS.

Currently, India is still following the independent decision-making process in several global and regional platforms. Say for instance, it voted in favor of Iran on nuclear issue. It also voted against the US decision to shift its embassy Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in UN resolution in December 2017. Some of the critics or Indian think tanks are still suggesting that India should carry defense and security alignment with old allies, then tentative proximity too with the US. For instance, India has signed the Logistical Exchange Memorandum of Understanding (here-in-after LEMOA), which provide the access for two nations military to use each other's air, land and naval bases for the purpose of repair, resupply and rest. It does not allow the US troops for the permanent stationing in Indian soils and have a right to refuse access anytime. However, some strategic think tanks increased concerns that shift is a sign of enhancing end of India's strategic autonomy in the upcoming years (Brewster, 2014; Upadhyay, 2016; Davar, 2018).

However, Lawrence William Prabhakar stated "India's strategic autonomy, choices entails that India could be determined by its strategic core interests of the scope momentum of its Indo-Pacific engagement. Further, he also indicated that India's pivot in the Indo-Pacific region emerges from the strategic partnerships with the US, Japan, South Korea, and Australia (W. L. S. Prabhakar, telephonic interview, September 23, 2018)". Therefore, the core issue of India's Indo-Pacific strategy is strategic autonomy then strategic partnerships with regional and great powers in the region. The US policies still under skeptic umbrella due to its decision get off from Trans-Pacific Partnership (here-in-after TPP) in 2017. It is also not showing that much enthusiasm to lead the IP-RSA likewise the NATO, might be understanding of its relative decline or move toward some alienate policies, to make ensure its own

interests rather than its alliances (Mui, 2017; Davar, 2018). Therefore, the major dilemma for Indian policy-makers is to deal with the Chinese assertiveness without diminishing its strategic autonomy within the theatre of Indo-Pacific maritime new great game. It is also a dilemma for Indian policy-makers to increase its extra-regionalism without harming its multi-alignment policy with great powers such as the US, Russia, and China within the theatre of Indo-Pacific maritime new great game. Therefore, the future geostrategic and geopolitical partnerships with other powers decide the balance of India's strategic autonomy with strategic interconnectedness.

4.7 Future Developments

The above examination of India's broader perspective of the IP-RSA has led by India's extra-regional aspirations of its enhancing regionalism in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific region. The maritime new great game in the Indo-Pacific region is another theatre of great power politics in the region whereby New Delhi has central role due to its geostrategic and geopolitical engagement in the region. However, there is still uncertainty about the US leadership role in the IP-RSA due to its relative decline and uncertainty about Trump administration to deal with the new paradigm shift in the Asian security system. There is a multi-layers' factors which can define India's central role to construct the enhancing IP-RSA in the near future. India's internal secular democratic fabric is increasing its soft power milieu to increase its engagement with extra-regional powers.

Firstly, there is another logical addition of the argument that if Beijing increase its border insistence as a zero-sum-game in the near future, it will embroil New Delhi towards more deepening regional construction as an IP-RSA in the Asian security system. Secondly, there is also a possibility that if Beijing will renovate its hard power approach to deal with the boundary issue within win-win approach, may shift the regional security complex in regional security cooperation, which reflects very limited signs at present. Thirdly, there are also future possibilities that New Delhi will increase unilateral approach to construct the regional security architecture, without harming its strategic autonomy in decision-making process. It will legitimize its deep strategic and political interests in the near future. However, New Delhi's vision for IP-RSA is in historical pivotal point, carried by the smart power strategies to achieve its

maritime interests in the broader Indo-Pacific region. It reflected in the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's statement by addressing 'Shangri-La-Dialogue' that 'strategic autonomy' remains fundamental principles of India's foreign policy. According to the newspaper of the Indian express sources (1 June 2018) Prime Minister Narendra Modi offers the India's vision for the Indo-Pacific region that "India does not consider the region as a strategy or as a club of limited members".

China on mind, PM says Asia of rivalries will hold region back

Shangri-La Dialogue: 'India, China should be sensitive to each other's interests'

PRESS TRUST OF INDIA
SINGAPORE, JUNE 1

PRIME MINISTER Narendra Modi on Friday said Asia and the world will have a better future when India and China work together with trust and confidence while being sensitive to each other's interests.

The Prime Minister's comments at the Shangri-La Dialogue here came over a month after his first informal summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping during which both sides resolved to build mutual trust and understanding.

"In April, a two-day informal summit with President Xi helped us cement our understanding that strong and stable relations between our two nations are an important factor for global peace and progress," said Modi, the first Indian Prime Minister to address the Shangri-La Dialogue — Asia's premier defence and strategic affairs conference.

"I firmly believe that, Asia and the world will have a better future when India and China work together in trust and confidence, sensitive to each other's interests," he said.

In his keynote address at the Dialogue, Modi said an "Asia of rivalry" will hold the region back while an Asia of cooperation will shape the current century.

The Prime Minister said both India and China have displayed "maturity and wisdom" in managing issues and ensuring a peaceful border, adding cooperation be-



Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Singapore on Friday. Reuters

Several leading powers including the US, Australia, Japan and India have been pressing for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific in the backdrop of China flexing its military muscles in the region.

"Today, we are being called to rise above divisions and competition to work together," Modi said, adding that India does not see the region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.

"Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country... India's vision for the Indo-Pacific Region is, therefore, a positive one," he said.

He also referred to his informal summit at Sochi with Russian President Vladimir Putin last month, saying he shared with him India's views on the need for a strong multi-polar world order for dealing with global challenges.

On India-US ties, Modi said New Delhi's global strategic partnership with Washington has overcome the "hesitations of history" and continues to deepen across the extraordinary breadth of its relationship.

Modi said the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be central to the future of the Indo-Pacific Region.

"We should all have equal access as a right under international law to the use of common spaces on sea and in the air that would require freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law," he said.

tween the world's two populous countries was expanding.

"No other relationship of India has as many layers as our relations with China. We are the world's two most populous countries and among the fastest growing major economies. Our cooperation is expanding," he said.

On competition among leading powers, Modi said it is normal but noted that contests must not turn into conflict and differences must not be allowed to become disputes.

Referring to the Indo-Pacific, Modi said a common rules-based order for the region should be evolved through dialogue, asserting that the rules must equally apply to all individually as well as to the global commons.

"Such an order must believe in sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as equality of all nations, irrespective of size and strength. These rules and norms should be based on the consent of all, not on the power of the few. This must be based on faith in dialogue, and not dependence on force," he said.

Source: China on Mind, PM says Asia of rivalries will hold region back. *Indian express*, (1 June, 2018), retrieved from <http://epaper.indianexpress.com/1681219/Delhi/June-2,-2018#page/8/2>.

Therefore, New Delhi considered region as a representation of its upcoming geostrategic aspirations in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Further, in his speech, Prime Minister Modi also mentioned that "Nor as a grouping that seek to dominate. And by no means do we consider it is directed against any country...India's vision for the Indo-Pacific region is therefore a positive one". Moreover, Prime Minister mentioned India's Indo-Pacific strategy, as "I firmly believe that Asia and World will have better future when India and China work together in trust and confidence,

sensitive to each other's interests". Therefore, it may limit the scope of 'Quad' in the region due to unclear vision among the participant countries. It shows that India is following its multi-alignment engagement in the region wherein it is exploring its own vision for Indo-Pacific region. Sometimes it seems that New Delhi is going to play a balancing role between two rival superpowers such as the US and China in the region. Currently, it prefers free and open maritime rule based Indo-Pacific region. It is endorsing its inclusive approach for all regional and great powers participation for open and free Indo-Pacific region rather than following the group of limited members club. Therefore, it is showing India's balance approach towards the new regional security construction, which sometimes seems to confuse for other surrounding countries. Therefore, it is too early to predict the India's clear line of thought towards the construction of new regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.

Chapter- 5

Impact of Emerging Security Architecture on Indian Security in the Indian Ocean Region

The enhancing IP-RSA has raised the new maritime security concerns for India especially in the IOR. The IOR is geo-strategically more significant region, as Alfred Mahan said that “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the Seven Seas in the 21st century. The destiny of the world will be decided in these waters (Mahan, 1890).” The Indian policy-makers considered the IOR as a future maritime lifeline of India. The chapter has focused on the Impacts of enhancing IP-RSA on Indian security in the IOR. It has begun with investigating the geostrategic position of India in the IOR. It has examined India’s existing maritime security components and measures the impacts of the IP-RSA on Indian security, especially in the IOR. Lastly, the chapter focused the New Delhi’s responses after realizing its geostrategic, geopolitical and economic position in the IOR. The chapter has concluded with the argument that IOR is not remaining a peaceful zone due to regional and great powers are involvement in the region. It is a theatre of Great Power politics, which India has strong maritime security concerns in the upcoming years.

5.1 India's Geostrategic Position in the IOR

The Indo-Pacific region is the core strategic region of India’s foreign policy from the last two decades. It has shifted the old trends of its existing policies to react the new power landscape under the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. The rising prosperity in the Asian continent depends on the IOR and its natural resources flow through maritime routes of Africa to Middle East and Asia. The IOR is one of the oceans, which provide the open and peaceful maritime access for commercial and trade activities through several maritime sea routes. It stands third in the ranking after the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans in term of carrying the volume of maritime traffic in the region. The geostrategic significance of IOR has increased after the opening of the Suez Canal between the Pacific and Mediterranean seas, which opened the broader communication line for commercial and trade activities in littoral countries of


the region. The region is around the various maritime gateways, which increased its geostrategic significance among the littoral states. The Northwestern region is surrounding the Suez Canal, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Strait of Hormuz and the Red sea, Eastern part share the boundaries around the Strait of Malacca and Sunda, passed through Indonesian Islands to Australian sea (Braun, 1982). It is the region, which is holding almost 20 percent of sea surface bounded in the North by Indian sub-continent, Northwestern parts covers by the Arabian Sea and to the East surrounded by Thailand, Indonesia (Michel & Sticklor, 2012).

However, India considered the greater Indian Ocean region around the Antarctica and Australian Sea. The region also links the Atlantic Ocean with Asia-Pacific maritime region, which provides the maritime access for cargo and oil vessels. Further, the IOR is only an ocean in the world, which is carries the name of any country due to India's largest geographical, historical, economic proximity, which is holding approximately 71% of the population Indian sub-continent. The region is rich and prospers in term of enormous natural resources and oil reserves. It holds the one-third of natural gas reserves of the world, 60% of world uranium, 40% of world gold and 90% of the world's diamonds, constructing the single largest region in the world, which has a huge potential of wealth in the world.

The Cold War has fragmented the interests of the Indian Ocean countries, which led to the suspicions' and reluctance for regional cooperation. However, after the cold-war period, these countries established the new regional regime like the IOR - ARC. It focuses on the management of regional economic integration within the Indian Ocean littoral countries to exploit the natural resources with cooperation and mutual respect (Braun, 1982; Gupta, 2010). Therefore, the geostrategic significance of the IOR has more significance due to its geographical contiguity with three different continents such as Asia, Africa, Australia, and their littoral states. India has a maritime dependency over the Indian Ocean region than other countries of the sub-continent. The geographical location of India increased its economic and commercial dependency over the IOR. Its Western boundaries touch the Arabian Sea and Eastern border are shared with boundaries of the Bay of Bengal through Andaman

Nicobar and Indonesian maritime boundaries. In the South, it shares the maritime boundaries with Sri Lanka and other littoral countries of the largest IOR. The Map no. 5.1 is showing the greater Indian Ocean and India's geostrategic position in the region.

Map: - 5.1 Greater Indian Ocean Region



Source: GIS & ESRI Software.

Hence, it has increased its geostrategic and security concerns due to a large number of military presence, notably by the US and China in the region. At the same time, New Delhi is committed to maintain its fastest Gross Domestic Product (here-in-after GDP) growth it need to secure maritime routes and increase regional cooperation for the healthy and sustainable growth of the entire region. These are several responsible factors that led India towards active naval modernisation and institutional structural reforms. According to Indian Maritime Doctrine-2009, 'Maritime is an all-encompassing word including everything that is connected to the Sea'. The doctrine focused on India's historical, cultural and religious connectivity with from Arabian to

South East Asian region. It also describes India's maritime strategies and navigation connectivity from its historical maritime sea connectivity in the IOR (Ballabh, 2013; Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009). Therefore, due to India's privileged geographical location in the IOR has strengthened its unique geostrategic position in the history of trade and commercial activities in the IOR. The saga of Indian trade history cannot complete without considering the IOR and its long maritime connection with Arabian to Malay World (Suri, 2016). India cannot imagine its maritime future without securing its coastal boundaries. India's geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economics' movements depend on its maritime coastal region. India cannot imagine its future without secure its maritime routes in the IOR. Therefore, India's geographical position has shifted its attraction toward maritime regional order whereby it can endure its rising maritime aspirations as a maritime seapower.

5.2 India's Existing Security Components in the IOR

India's existing security components is nearly around the Maritime security, which considered the traditional as well as non-traditional security issues. Due to the large maritime boundaries and coastal region, it has a more sensitive and proactive approach for the security of the coastal region. The 21st century is a maritime century, which could play a crucial role in deciding the future of India's economic, military and geostrategic developments. There are several existing components in the region, which are playing a crucial role in order to decide India's maritime security trends and its responses.

5.2.1 Maritime Coastal Security


The maritime coastal security is one of the vital tests for India's present security strategies due to the more dependency over maritime trade and commercial routes. However, international maritime sea law initiated by the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (here-in-after UNCLOS) held in Geneva in 1958. Somehow, this convention could not conclude on the issue of maximum width of territorial sea. Therefore, in second UNCLOS in 1960, 88 nations met again on agreement to establish the 6nm ship zone beyond the territorial seawater. Later, it did not succeeded due to lack of two third majority and fell short only by one vote.

Nonetheless, after the third UNCLOS convention the new law of the sea came in force on 16 November 1994, signed by 158 countries and ratified by 132 countries in January 2000. In this process as a responsible country, India also signed the UNCLOS and ratified on 29 June 1995 (Malhotra, 2010). It has approximately 7516.6 km coastal line and 1200 Islands. India's Exclusive Economic Zone (here-in-after EEZ) covers 2.02 million sqkm and sea boundaries have expended nearly 193,834 km. (Malhotra, 2010; Suri, 2016). Therefore, it has a large coastal belt, which needs proper organizational management for proper safety and security. The Coastal Security Scheme (here-in-after CSS) has implemented by the department of Border Management in different phases to increase the infrastructure of police forces for regular patrolling and surveillance activities around the coastal areas (Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Reports-2017-18).

However, the Indian Navy (here-in-after IN) is a responsible nodal agency for overall coastal and offshore maritime security by assisting State Marine Police (here-in-after SMP), Border Security Force (here-in-after BSF) and Central Industrial Security Force (here-in-after CISF) to cooperation with operational activities of coastal maritime security. In addition, it has also provided the conceptualization support to set-up the training curriculum and survey for the establishment of the Maritime Police Training Institute (here-in-after MPTI) which is established in the Indian state of Gujarat in Dwarka (Ministry of Defence, Annual Report-2016-17).

Notably, after the 26/11 Mumbai incident, coastal security concerns have increased in the mainstream media led to New Delhi towards the new structural reforms in the coastal security. In this addition, the government has sectioned the 131 coastal police stations, 225 boats, 60 jetties, 131 four wheelers and 242 two-wheelers along with some financial assistance for strengthening the strong coastal security mechanism for nine coastal states and four Union Territories (here-in-after UTs). Currently, the three-tier of coastal security mechanism has constructed, which will lead the secure and safe coastal belt of India. The three-tier coastal security circle protects the 7516.6 km coastline of nine states and four UTs. The Figure 5.1 is showing India's three-tier coastal security mechanism.

Figure: - 5. 1 India's Three Tier Mechanism of Coastal Security



Source: Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report-2017-18. *Government of India*, retrieved from <https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/MINISTRY%20OF%20HOME%20AFFAIR%20AR%202017-18%20FOR%20WEB.pdf>; Ghandi, F. & Fazal, I. (2016). Security the Seas: Eight Years after 26/11 much Remains to be Done to Prevent another attack, retrieved from <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-securing-the-seas-2276689>.

In addition to this, coastal police jurisdiction has extended up to 12 Nautical Miles (here-in-after nm) in the territorial water. Further, the Indian Coast Guard (here-in-after ICG) is limited around the 200 nm baseline of EEZ. The third tier of coastal security is under the jurisdiction of the Indian Navy, which is beyond the 200 nm (Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report- 2017-18; Das, 2013; Ghandi & Fazal, 2016). Therefore, the three-tier mechanism of coastal security is providing the efficient coastal management system, which is assisting towards secure trade and commercial activities. Furthermore, the security of maritime coastal territory also leverages by a series of projects designed by Sagarmala Programme. The Programme, was established on June 2015 under the Ministry of shipping of India, aims at to modernizing and developing the existing ports and develop the new mega ports to provide the efficient connectivity through roadways, rail and waterways. In addition to this, government has planned to utilize the proper potential of the 7516.6 km coastline belt and exploit the key opportunities of international maritime trade routes in the upcoming future (Asthana & Nirmal, 2012; Baru & Mathur, 2017). The government

has become conscious of coastal security for last two decades and started various initiatives to construct the more safe and secure coastal security mechanism. Therefore, security of coastal territory is in top preference to diminish the possibilities of maritime threats in the near future in the region.

5.2.2 Blue Economy: 'Blue Economy' (here-in-after BE) is recent trend among the littoral countries to redefine their maritime trade and commercial activities related to sustainable use of natural resources and their exploitation in the deep sea. The concept of BE combines the trends of geo-economic, geo-environment and geostrategic possibilities on the ground of national and regional manifestations. Say for instance, the IORAs declaration of BE on October 2014 was focused on enhancing productive and sustainable approach for utilizing natural resources of the IOR. Therefore, BE means to increase the green ocean development strategies to conserve and use the natural resources with the sustainable approach (Pauli, 2010; Mittra, 2017). Gunter Pauli has discussed this concept in his work in 2010. Later, United Nations (herein after UN) at the UN conference on sustainable development in 2012, coin this new discourse which attracts several Indian Ocean littoral countries for related to serious maritime security concerns in the region. In this regard, Bangladesh hosted the conference at Dhaka in 2014, to promote the Bay of Bengal partnership for BE. In September 2015 conference held in Mauritius by IORAs, underpinned the priority areas such as renewable ocean energy, fisheries, and aquaculture, mineral exploration, ports and shipping in priority sectors (Mittra, 2017; Doyle, 2018).

India is more proactive to intensify this debate due to its long coastal belt in the IOR. India's economic development endures on the innocuous use of Indian Ocean natural resources in sustainable development approach. There is also the datum that to protect the living and non-living ecological system, marine diversity and natural resources security deriving factors behind the promotion of the concept of BE by India. Say, for instance, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that the BE is an effective tool for carrying the tale of India's economic development and flourish its upcoming vision for regional security mechanism in the IOR. Lastly, India's


dependency over the sea trade and commercial activities and security of coastal and maritime routes driving force behind India's move to promoting the concept of the blue water economy in the region.

5.2.3 Maritime Sea Lines of Communication: India's major existing security threat in the IOR is secure its Maritime Sea Lines of Communication (here-in-after MSLOC) for safe maritime coastal line free oil shipping routes. Approximately, India's seabase trade has grown like maritime container trade 6.5% in compared to world total average 5.4% and expected that 1.7 billion tons per annum cargo traffic reach at Indian ports by 2022. Further, India's free flow of goods and commercial activities is reliance on Indian Ocean imports whereby 90% of merchants' shipping trade occurred from Indian Ocean maritime routes (Pant, 2009; Suri, 2016). It is an inter-continental region for transports energy and commercial goods. There is great power involvement such as the US, China to establish their footprints around the MSLOC to increase strong connectivity among Europe to the Middle East and South East Asia.

Hence, New Delhi feels insecure about the security of MSLOC and future trade and energy supplies. It pushed the greater responsibility on the shoulders of the Indian Navy to maintain the maritime peace and stability around the shores of IOR (Sweijts & Willem Cleven et al., 2010). The instability around the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and vulnerable acts of non-state actors around the MSLOC is vital security concerns in India. To protect the maritime sea routes of communication, New Delhi has adopted the gradual stance to response the existing threats in the region. However, since Beijing has increased its geostrategic appearance in the IOR, it pushed India toward the pragmatic stance to deal existing threats with serious determinations. In this addition, the Indian Navy is playing a role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean littorals to balancing the existing maritime security threats and reduces or normalizes the existing maritime threats. Similarly, India and Japan have joined hands in the regional multi-lateral organisation to keep the sea line maritime security in the IOR. Both, India and Japan two parallel forces pivotal to deterring the maritime threats for secure MSLOC. Both have joined the US lead alliance system to cement or reduce the maritime threats in the IOR (Khurana, 2007;

Gordon, 2014). Say, for instance, the Strait of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok have affected the Southeast Asian maritime communication in the Asia-Pacific region. Likewise, India's geostrategic location enlarged its dependency over the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca. However, there are several maritime sea checkpoints in the IOR such as the Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Bab-Al- Mandeb, Mozambique Channel, Strait of Malacca and Strait of Sunda and Lombok. The Map 5.2 is showing the major maritime checkpoints in the IOR.

Map: - 5. 2 Maritime Checkpoints in the Indian Ocean Region



Source: GIS & ESRI Softwares.

The MSLOC is passing through the Indian Islands of Andaman and Nicobar to connect the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, the mercantile traffic crosses close to Indian maritime boundaries, whereby increased the New Delhi's greater responsibility to preserve the UN convention of the sea to secure open and free maritime order for commercial and trade activities in the region. Therefore, India has strong maritime security concerns related to the security of the sea line of communication. It has also

traditional and non-traditional security concerns around the IOR (Sakhuja, 2001). The traditional military security threats around the circle of IOR is more vital security concerns in India, notably after China's intervention through ports and infrastructural development in the Indian Ocean littorals. However, the military strategy is also considering the wider range of political, strategic, economic and social perspectives whereby it required the inter-organizational partnership and combination (Rumley & Chaturvedi, et al., 2007).

Further, non-traditional maritime security threats such as sea piracy, sea robbery, human trafficking, drug trafficking, cyber security, climate change and sea-based maritime terrorist activities in the IOR. Say, for instance, Al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba and more recently ISI have increased their influence in the Indian Ocean littoral enlarged the vulnerable circumstances for MSLOC (Putten & Thorsten Wetzling et al., 2014). Therefore, the security of MSLOC is important for India's maritime security to escape or normalize the existing maritime threats in the IOR. In fact, the MSLOC is a significant lifeline of India's trade and commercial backbone, which would support its political, economic and geostrategic development in the upcoming future.

5.2.4 India's Reciprocation against the Geostrategic Presence of External Powers: The genesis of superpower rivalry was in the cold war period whereby the USSR and the US were major entities in the IOR. On the one hand, the US policy in the region to provide the guardian approach for its Western allies and increased its economic, military and geostrategic interests in the region. Nevertheless, it also filled the power vacuum after British withdrawal from Suez Canal in 1971. Therefore, the US increased its multilateral approach in the different regions of the world, which include the Indian Ocean as a part of its greater strategy of carrying Mahan's maritime sea doctrine. In this addition, it established the naval base on Diego Garcia Island, which was the part of British Indian Ocean Territory (here-in-after BIOT) to maintain the status-quo with the Soviet invasion in the region (Moonis, 1983). On the other hand, the Rapid Development Force (herein after RDF) established by former USSR to increase its geostrategic influence to capture the Middle East oil rich area

and resist the pro-western groups in the region. Further, it understood the geostrategic importance of IOR, shifted its strategies by adopting a vertical approach toward its South. Therefore, it also invaded Afghanistan to maintain status-quo to oppose the US lead organizations such as CENTO and SENTO in the region (Moonis, 1983; Rais, 1987). However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US unilaterally dominated the IOR, by increasing its geostrategic partnership with Pakistan as a major Non-NATO ally. Meanwhile, China has started to upturn its vertical approach towards its South, especially towards the IOR.

At the part of this strategy, it has increased its geostrategic partnership with Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and South East Asian countries (Brzezinski, 2012). It increased its huge investment in infrastructure, road, railway and ports connectivity in the Southeast Asian and small Islands states of the Indian Ocean region. It increased the encirclement strategy around the Indo-Pacific region that now extends with its OBOR initiative. The OBOR initiative will revive its sphere of encouragement around the Indo-Pacific region including the African and Eurasian region. It revives its glory of historical land-based Silk Road connectivity that now extended with the maritime silk route connectivity. Therefore, after the disintegration of the former USSR, Beijing is trying to fill the power vacuum in the IOR.

However, Russia is still carrying the legacy of the former Soviet Union to mark its presence more reliable and responsible power in the region. It is playing the central role to maintain the status-quo in the South Asian region, notably after the Indo-US geostrategic proximity. It has started to increase the new alignment with China, including Pakistan in the region to balance US geostrategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific region. Likewise, the EU also part of the great maritime new great game in the region. It increased its relationship with South and Southeast Asian countries along with the island nations of the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, the geostrategic presence of external powers in the IOR is possible existing security threats for India's own aspirations of the extra-regional ambitions. Say for instance, in the case of China, it is still not an Indian Ocean power and yet trying to construct its diplomatic and geostrategic milieu around the region. At the same time, India is also not an SCS

power, still projecting itself for retaliation of Beijing assertiveness in the region (Sharma, 2012). To overcome China's assertiveness towards the IOR, India move toward a familiar approach the term Indo-Pacific whereby acknowledged by the US, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries in contrast of Beijing OBOR initiative. Ironically, the skeptic nature of Trump administration altered India's complete dependency over the US and its alliance system due to its traditional approach of NAM and its concerns about long-term strategic autonomy (Dian, 2017). Similarly, it tries to maintain its multi-alignment approach with other great powers in the region such as China, Russia, and EU. Therefore, the great powers' intervention in the sphere of the Indo-Pacific maritime new great game is increasing, the greater security concerns for New Delhi to protect its own interests in the Indian Ocean regionalism.

5.2.5 Indian Ocean Maritime Governance (IOMG): To enhance regional maritime security interests in the IOR, New Delhi has tracked the waves of regionalism and globalization in the late nineties. It focused to improve regional cooperation and institutional mechanism to secure its regional sphere of influence after the post-cold-war world order. The initiative started with the establishment of IOR-ARC in 1997 by an initiative from India, South Africa, and Australia. The step was acceptable in India due to its discontent from SAARC and its rejection from APEC membership (Kelegama, 2002; Rumley & Timothy Doyle, 2015). On the one other hand, New Delhi has started its process of regionalism, which is remaining its core of interests for its maritime strategy. On the other hand, it focused on regime formation for maritime ocean governance. For instance, India has assumed that interdependence over the sea space of littoral countries is driving force behind the embodiment of United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (here-in-after UNCLOS) for the maritime regime formation in the Indian Ocean region.

The UNCLOS has adopted for Ocean governance by 1982, which came in the force in 1994 (Gupta, 2010). New Delhi overwhelmed to appropriate implementation of UNCLOS to remain with the idea of ocean regime formation in the IOR. Furthermore, the step has also supported by the US, Japan, Australia, and other Indian Ocean littoral countries for the open and secure maritime communication in the

region. Similarly, in the Asia-Pacific region, APEC is one of the examples of maritime regime formation, which completely based on maritime governance. To follow the path of APEC Indian Ocean littoral courtiers established the IOR-ARC that based on open regionalism, as similar to APEC for the formation of Indian Ocean maritime governance (Kelegama, 2000). Thereby, New Delhi adopted a more pragmatic approach toward the formation of maritime governance to keep more secure, its coastal affairs with Indian Ocean littoral countries. New Delhi is also conscience about its upcoming role in the Indian Ocean maritime governance notably after adopting the approach of enhancing IP-RSA by several littoral countries including the US, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and other ASEAN countries. Therefore, it is more proactive in formation of the Indian Ocean maritime governance by increasing the open regionalism whereby it has proper space a leading or influential power in the region.

5.3 Impacts of IP-RSA on Indian Security in IOR

To find out the fundamental roots behind the impacts of the IP-RSA on Indian security in the IOR, it is necessary to understand the wider sphere of Indo-Pacific region and India's central role to construct the new security outlined in the region. There are several responsible factors which might affects India's security after the construction of the IP-RSA. The IP-RSA is basic maneuvering driver to predict the way of India's upcoming foreign policy. On the one hand, India's security in the IOR is under the umbrella of IP-RSA, which generated the new enigma for New Delhi's stand over its strategic autonomy in foreign affairs. It is expected that New Delhi is increasing its extra-regional bid to claim the great power aspiration in the multipolar world order. On the other hand, it has some dilemma over to define its mutual relations with China due to its boundary disputes over the Himalayan region. However, India is willing to carry its multi-alignment policy with great powers to engage with all great powers which are under stress due to India move toward the US and its alliance system in the IP-RSA. It created unsound mistrust between Sino-Indian relations. As an active part of the Indo-Pacific strategy, India stands on the historical pivotal point, which decides its future capacities to deal with new security divergence in the region.

5.3.1 Challenges for India's Unilateral Position: The first measurement after the construction of the IP-RSA is came in the attention that new construction might affect India's independent approach to deal with Indian Ocean maritime issues. The acceptance of the concept of Indo-Pacific as the US has defined would make more lead skeptic environment for India. The US relative decline and uncertainty of the Trump administration about the systematic management of the Indo-Pacific policy will hazard India's strategic autonomy in the international affairs. Say, for instance, Pakistan was part of the US South Asian strategy until the 9/11 attack. Since, this major incident, it considered India as a greater player in its war against terror policy rather than full dependency on Islamabad. Secondly, The US policy-makers also considered that New Delhi could play a greater role to counter the Chinese assertiveness and its new infrastructure and ports development around the sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

Thirdly, the US also found the opportunity to enter into major commercial and defence market like India to sell its defence technologies. On the other hand, India is also a victim of the cross-border terrorism, which pushed it toward the US to fight against the global terrorism. Secondly, New Delhi also has the same approach to balancing the Chinese rise by constructing new regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. In this process, India has turned toward Southeast Asia to balance China with the same response. However, the new pivot has shifted the somewhere nature of its policies toward the US lead alignment system which is still not a partial part of India's foreign policy. Therefore, New Delhi is more conscious of its strategic autonomy, which is part of its NAM legacy from the cold-war period. To maintain its historical legacy of strategic autonomy Prime Minister Narendra Modi has escaped to mentioning 'Quad' (US, Japan, India, and Australia) as part of its maritime strategy in 17th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. He revives India's vision for Indo-Pacific region through adopting the balance approaches on Sino-Indian relations underpin of its NAM- 2.0 policies. He also cleared that the Indo-Pacific region should be open and inclusive rather than a club of limited members (Chaudhury, 2018; Zongyi, 2018; Organiser, 2018). Therefore, through opening speech at Shangri-La-Dialogue New Delhi has indicated that it is ready to its upcoming role to maintain its strategic

autonomy in the Indo-Pacific region. It is also committed to promote the open and rule-based international order, which all nations will get equal respect as a sovereign state. Further, Prime Minister Narendra Modi also suggested a positive vision of its Indo-Pacific strategy for instance, inclusive and free Indo-Pacific, common rule-based order, common access on sea and air, peaceful settlement of sea disputes by international law, favor globalization rather than protectionism (The Wire, 2018). Therefore, New Delhi is committed toward the open and free Indo-Pacific region, which provides the equal maritime access for all littoral countries in accordance with international laws. It helps to maintain status-quo in favor of New Delhi's maritime sphere in the IOR. India's vision for free and prosper Indo-Pacific region accept its existing geostrategic position whereby New Delhi can play a role as a central or deciding factors to predict the future of IP-RSA. Therefore, the IP-RSA influences India's decision-making process in the IOR. However, it depends on India's stand on this new regional security collaboration that affects India's maritime interests or extends its future role in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

5.3.2 Sino-Indian Maritime Competition: The first and major antagonism India has faced after acknowledgment of Indo-Pacific as a part of its maritime strategy that was China's assertiveness. L. Alan Winters and Shahid Yusuf have considered India-China two dancing giants that are rising with rapid growth and parallel economic development. The rapid economic and commercial growth is also influencing the sustainable growth agenda of global commons in such fields as climate change, global warming and International Sea laws (Winters & Yusuf, 2007). However, the rise of these powers have increased skeptic atmosphere between both sides due to rising economic competition, boundary dispute over the Himalayan region and China's maritime assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, Beijing is increasing its geostrategic and military presence in the IOR, by constructing the ports and infrastructural development around the circle of IOR. Nonetheless, approximately, 80% of China's oil imports transit through IOR and the Strait of Malacca, which is a still crucial waterway for China. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao understood the significance of these maritime waterways. He stated that China's high dependence on the Strait of Malacca and geostrategic appearance of

external powers is 'Malacca Dilemma' for China's MSLOC (Athwal, 2008). Therefore, the MSLOC routes top in PLA priority to limit the maritime threats for its commercial and trade activities. However, the layer of its naval modernization has started during 1980, and then Liu Huaqing has formulated the three layers of Chinese Navy to make China an excellent sea power. Liu Huaqing also called as a 'Chinese Mahan', which followed the same Mahan's maritime sea power doctrine in the Chinese characteristics (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2005). Actually, Beijing is following the mixed pattern of Mahan and Marxist model of maritime sea power that not based on martial techniques of the west, but includes the historical Chinese maritime sea power doctrines (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2008). The first phase of naval modernization focused on renewal and improvement of existing naval vessels to deter the regional threats around the coastal regions, which create the immediate threats.

The second layer of Chinese naval modernization is presenting current developments of PLA Navy such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and development light aircraft carriers. Further, to develop the modern capacities of People Liberation Army, Naval (herein after PLAN) for major warfare, naval strategies within the time limit of 2001-2020. Lastly, the expected phase will focus on fully-fledged blue-water capabilities of PLAN strength to surveillance all parts of the world until 2040 (Kondapalli, 2001; Athwal, 2008). Therefore, the process of PLAN modernization is based on its future aspirations of maritime sea power. Notably, its patterns of modernization are in contrast to the US Navy and its modernization process. China considered the US presence and its alliance system in the Asian-Pacific region is potential threats for its upcoming aspiration of a unilateral superpower in the region. Therefore, Beijing is following the offensive realist approach which puts its defense strategies more pragmatic on the real ground (Lim, 2014).

Nonetheless, on the same hand it is strengthening the concept of cooperation and common security that based on mutual trust, benefit and cooperation to promote the political, economic, social, military and international security for international peace and stability (Jianing, 2011). It is the more active approach by Beijing to dealing with its boundary disputes within its own sphere of influence. Paradoxically,

the Indo-Pacific littoral countries are considering its assertiveness as a hard power approach, which is not providing a win-win platform. Therefore, the littoral countries are moving toward a new matrix of regional collaboration in the region. In this process, New Delhi considered the IOR is its own relative potential area to resist the external powers, appearance notably China's new developments in the region. India has shown its acceptance on the concept Indo-Pacific, which motivated by its aspiration to revive historical, economic and maritime connectivity with ASEAN countries that would help India to save its energy and oil routes in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, for India, the SCS and IOR are two pivotal points whereby a future conviction of its maritime commercial and trade activities can fulfill within free and open Indo-Pacific region.

However, China is remaining consider that the IOR not belong unilaterally to India Just because of its name. Similarly, in the same concerns, India and other littoral countries do not consider that SCS belongs to China alone. Therefore, both India-China is involved in deep strategic oceans in the backyard of several policies and through the regional organizations. On the one hand, China is investing ports and infrastructure development in the Indian Ocean Islands nations such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles. In response, India intended for the geostrategic proximity with Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia. Even, along with this India has also adopted the reactive stance to offset the Chinese strategic engagement by providing financial and defense net security around the IOR (Sharma, 2012).

Hence, India is responding against Chinese overlapping maritime influence in the IOR. For instance, in response of China's first Air Craft carrier '*Liaoning*' commissioned in PLA September 2012, New Delhi has launched its first Air Craft carrier '*INS Vikrant*' in 2013, built by Cochin Shipyard Kerala inspired by Sanskrit Vedic quote '*जयेम सं युधि स्पृध*' which means that '*I defeat those who fight against me*'. Therefore, the indication behind this dictum is clear that to show its maritime strength against the aggression of other maritime powers in the IOR. New Delhi is constantly increasing its naval strength by receiving new technologies from the US, Japan, Russia, France and Israel. It also increased the geostrategic and defense proximity

notably in the US, Japan, Australia, and EU to receive a more benefits such as remarkable defense equipment and technology from the West. In this, process, New Delhi is inviting Foreign Direct Investment (here-in-after FDI) through 'Make in India' initiative in the defence industries.

However, in the year 2017-18 India's defense budget has reduced around the 1.63% of its GDP that is the lowest ever after 1962 in terms of GDP share. In contrast, China and Pakistan both are spending 2% of their percentage of GDP shares (Mahajan, 2018; Basu, 2018; Sharma, 2018). However, the 2014 Chinese white paper is claimed that "Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China's modernization drive and a security guarantee for China's peaceful development". In contrast, India at this time considering these new developments as a security threats from China and Pakistan borders including the maritime security threats in the IOR. The maritime competitions between Sino-India from both sides have increased due to competition for naval and technological supremacy in the IOR. Nonetheless, the below mention

Table: - 5. 1 Comparison of Sino-Indian Naval Power Strength

Serial No.	Subjects	China	India
1).	Aircraft Carriers	1	1
2).	Frigates	50	14
3).	Destroyers	29	11
4).	Corvettes	39	22
5).	Submarines	73	16
6).	Patrol Craft	220	139
7).	Mine Warfare Vessels	29	4

Source: www.globalfirepower.com

Table 5.1 is showing the comparison between Sino-Indian naval power strength. Say, for instance, the comparison in the frigates, destroyers, corvettes, submarines, patrol craft and marine warfare vessels, Chinese has more than double digits' strength comparison to India. The table also helps to understand both sides' naval strength and their capacities to deal with maritime threats in the upcoming years. Therefore, India's approach in the region is a defensive realist approach which is the mixed of Mahan and democratic sentiments. However, New Delhi is very active toward its upcoming role in the IP-RSA. It is conscious of its maritime strategic autonomy notably in the IOR. It understands the consequences of new regional collaboration with the US lead alliance system. Therefore, New Delhi adopted as an inclusive approach toward the IP-RSA rather than promoting Indo-Pacific as a strategy that possibly will promote India's future vision for the Indo-Pacific region.

5.3.3 From Non-Alignment into Quasi-Alignment: There will other possible impacts on Indian foreign policy since accepting the Indo-Pacific concept in central preference area. It has increased geostrategic and geopolitical alignment with littoral countries to secure its maritime interests in the greater sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Indian foreign policy, which was, based on Non- alignment principles from the cold-war period to balance the bipolar rivalry between two superpowers yet facing another landscape in its foreign affairs. Since Narendra Modi became Indian Prime Minister Indian foreign policy has faced the new trajectory on the diplomatic and geostrategic front. The new regime has adopted the proactive and flexible stance notably to secure its maritime boundaries in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. It breaks the old rigidity and reactive nature to deal its maritime security issues.

Further, after holding the Prime Minister office Narendra Modi has visited approximately record 55 countries to revitalize its historical, cultural and geostrategic partnerships with other countries. He extended India's historical and religious proximity by linking the Hindu and Buddhist civilizations with neighboring countries, notably with South and Southeast Asian countries. The new regime has entered in the new adventurism, which has broken the historical taboo of decisive choices in the geopolitical and diplomatic front. In this process, it has started closer strategic and

defence partnerships with the US, Japan, Australia and Israel (Chaulia,2018). For instance, New Delhi has signed the 'Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region' with the US, 'Framework of Security Cooperation' with Australia and signed the 'Special Strategic and global partnership' with Japan to revitalize its maritime connectivity in the Indian and Pacific oceans for open and free maritime communication (Baruah, 2016). Nonetheless, with the US, India has signed the Communications and Information's Security Memorandum of Agreement (here-in-after CISMOA) called as Communication Capability and Security Agreement (here-in-after COMCASA) due to its special nature with India. Before this India has also signed the Logistics Exchange Momentum of Agreement (here-in-after LEMOA) to strengthening the defence partnerships (Narayanan, 2016). The 2+2 dialogue has been successfully signed first ever-military agreement between two countries. However, according to Indian express sources (5 September, 2018) India has put strong position on the matter of oil import from Iran and S-400 deal with Russia. Same as it is also increasing its geostrategic and security partnership with Japan, Australia, and other ASEAN countries.

Hence, some academicians and experts are considering these geostrategic moves as a gradual shift toward the non-alignment to the semi-alignment strategy of the New Delhi likewise, semi-alignment with former USSR during the cold-war period. The school of thought considers that the shift will bring the new height of India's upcoming aspiration of the third center of power attraction after the US and China. Another school of thought opposed that India's move toward the new quadrilateral proximity to the US, Japan, Australia, and other ASEAN countries will restrict its strategic autonomy in the upcoming years. Therefore, the school has suggested that New Delhi should avoid any type of alignment or grouping in the region. The third school of thought further mark to the attention that India's Indo-Pacific strategy is a matrix of confusion between its non-alignment approach and its upcoming aspiration for extra-regional power. Therefore, these complicated situations confuse India's clear vision toward the Indian Ocean or Indo-Pacific strategy that impacts India's maritime security strategy in the IOR. Nonetheless, New Delhi's tilt towards the non-alignment to the semi-alignment with western groups and the US lead alliances will increase the

skeptic atmosphere within Russian and Chinese policy-makers. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has one-on-one dialogue through different outreach by Wuhan meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping sideline of the SCO meeting in the Qingdao to increase progress and partnership for economic as well as geopolitical developments with Beijing.

Ensure that Iran sanctions don't hurt us, India tells US

SHUBHAJIT ROY
NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 6

THE US has told India that it is not in Washington's interest to damage the Indian economy as External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo discussed the issue of oil imports from Iran. As the US has walked out of the nuclear deal with Iran, it wants all countries to cut oil imports to zero by early November.

At the first-ever India-US 2+2 dialogue, sources told *The Indian Express* that the Indian side "frankly" put across their position on oil imports from Iran. "We told them that we are an energy-reliant country, and candidly told them that rapid reduction of oil imports from Iran will impact our economy. We said that our economy should not be impacted by your policies," a source said.

According to the Indian government source, the US side replied they "fully understand" and added that it is "our policy", but "it is not in our interest to damage your economy".

Pompeo, however, in his remarks said, "We have told the Indians consistently as we have told every nation, that on November 4th the sanctions with respect to Iranian crude oil will be enforced, and that we will consider waivers where appropriate, but that it is our expectation that the purchases of Iranian crude oil will go to zero from every country, or sanctions will be imposed. So we'll work with

FROM THE FRONT PAGE

India-US

American counterparts, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Secretary of Defense James Mattis, at the Jawaharlal Nehru Bhawan.

While there are more than 50 bilateral dialogue mechanisms between the two governments, this is the highest level of engagement after the summit-level engagement between the Prime Minister and the US President.

A joint statement said, "They welcomed the signing of a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) that will facilitate access to advanced defence systems and enable India to optimally utilise its existing US-origin platforms."

The general agreement signed by the US is called the Communication and Information on Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) but the name was changed to COMCASA to reflect its India-specific nature.

It is part of a set of three military agreements that the US considers "foundational" for a functional military relationship. In August 2016, India had signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which allows the military of each country to replenish from the other's bases. Negotiations on the third agreement, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BCECA), have not yet begun.

As reported by *The Indian Express*, the two sides decided to establish a hotline between the External Affairs Minister and the US Secretary of State, and another between the Defence Minister and Secretary of Defense. "The two sides further decided to establish secure communication... to help maintain regular high-



External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and US Secretary of Defense James Mattis at a joint press conference in New Delhi on Thursday. *Retna/Kur*

the Indians. We committed that we would do that. Many countries are in a place where they — it takes a little bit of time to unwind, and we'll work with them, I am sure, to find an outcome that makes sense."

"And from whence they purchase the other crude oil, we're happy to see if it's American products that are able to deliver for them. I think that'd be a great outcome. But our mission set is to make sure that Iran doesn't engage in malign behaviour with wealth that comes from countries around the world, thus the purpose of the sanctions," the US Secretary said. India has already told them it is going to buy oil and gas from the US.

On the S-400 deal with Russia, Indian government sources said that it did not figure in the Pompeo-Swaraj bilateral or the 2+2 dialogue. The US wants to put sanctions on countries making defence deals with Russia, but a special waiver under the US law is in the works. While the US Congress has passed the waiver, the US President still has to personally certify waiver for the S-400 deal.

Pompeo, however, said, "With respect to the S-400, no decision has been made. We are working to impose CAATSA Section 231 in a way that is appropriate and lawful and to exercise that waiver authority only where it makes sense. And we as a team, the national security team, will work on that, and as we continue to have these conversations with India about that, I think, come to an outcome that makes sense for each of our two countries."

level communication on emerging developments," the joint statement said.

Swaraj said, "Secretary Pompeo and I decided to remain in touch regularly through the new hotline between the Foreign Ministers that we will establish." Pompeo said that the Indo-US ties have entered a "new era of growth" under President Donald Trump and called the 2+2 dialogue "important and successful".

To keep an eye on Chinese submarines and ships, both sides reviewed the growth of bilateral engagements in support of maritime security and maritime domain awareness. Towards that end, the ministers "committed to start exchanges between the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the Indian Navy, underscoring the importance of deepening their maritime cooperation in the western Indian Ocean," the joint statement said.

This is expected to lead to stationing of a Navy liaison officer at the NAVCENT in Bahrain, sources said.

Mattis said India is a "stabilising force," a key country to make the Indo-Pacific "safe and secure". He also advocated increased "maritime awareness" and said "successful and productive discussions" will bolster the defence relationship.

All four ministers welcomed the inclusion of India by the United States among the top tier of countries entitled to licence-free exports, re-exports and transfers under License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1) and also committed to explore other means to support further expansion in two-way trade in defence items and defence manufacturing supply chain linkages.

Pompeo, who came from Pakistan, pitched for "elevating the security cooperation". Swaraj said counter-terrorism cooperation has acquired a "new qualitative edge and purpose". Welcoming the recent designations of Ashkar-e-Taiba terrorists by the US, she said they underscore the international community's scrutiny over the threat of terrorism emanating from Pakistan which has affected India and the United States alike.

"In the 10th anniversary of the 26/11 attacks, we recognised the importance of justice and retribution for the mastermind behind this terrorist attack," she said.

Stressing that India supports President Trump's South Asia Policy, she said, "His call for Pakistan to stop its policy of supporting cross-border terrorism finds resonance with us." Both sides agreed to deepen cooperation in international forums like the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force.

Denouncing use of terrorist proxies in the region, they called on Pakistan to ensure that the territory under its control is not used to launch terrorist attacks on other countries. "On the eve of the 10-year anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai attack, they called on Pakistan to bring to justice expeditiously the perpetrators of the Mumbai, Pathankot, Uri, and other cross-border terrorist attacks", the joint statement said.

On the vexed issue of H1B visas, Swaraj said: "I sought Secretary Pompeo's support to nurture our people-to-people links. Specifically, I conveyed our expectation for a non-discriminatory and predictable approach to the H1B visa regime, given its high impact on innovation, competitiveness and people-to-people partnership, all of which are a vital source of strength for our relationship."

Sources: Ensure That Iran's Section Don't Hurt us, India tells US. *Indian Express* (September 6, 2018), retrieved from <http://epaper.indianexpress.com/1807097/Delhi/September-7,-2018#page/12/1>.

Likewise, after the one month he also meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi to rebalance its historical defence and strategic proximity with Russia (Aneja, 2018). Therefore, it is clear that India wants the balance of its strategic partnerships with all great powers in the sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. In this process, to secure its maritime interests for open and free Indo-Pacific region, it is moving toward the semi or quasi-alignment with Indo-Pacific littoral countries including with the US. The new pivot in India's strategies towards the western groups has increased China's assertiveness towards India that might impacts its maritime security relations with

Beijing. Therefore, the New Delhi need to very conscious about its new strategic shift in the IP-RSA especially in making some military and defense pacts with western groups.

5.3.4 Quad Vs. Triangle: There is debate among the circle of international scholars that there are geostrategic proximities are occurring among the great and regional powers. Say, for instance, 'Quad' (US, India, Japan, and Australia) is one of the new geostrategic proximity in the Indo-Pacific region. The impetus behind the formation of the quad is to enhance the 'free and open' Indo-Pacific region by revitalizing the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (here-in-after QSD). It is an informal mechanism containing by four democratic powers such as the US, Australia, Japan, and India to balance China's naval rise and its assertiveness in the region. Since ten years of its inactive period, the group again revives its strength in this year by holding a continuous meeting in November 2017 and June 2018. However, the destiny of Quad is determined by the enthusiasm of participating countries, especially India, Japan, and Australia. In the case of New Delhi's stance, it is extending cold feet rather than fully engaged in strengthening the Quad strategy. Notably, after Prime Minister Modi's Wuhan visit New Delhi has rejected the participation of Australia in Malabar military exercise.

Further, there is also a clear message by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the annual Shangri-La Dialogue that India does not see Indo-Pacific as a strategy or club by a limited group of members (Grossman, 2018; Smith, 2018). So, it is clear sign by the New Delhi that Quad is not only the one pivotal point of its strategic alignment. It is also carrying the legacy of non-alignment policy, revive by the Indian strategic community as a non-alignment 2.0, which focused that India should carry its legacy of strategic autonomy in the foreign affairs and increase its multilateral engagement with all great powers. Further, William Lawrence S. Prabhakar rightly stated that in the "Quad there are strong bilateral security agreements between the US-Japan and US-Australia relations since the Second World War. In the case of India, it has not bilateral Security agreement with the US as similar to Japan and Australia. Therefore, the position of India is complex or can fathom as a weak comparison than other Quad

members (W. L. S. Prabhakar, telephonic interview, September 23, 2018)". In this contrast, the 'Triangle (Russia-China-Pakistan) is another enhancing power alignment, which deliberated to balance the US pivot in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. The rising geostrategic proximity among the Russia-China-Pakistan relations is new landscape trajectory for power axis in the region. Notably, after the 9/11 attack and paradigm shift in the Indo-US relations, invites new power nexus among other great powers in the region. In this process, Russia has pauses its traditional cold war differences with Pakistan and signed the 'military cooperation agreement' with Islamabad on November 2014 (Mitra, 2015).

A part of Russia's eastward and southward strategy, it has increased more energy, defense, military and diplomatic relations with Islamabad and Beijing, especially after sections of the western world after Crimea annexation (Shah & Kumar, 2018). These overwhelming steps by Moscow are increasing the more possibilities of the new superpowers triangle as a controlling nuclear force in the region. However, China-Pakistan is an old ally in the region matching new strategic interests with Moscow to counter the 'Quad' strategies in the Indo-Pacific region. The geostrategic proximity between China and Pakistan has increased notably after signed the CPEC imitative between both countries. It is replacing the US in the power equation of the South Asian regional order (Andleed & Khalid, 2018; Tikhonova, 2016). Therefore, the new strategic triangle brings the new possibilities of the alignment within great powers in the region that attract other regional powers, which are already in opposite stance with the US protectionism outlook in international affairs. Say, for instance, Iran has shown its policy shift toward the Moscow and Beijing after termination of the US-Iran nuclear deal.

Likewise, Turkey has also diversified its geostrategic aspirations toward the Russia and China to strengthen its anti-US stance over Syria and Arab-Israel conflict. Therefore, triple-axis powers have a more legitimized collaboration in contrast to Quad uncertainties in the region. Ironically, New Delhi is under diverse stance in these new power equations, responding with a balance approach to carry its traditional legacy of strategic autonomy through NAM-2.0. Apart from this, New Delhi

also stated that Indo-Pacific is not a strategy or any group of alliances; it is free and open for all those who support the free and open Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, it extends its geostrategic stance in the region as a balancing power between two rival powers. Though, New Delhi's pivot towards the US for defence and strategic partnerships increased the skeptic attitude about its balance stance over its multilateralism.

5.3.5 IOR Contending Claims

The Indo-Pacific region is enhancing theatre of Great Power politics due to huge natural resources availability and its geostrategic position. The prediction of Mahan's sea power notion is more relevant than Mackinder's land power notion. The entire rimland region considers as a geostrategic significance region to predict the Asian destiny. It is the multiplex theatre of Great Power politics, overlapping the claims of geostrategic dominance notably by the US, China, Russia, India, Japan, and Australia. However, in case of IOR, there is remain the US has a geostrategic presence through the Diego Garcia air base and navel troop's appearance from the Suez Canal to Strait of Malacca including SCS (Kaplan, 2009; chari, 2014). Similarly, Russia's vertical shift towards the Southward regions, such as the Middle East, Central and South Asian regions is also increase geostrategic and geopolitical proximity with the IOR littoral countries. Notably, after the US shift toward Pakistan to India, Moscow is trying to fill the power vacuum by increasing its strategic and defense proximity to Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey to increase its geostrategic influence in the greater IOR.

Similarly, China has also adopted the vertical approach towards its Southward notably in the SCS and IOR to increase its own consideration in great power politics. To fulfill this objective, it is in progress with OBOR plan which is diversified within several initiatives such as CPEC, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (herein after CIPEC) and Bangladesh, China, India Myanmar Economic Corridor (here-in-after BCIMEC) etc. These are major fundamental projects, which are the brainchild of Chinese President Xi Jinping vision of OBOR initiative (Singh, 2018; Aoyama, 2016). Despite this, other regional powers such as India, Japan, Australia,

Iran, South Africa, Indonesia, and Singapore are also involved in the IOR to legitimize their claims to secure their maritime interests. Therefore, the overlapping geostrategic and maritime interests within Indian Ocean littoral countries and great powers active involvement are constructing the complex theatre of maritime claims in the region. Indeed, the interdependence among great and regional powers in the geo-economic, geopolitical and maritime security spheres led to the complex theatre of claims in the Indian Ocean region. However, India is a big character in the story behind the new power considerations in the IOR. India's economic reforms fueled its naval development ahead to increase its geostrategic reach from the Suez Canal to Strait of Malacca to secure its maritime routes. Therefore, the IOR is remaining a central region to decide the destiny of the rising Asian century. The acknowledgment of the concept of the Indo-Pacific region, especially by the US, Japan, Australia, and Indian policy-makers, captivate the other great powers such as China and Russia toward the IOR.

The recognition also shifted the courtesy of surrounding regional powers to increase their geostrategic proximity with Indian Ocean littoral countries to secure their maritime routes. These countries are increasing their naval strength by increasing maritime capacities to secure maritime boundaries and routes in the greater sphere of the IOR. These powers engaged in the region to shape the maritime regional security architecture according to their convenience and maritime interests. However, the IOR was once a zone of peace declared by General Assembly under resolution 2832 in the year 1971 (Singh, 2015). Currently, the region is a theatre of Great Power politics, which every littoral country of the Indo-Pacific region is involved in bilateral or multilateral regional cooperation in the region. Therefore, the region is the theatre of overlapping maritime interests and multiplex claims in the region, which led to new maritime challenges for New Delhi to retain its geostrategic presence in the greater sphere of the IOR. The Table no. 5.2 is showing the Indo-Pacific littoral countries which are involved through various bilateral or multilateral regional cooperation in the region.

Table: - 5. 2 Naval Strength among Indo-Pacific Rival Countries in the Year 2018.

Serial No.	Country Name	Aircraft Carriers	Frigates	Destroyers	Sub-Marines	Patrol Craft	Mine Warfare Vessels	Total Naval Assets
1).	USA	20	10	65	66	13	11	415
2).	Russia	1	9	13	78	41	47	352
3).	China	1	50	29	73	220	29	714
4).	India	1	14	11	16	139	4	295
5).	Japan	4	—	36	17	6	25	131
6).	Australia	2	10	1	6	13	6	47
7).	Pakistan	—	10	—	5	11	3	197
8).	Philippines	—	4	—	0	35	—	119
9).	Indonesia	—	8	24	3	74	12	221
10).	North Korea	—	10	—	86	438	25	967
11).	South Korea	1	12	12	16	69	11	166
12.)	Myanmar	—	5	—	—	40	2	155
13).	Vietnam	—	9	—	6	25	8	65
14).	Singapore	—	6	—	—	11	2	40
15).	Bangladesh	—	6	—	2	30	5	89
16).	Iran	—	5	—	33	230	10	398
17).	Saudi Arabia	—	7	—	—	11	3	55
18).	Sri Lanka	—	—	—	—	191	—	40
19).	United Kingdom	2	13	6	10	21	13	76
20).	France	4	11	12	10	18	18	118

Source: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/>

5.4 India's Reactive Orientation

Since, scrutinize the impacts of IP-RSA on India's security in the IOR, it is also important to understand India's responses to secure its maritime interests in the IOR. New Delhi has adopted the reactive orientation towards the new security threats in the IP-RSA. It is still facing the several policies paralyzes to counter China's assertiveness in the greater IOR. However, New Delhi has adopted the reactive stance notably after the Narendra Modi Government came in the power. It focused on the reactive orientations through increasing the several ports, rail and transport connectivity counter its traditional and non-traditional security threats in the greater sphere of Indo-Pacific region. New Delhi has adopted mixed reactions on the existing maritime security threats. Some experts of international security studies favors India's reactive stance rather than favor the proactive engagement in the region.

In this contrast, Lakhvinder Singh director of the Asia institute from South Korea stated, "Indian leadership appears to be confused and lost. It seems that Indian leadership has no idea of the gravity of the situation. In contrast to China, it is eager to overthrow US-led Asia-Pacific security architecture (L. Singh, emailed interview, August 14, 2018)." However, New Delhi is engaged in the greater sphere of IOR, through the various bilateral and multilateral engagements. It promoted the more regional and extra-regional, institutional arrangements, whereby it secures its regional and extra-regional sphere of power. In this addition, below points investigates India's reactive and pro-active stance to deal relative issues of foreign policy to counter the existing traditional and non-traditional security threats in the greater sphere of IOR.

5.4.1 India as a Net Security Provider

The gradual rise of India's economic, diplomatic and military enlargements intensifies its sphere of influence in the greater IOR. It increased its sense of responsibility as a regional or extra-regional power. In this process, New Delhi is active to play a role as a net security provider in the surrounding regions. Firstly, in this consideration the US Secretary of Defence has argued at the Shangri-La-Dialogue "we look to India to be a partner and net security provider in the Indian Ocean and its beyond" (Mukherjee, 2014; Muni, 2015). Thereafter, the phrase

accepted by Indian policy-makers in the regular consideration for speaking in the favor of its wider maritime security interests. For instance, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also anticipated that our responsibility and stability in the region provide us platform to provide the net security for other countries of the Indian Ocean and its beyond (Mukherjee, 2014; Mukherjee, & Mohan, 2015). In this process, there are four major such preference points 1). Capacity building 2). Military diplomacy 3). Military assistance 4). Direct deployment of military forces to provide aid and stability within the country or region.

Similarly, New Delhi has adopted the same patterns to increase its maritime sphere of influence in the greater IOR, notably after its independence. However, during the period of colonial India, the British Indian Army provided the net security in the greater sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Since the independence of India, New Delhi has adopted the Non-alignment policy to increase its solidarity with post-colonial states of Asian and African countries. Later, the shift has realized during unconstrained strategy by former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to intervene in the peace process of Sri Lanka and Maldives affairs in late 1980. Nonetheless, after the disintegration of the former USSR, New Delhi's policy choices have shifted towards Southeast Asia through launching its 'Look East Policy' to provide the broader sphere of influence (Mukherjee, A. & Mohan, 2015).

However, the beginning of the twenty-first century makes the new foundational stone of India's economic, military and diplomatic achievements led to promote India's national interests in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. The South Asian countries from Afghanistan to Myanmar are facing the internal or institutional turbulence from the last several years' still a major threat to carry the democratic and cooperative regional order. Likewise, India also faced the internal emergency late 1980; remain to maintain its institutional and democratic spirit in comparison then its surrounding countries (Brewster, 2013; Menon, 2016). Say, for instance, currently, India is increasing the capacity building of Afghanistan military to strengthen its basic structure by providing the assistance and basic official training of Afghan military officers. It is also snowballing the capacity building of Royal Army of Bhutan on

China-Bhutan border. India's space agency also launched the South Asian Satellite or GSAT-9 to provide the essay communication access, good governance, land monitoring, weather broadcasting medical service during natural calamities (Madhumathi, 2017). There are other several examples, such as in Nepal earthquake and India first response towards rehabilitation and infrastructural developments, quick response by the Indian government to the Maldives water crisis and some infrastructural and connectivity initiative by New Delhi in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Nonetheless, the Indian Navy is also providing the ring of maritime security for surrounding the Western shore of the Indian Ocean to combat against the Sea Piracy notably from the Somalian Pirates. It is seeking to contribute to the maritime security and provide the stability and sustainability in the growth of the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. In the geostrategic frontiers, the Indian Navy is also increasing its engagements with the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean region to reduce the external power influence in the region.

Notably, after the 26/11 Mumbai attack, the Indian Navy is more pro-active to increase its naval capabilities notably around the IOR. It has enlarged its naval capabilities far away from traditional bearing shifted toward the development of modern naval capabilities through buying several long-range aircraft, aircraft carriers and submarines to respond the traditional and non-traditional security threats. Nonetheless, it has also increased its proximity with middle powers such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia, and South Korea to strengthen its geostrategic position in the IOR. Additionally, to prompting military diplomacy, it has joined the Malabar naval exercise with the US and Japan (Brewster, 2013; Khurana, 2016). Currently, India is playing the very vibrant role behind the creation of IONS in the Indian Ocean region to offer the space for inclusive regional maritime security building for open and free maritime connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region (Chauhan, 2016). In this addition, Indian peacekeeping forces in United Nations Security Council (herein after UNSC) is also underpin India's stance as a net security provider not in the Indian Ocean region but it's beyond. Therefore, India is a hotspot to provide the net security for surrounding countries, notably for the Indo-Pacific littoral countries.

5.4.2 China's String of Pearls Policy and India's Reciprocations

The twenty-first century brings the new attention for great powers towards the Indo-Pacific region notably around the IOR. The rise of two major economies such as China and India is reshaping the geopolitical, geostrategic and diplomatic equations in the region. Notably, the Indian Ocean region is the center of attraction both countries due to their geostrategic dependency on maritime sea routes in the IOR. India is enjoying its longtime historical legacy as an influential power in the IOR from the colonial period. Since, independence it maintained its strategic autonomy in the maritime affairs through adopting the NAM, behind the backdrop of bipolar Movement in the cold war period. However, after the disintegration of the former USSR, China found itself as major actors to fill the power vacuum, notably in the South and South East Asian region. Therefore, it has shifted its attention towards its seaward strategies, notably SCS and Indian Ocean littoral region. It has core maritime security interests in the SCS. Therefore, it has illustrated its maritime interests by claiming 'nine dash line' is a core area of interests in the region. It is also increasing its presence in the Scarborough Reef and second Thomas Shoal in contrast with Philippines claims. Further, the Luconia Shols also cause of mistrust and dispute between China and Malaysia due to uncertainty about the natural gas reserves and oils and fishing boundaries (US Department of Defence Annual Report-2015).

The international tribunal in July 2016 has given a decision in favor of Philippines over the legal clarification on nine-dash line claim. However, China has refused the tribunal decision and still increasing its presence around the SCS. The Tribunal has cleared that PRC is violating the sovereign rights of Philippines over the EEZ. To this contrast, China is continuously increasing artificial Islands around the SCS to overlapping its maritime claim in the region (US Department of Defence, Annual Report-2017). Nonetheless, it has started the ports and infrastructure developments in the Indian Ocean Islands states such as Maldives, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and Mauritius. Along with this, it has also linked up with other littoral states such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan etc. The Boo-Allen Hamilton in his thesis in 2005 called it as a China's 'String of Pearls' strategy which China has adopted policies to increase its naval bases and intelligence, surveillance around the

circle of the South Asian region (Townshend, 2011; Chacko, 2014; Jacques, 2012; Khurana, 2015). Further to keeping a check on maritime checkpoints such as the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, the Straits of Lombok and Sunda, the US has increased its geostrategic alignment with its Pacific alliances, revitalized again through Obama's Asia-Pivot policy and acknowledgement of the Indo-Pacific term to intensify its economic, strategic and military alignment within broader, sphere of Indo-Pacific region. China has also considered that India's 'Look East' policy as a security concerns for it. The first stage of strategy has begun with economic relations has shifted towards the strategic and security collaboration notably after Narendra Modi government stated the 'Look East to Act East' Policy in the Indo-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, Beijing has announced the OBOR ambitious project to link or rebirth its string of pearls policy with snowballing essence for geo-economics, geostrategic and diplomatic relations with Indo-Pacific littorals (Holmes, & Yoshihara, 2008; Abhi, 2015; Chellaney, 2015). To freeze its 'Malacca Dilemma' Beijing has the impetus to secure its blue-water interests in the IOR. Actually, it is the counterbalance of the US Asia-Pivot policy and its longtime naval presence in the region. Therefore, Chinese string of pearls policy response of its fear of the US naval presence and its Malacca dilemma. The above table shows China's major ports and infrastructural developments in the IOR. On the other hand, in this background, New Delhi has dissimilar stance over this new infrastructural development in the region. There are different schools of thoughts, examine India's line of thoughts and its reactive orientations over new ports and infrastructural development in the region. Currently, India's new infrastructural development projects are growing its own milieu of economic, political, strategic and military developments to face the new maritime security dynamics notably in the IOR. Say, for instance, Zhang Ming has claimed that India could use the Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago as a 'metal chain' to block the Beijing access through the Strait of Malacca to carry its maritime commercial activities. The Table no. 5.3 is revealing Beijing naval and commercial access through several major ports in the Indo-Pacific region that boost its geostrategic and military presence in the region.

Table: - 5. 3 China's Major Ports and Infrastructural Developments in the IOR

Serial No.	Countries Names	Ports Developed in the IOR	Naval & Commercial Access in IOR	Current Status
1).	Pakistan	Gwadar port Deep Port Water	Naval and Commercial Access	Build by China in total cost USD 248 million, linked with as a part of CPEC initiative
2).	Sri Lanka	Hambantota Port	Commercial Access	China has invested USD 8 billion, estimated 80% stake sell to China over it.
3).	Myanmar	Kyauk Pyu & Sittwe Deep Water Ports	Offers the Chinese Nuclear Submarines and intelligence gathering facilities	China has invested USD 7.3 billion, & 75% controlling stake over it.
4).	Maldives	Male Deep Water Port	Expected military infrastructure and air force base will construct	Taken 50 years-lease within cost of USD 4 million.
5).	Bangladesh	Chittagong Port	Navel and Commercial access	Provides the USD 25 billion, over 34 projects
6).	Cambodia	Sihanoukville Deep Water Port	—	Completed
7).	Tanzania	Port of Bagamoyo	—	—
8).	Seychelles	—	Naval Base	—
9).	Thailand	Kra Isthmus Canal Project	Infrastructure and connectivity projects	It is a part of China's OBOR project
10).	Djibouti	Djibouti Port	Military Base of PLA	PLA has built by US\$590 million

Source: US Department of Defence Annual Reports to Congress. Military and security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China- 2018, retrieved from <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF>.

Therefore, China does not want that the Indian Ocean only belongs to India, it is beyond India's consideration which Beijing has serious maritime security concerns in the region (Rai, 2013). However, New Delhi considered that the Indian Ocean is its historical, cultural and economic legacy led to its claim over a region that the Indian Ocean related to India and its coastal belt. To intensify its historical, economic, cultural and geostrategic appearance in the region, it has taken the several initiatives such as to the port's development, infrastructural developments and transports and railway connectivity around the circle of the Indian Ocean littoral countries.

To counter the Chinese assertiveness and its encirclement strategy called '*Chakravyuh*' in Indian mythical dogma. To delimit the influence of *chakravyuh* the Indian policy-makers are making the new encirclement strategy around the IOR. It also called India's string of pearls policy to counter Chinese recent geostrategic and naval presence around the encirclement of the Indian Ocean region. Apart from this, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Maldives, Mauritius, Iran, Oman, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam is an active part of India's 'String of Pearls' or called as India's 'Necklace of Diamonds' strategy. New Delhi has also increased its military strength through shifting its defensive military strategies to defensive-offensive move and conducted the two surgical strikes alongside with its Eastern and Western borders (Merchant, 2015; Ashish, 2017). There are several ports and infrastructural developments intensify India's counter strategies in contrast to Chinese string of pearls policy in the region.

Prime Minister Modi also announced the facilities for visa on arrival for several Pacific island states during his Island nation visit to Fiji. He stated that the e-network for small Pacific-Islands nations to increase the connectivity for new project called the pane Pacific Project to increase the telemedicine and tele-education with hike grant-in-aid \$125,000 to \$200,000 for selected community project developments (Gilani, 2015). Therefore, New Delhi intensifies its own capabilities to increase the encirclement strategy to break the Chinese string of pearls around the IOR. The table 5.4 has shown India's ports and Airbase development around the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region.

Table: - 5.4 India's Major Ports and Development in the Greater IOR

Serial No.	India's Partnerships with Countries in IOR	Ports/Air Base construction	Naval and Commercial Infrastructure Development	Current Status
1).	Myanmar	Development of Sittwe Port, Dawei Port	Commercial and strategic access	Under Construction by Indo-Japan combined project
2).	Maldives	Air Base Development	—	—
3).	USA	India's access in Diego Garcia with the US army	Naval Development by the US, the Indian Navy also get access	Constructed
4).	Indonesia	Sabang Naval Port	Develop the Strategic and Economic Zone	Beginning Stage
5).	Singapore	Changi Naval Port	Direct Naval Access	Beginning Stage
6).	Tajikistan/Mongolia	Air Base in Tajikistan & Electronic Monitoring and Joint Air Corridor in Mongolia	Geostrategic and Military access	Building by India
7).	Andaman & Nicobar Islands Radar Station (India's own Islands in IOR)	India's Naval Ports & Airforce facilities	Navel and Military access & permanent naval presence around the maritime sea route	Built in India's Union Territory
8).	Iran	Chabahar Port	Commercial Access	Construction under combined project of Indo-Japan
9).	Oman	Duqm Port	Indian Navy able to use Logistic and Long-term operations	Beginning Stage
10).	Seychelles	Assumption Island	Military Access to India	Beginning stage
11).	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee Port	India and Japan commercial access	Under Construction by Indo-Japan combined efforts
12).	Bangladesh	Chittagong and Mongla ports (India also purposed the Payra port in South Western corner of Bangladesh)	Commercial access	Under process (Japan is also willing to develop the Matarbari Port)

Source: Ministry of External Affairs of India & Sangupta, H. (2018). Is India's Necklace of Diamonds Completes? *Indian Defence News*, retrieved from <http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2018/11/is-indias-necklace-of-diamonds-complete.html> & <https://www.careerride.com/view/string-of-pearl-theory-motives-and-indias-counter-reaction-19500.aspx>.

The table also examines India's naval and commercial access in the Indian Ocean littoral countries by constructing the infrastructural, rail and transport connectivity around the region. Furthermore, New Delhi has also revived its 'Sager Mala' project after the Modi government came in the power. The Sager Mala project was brainchild of former Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Bajpai introduced in the year 2003. It has revitalized by Narendra Modi government under the Ministry of Shipping in July 2015. There are certain objectives of this project such as 1). To develop the new mega ports around the circle of the coastal region. 2). Develop the institutional framework for ports management 3). Modernize the existing ports 4). To develop the transport connectivity by such as road, rail, oil and gas pipelines, waterways and multi-modal logistics parks around the coastal region (Debu, 2015; Siva, 2016; Sekhsaria, 2017).

Further, New Delhi also intensifies its coastal security mechanism to secure its maritime boundaries of traditional and non-traditional security threats. It is also increased its alignment strategy with middle powers Such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Therefore, to counter the Chinese encirclement strategy around the garlands of geostrategic checkpoints such as the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, Mozambique Channel, Cape of Good hope, Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and Straits of Sunda and Lombok. Therefore, gradually India is pivotal towards the new encirclement strategy to increase its sphere of influence in the greater Indian Ocean region. The reactive stance of India's foreign policy shows its bit for extra-regional or great power determination in the future Asian century.

5.4.3 India's Naval Modernization

India's naval modernization one of the recent trends in the New Delhi's strategic pivot due to its long coastal boundaries in the IOR. Therefore, Indian policy-makers considered that it is India's area of interests to safe its maritime costal belt around the Indian Ocean littoral region and provides the net security surrounding countries. Due to a former larger British colony, New Delhi has inherited naval practices since its independence on 15 August 1947. Therefore, India followed the larger tradition of the British set up of the naval organization until the date of 1964. The modernization process has started after the 1964-69 Defence Plan, which carried


by the Indian Navy by accepting the Soviet ships and technology to uplift the naval journey of Indian naval modernization. Say for instance, the modernization process helped India in the Indo-Pak war in 1971 by blocking Pakistani ships played the wider role in India's victory (Paiva, 2011; Ladwig, 2016).

Since this major war, India has increased its aspiration as an extra-regional power led to its naval modernization to achieve its geostrategic objectives in the broader sphere of the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Navy adopted the Mahan's doctrine of sea power to secure its maritime interests in the region. India's Naval strategy compiles within six basic principles such as increasing the naval spending, expand the infrastructure facilities, adopt the modernization process, arrange the naval exercises, deployment in the Indian Ocean region and increase active maritime diplomacy to protect the MSLOC in the greater IOR. The Indian Navy is also developing its warfare and deployment strategies to provide the net security in the Indian Ocean littoral countries (Khalid, 2017; Raghuvanshi, 2017). To attaining the modernization process, it has restructured its commanding levels in the diverse structural organization within strong responsibilities. Say for instance, after the chief of the naval staff, there are further demarcations of responsibilities among the three-tier command levels.

Further, there are also two independent commands of levels such as chief of material and commander in chief Andaman and Nicobar command. The three main commands such as Western, Eastern and Southern naval commands have altered tasks to ensure the security of India's coastal areas. The Western Naval command is responsible for the western coastal security of India's maritime boundaries, which has increased its greater sense of responsibilities, notably after the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack. The Eastern Naval command, which is responsible for the eastern coastal maritime security, remains a more important in strengthening India's 'Look Act East Asia' policy. For the same purpose, the Southern Naval command has also a more pro-active role to ensure the Indian oceanic approach towards its southern islands and littoral states including India's Antarctica projects. More importantly, the Andaman and Nicobar command have a geostrategic role to secure the Indo-Pacific maritime

routes, make checks, and balance over the most important strategic maritime checkpoint Strait of Malacca. Therefore, the nature of the Indian Navy is spreading out of its traditional hesitations and ready to play a broader role in the greater Indian Ocean region as a net security provider for littoral countries. The below table no. 5.5 is showing Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy) Level and Operational Commands level. Further, table no. 5.6 is showing Administrative Control of Flag Officer Commanding in Chiefs.

Table: - 5.5 Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy) Level & Operational Commands Level



Source: <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/organisation>.

According to Indian maritime doctrine 2009, India has defined its maritime interests within two spheres. The primary area defined as the Northern Indian Ocean region. Further, it has extended after 2015 around the southward and westward. The secondary area of maritime interests has also extended around the Mediterranean Sea and West coast of Africa. It has also included the Pacific littoral and southern Indian Ocean region around the Antarctica.

Table: - 5. 6 Administrative Control of Flag Officer Commanding in Chiefs

Serial No.	Flag Officer Commanding In Chief Western Naval Command	Flag Officer Commanding In Chief Eastern Naval Command	Flag Officer Commanding In Chief Southern Naval Command
1).	Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet	Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet	Commandant Indian Naval Academy
2) .	Flag Officer Commanding Maharashtra Area	Admiral Superintendent Dockyard (Visakhapatnam)	Flag Officer Sea Training
3).	Commodore Commanding Submarines (West)	Flag Officer Commanding Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry Naval Area	Admiral Superintended dent Yards (Kochi)
4).	Flag a Officer Commanding Goa Area	Commodore Commanding Submarines (East)	Naval Officer-In-Charge (Kerala)
5).	Flag Officer Naval Aviation	Naval Officer-In-Charge (Andhra-Pradesh)	Naval Officer-In-Charge (Lakshadweep)
6).	Flag Officer Offshore Defense Advisory Group	Naval Officer-In-Charge (Tamil Nadu)	Shore Establishment
7).	Flag Officer Commanding Karnataka Naval Area	Naval Officer-In-Charge (ORISSA)	Training School / Establishment
8).	Flag Officer Commanding Gujarat Naval Area	Naval Officer-In-Charge (West Bengal)	–
9).	Admiral Superintendent Dockyard (Mumbai)	Shore Establishment	–
10).	Naval Officer-In-Charge (Maharashtra)	–	–
11).	Naval Officer-In-Charge (Gujrat)	–	–
12).	Naval Officer-In-Charge (Goa)	–	–
13).	Shore Establishment	–	–

Source: - <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/organisation>.

Moreover, the former Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has defined India's policy towards the region as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Islands countries. Nonetheless, the maritime doctrine also stated that the future fleet based on operational capabilities, nuclear ballistic missiles, carrier battle groups, and aircraft carriers. Nonetheless, India's maritime strategy also emphasizes the maintenance of the freedom of navigation and proper implementations of UNCLOS (Chaudhury, 2015; Vasan, 2012). The Indian maritime doctrine 2009 is also focused the peace, security and political stability in the Indian Ocean littoral countries. New Delhi also increased its maritime capabilities to counter the terrorism and insurgency threats around its coastal littoral region, notably after the 26/11 attack in Mumbai. It also mentioned different kinds of characteristics to increase the maritime forces through adopting such kind of access possibilities, the mobility of sea resources, ability to influence the sea-based events, secure the maritime routes, resilience, and sustainability of maritime resources. The maritime doctrine also distinct the objectives of the Indian Navy are such as deterrence against the conflicts and coercion, defense against the seaborne threats and nuclear strikes (Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009).

New Delhi has revitalized its naval modernization for fulfilling such Indian Ocean maritime aspirations. Probably, New Delhi naval modernization is a counter strategy for China-Pakistan Geostrategic proximity in the Southwestern borders of India, which provides the geostrategic access for PLA Navy on Gwadar Port infrastructural developments within CPEC initiative. Due to the new geostrategic encirclement strategy by Beijing increased skeptical environment to India about its 7,516.6 km. long maritime coastal line, 27 Lakshadweep Islands and its 572 Andaman Nicobar Islands. Therefore, India's naval strategy has shifted towards the edition of Alfred T. Mahan's sea power notion to increase geostrategic aspirations in the greater IOR (Scott, 2013). To implement this strategy New Delhi has adopted the pro-active oceanic strategy to intensify its maritime interests around the IOR. In the year 2002 to 2013 Indian government has decided to spend US\$40 billion as a part of its naval modernization process to make the Indian Navy as a third largest fleet in the world. The main central pillar of this modernization process was to develop the

aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. In this process, India has launched its first indigenous built nuclear submarine *INS Arihant*, commissioned in August 2016 in the Indian Navy. The *INS Vikramaditya* also already entered in the Indian Navy, which has the capacity to carry 29 MiG-29K aircraft. It increased the true spirit of Indian navy in the broader sphere of the Indian Ocean region (Ladwig, 2012; Sypott, 2015). Further, five other indigenous built nuclear submarine project has approved by the government with a total cost of US \$ 42.9 billion. It has also, built the stealth-featured *Shivalik-class* frigates, which first commissioned in April 2010. The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has commissioned the first six planned Scorpene-class *INS Kalvari* diesel-electric attack submarines in naval dockyard in Mumbai on 14 December 2017 (Brown, 1991; Gady, 2017). Therefore, New Delhi is intensifying its navel modernization process, notably after the Narendra Modi government came in the power. It is increasing its navel share in its defence budget itself dictated its preferences toward the land to oceanic approach. Narendra Modi government has a pro-active stance towards its neighboring countries, notably with Indian and Southeast Asian countries to increase the ports accessibilities and play the active role as a net security provider in the greater Indian Ocean region.

5.4.4 One Belt One Road Vs India's South Asian Growth Corridor/ Asia-Africa Economic Corridor

Bringing to the attention of China's most ambitious plan in the twenty-first century One Belt One Road (herein after OBOR) is announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Indonesian parliament on October 2013. The OBOR initiative contains the Silk Road, Economic Belt (here-in-after SREB) and Maritime Silk Road (here-in-after MSR) to connect and integrate the land and sea-based economic corridors through the high-speed infrastructural development of the Ports, economic corridors, Oil and Gas pipelines and Railway and transport connectivity. The OBOR is a revival of the ancient Silk Road and routes, which are connecting with commercial, trade and maritime economic corridors. The OBOR initiative project runs through Asia, Africa, and European continents to connect the vibrant economic circles of the World. It connects China with Central Asia, Europe, and Russia through the land routes. Same as in maritime routes it is booming China's geostrategic proximity near to the South

China Sea to the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean region. It also opens the doors to China's commercial connectivity with African countries through the Mediterranean Sea (Swaine, 2015; National Development and Reform Commission People's Republic of China, 2015). Beijing has considered this initiative as an opportunity to bring back its historical, cultural, economic and civilizational glory in the international affairs. Nonetheless, some international scholars measured that Beijing OBOR initiative will help China to build the periphery of Sino-centric world order. Further, the more target region in the OBOR projects is South Asia due to the geostrategic importance of South Asian region and threshold point for China's entry into the greater IOR.

The South Asian region is the battleground of Chinese OBOR initiative due to India's opposition over it, and Pakistan's more enthusiasm toward the CPEC and other infrastructural projects. Same as Nepal and Maldives also facing the polarize opinion between two great powers. Thus, balance shifting toward the Sino-centric leading Asian century (Small, 2018; Ploberger, 2017). Chinese policy-makers estimated the total investment cost of OBOR initiative would take place approximately \$US6 trillion. The Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (herein after AIIB) and China-led financial Institution will play such major role to obtain a large amount of investment money. Along with this, China's Export-Import Bank has already financed in 2057 initial projects in the 49 countries. Nonetheless, China Development Bank also plays a major role to finance in 400 major projects in 48 countries with extensive funds. These new Chinese developments and investment agenda brought the new debate among the scholars on the geopolitical landscape in the hinter and Rimland region. Say, for instance, the Mackinder geopolitical transformation based on railway and transport connectivity that followed by Chinese policy-makers through implementing the OBOR projects (Aoyama, 2016; Blanchard & Flint, 2017).

Hence, OBOR projects have brought new changes in Beijing foreign policy trends. Say, for instance, the focus under the OBOR around the encirclement of rimland region around the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing is hopeful toward its South and South West region by adopting the vertical approach in the policy implementation and geostrategic engagements through inaugurating the

several projects such as CPEC, CMEC, BCIM, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic corridor and Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road within the Umbrella of OBOR. Therefore, the Indo - Pacific region is a more debatable region due to geostrategic construction pushed by China in the region. The table 5.7 is showing China's major projects, partner countries, major infrastructural developments and their status under the OBOR initiative. Therefore, due to new economic corridors and ports construction around the encirclement of the Indian Ocean is constructing the new regional security dynamics for surrounding littoral countries notably India and Southeast Asian countries. Hence, the Indo-Pacific new construction is encouraged by China's rapid rise, which opposed by regional powers in the region. Therefore, maritime Asia cannot consider as the US, ASEAN and China centric Asia-Pacific approach. It is larger than Asia-Pacific region expending in greater sphere of Indo-Pacific region (Saran, 2018). China's vertical pivot toward the South Asian region, notably through the CPEC, CMEC and China-Indochina Peninsula corridor brings new uncertainty for Indian policymakers in the region. India has strong objections notably on CPEC due to sovereignty concern over PoK.

India as an emerging power in the region, it has also moved with an extra-regional inspiration toward its westward and eastward neighboring countries. In this process, New Delhi has also taken the initiative of regional and trans-regional growth corridors to revitalize its historical, cultural, economic connectivity with surrounding countries. To bring a new alternative to China's OBOR initiative New Delhi came with the idea of the South Asian Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (here-in-after SASEC) for increase the new trade and commercial possibilities with its Eastern neighboring countries.

The SESEC is an economic cooperation program brings South Asian countries together such as India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Maldives due to a common vision for interregional trade and economic cooperation. However, New Delhi already has signed the Free Trade Agreement (here-in-after FTA) with the ASEAN organization in 2010, and South Asian Free Trade Area agreement (here-in-after SAFTA) with South Asian countries in 2006 (De & Lyengar, 2014).

Table: - 5. 7 China's Major Projects, Ports and infrastructural Developments under OBOR

Serial No.	China's Major Projects under OBOR	Partner countries	Expected Major Infrastructural Developments	Current Status
1).	CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor)	Pakistan-China	Transports, Railway, Gwadar Port and other infrastructural developments	Under Construction
2).	CMEC (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor)	China-Myanmar	–	Proposed
3).	BCIM Economic Corridor	Bangladesh-China-Myanmar-India	–	Proposed
4).	China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor	China & ASEAN members countries	Transports, Railway, and air connectivity	Under Construction
5).	China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor	China-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan, Iran & Turkey	Transports, Railways & Energy Infrastructure	Under Construction
6).	China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor	China-Russia & Mongolia	Transports, telecommunication & Energy Networks	Proposed
7).	New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor	Connect China to Europe through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus (cover approximately 30 countries)	Railway connectivity and energy is major preferences areas	Under construction
8).	Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road	It starts from SCS to Europe & Africa through IOR (China and several small islands countries part of the Maritime Silk Road)	Ports, Railways, Transports, Air and infrastructural developments	Under Construction

Source: Aoyama, R. (2016). "One Belt, One Road": China's New Global Strategy. *Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies*, retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/24761028.2016.11869094?needAccess=true> & Schneider, H. (2017). Opinion: The BRI-China's Road to Hegemony, Geopolitical Intelligence Service, retrieved from <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/opinion-the-bri-chinas-road-to-hegemony,economy,2318.html>. &The New Silk Road Corridor. OBOR Europe, retrieved from <http://www.oboreurope.com/en/beltandroad/one-belt/>.


However, due to Pakistan reluctance over joining the SAARC inter-regional economic cooperation, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka focused on sub-regional grouping such as BIMSTEC is in the priority zone (Mohan, 2017). The table no. 5.7 is showing the China's major projects and infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region. In this process, New Delhi signed the Road connectivity pact with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal (herein after BBIN) to increase the trade and economic cooperation in the sub-region by sideline Pakistan. It has also operated the 3200-km road connectivity from Indian city Moreh to Thailand city Mae Sot. Therefore, the Narendra Modi government has taken an open stance towards the sub-regional connectivity to counter or balance the Chinese OBOR imitative through increasing the alternative possibilities by implementing its 'Act East Asia' policy. Further, India, Myanmar, and Thailand also agreed in the SAARC Vehicle Agreement in the upcoming years will boost the sub-regional cultural, commercial and road and transport connectivity (De & Lyengar, 2014; Mukherjee, 2015). Therefore, the New Delhi is committed towards the regional or sub-regional trade and commercial connectivity by increasing the road and railway connectivity, economic corridors with its Eastern neighboring countries.

It also tilted towards its southward region by adopting the oceanic approach to develop the naval capabilities around the Indo-Pacific littorals. It found Japan as a geostrategic partner in the region in developing the maritime infrastructure and developments around the Indo-Pacific littorals countries. On the same hand, Japan also considers New Delhi as a reliable partner to expand its commercial and maritime connectivity in the Indo-Pacific theatre. Therefore, both have agreed on Asia, Africa Growth Corridor (here-in- after AAGC) in November 2016. The AAGC is a fundamental component of the Indo-Japan bilateral relation and their vision for Indo-Pacific region since 2025. According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, that it is fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which focused on free and open Indo-Pacific region to provide the equal opportunities for low based economic and commercial activities among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries.

Hence, the idea of AAGC came after the joint efforts by three major institutions such as Research and Information System (here-in-after RIS) for developing countries in New Delhi; Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade

Organisation (here-in-after IDE-JETRO) and Jakarta base Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (herein after ERIA). The fundamental components behind the establishment of this initiative to expand the development and cooperation projects; increased the institutional and infrastructural connectivity; increase the capacities and skills developments; increase the people to people partnership and engagements (Basu, 2017; Batia, 2017; Aiyar, 2017). The map no. 5.3 is showing the AAGC and its proposed and potential shipping routes in the upcoming years.

Map: - 5. 3 Asia –Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)



Source: Eurasian Business Review

However, there are other geostrategic and economic reasons behind this new development that to delimit or balance China's OBOR initiative around the Indo-Pacific region. The OBOR is China's ambitious project, which brings the new uncertainties for the Indian Ocean littoral countries, notably in Japan, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia, and other Indo-Pacific littoral countries. Therefore, these countries have a reactive attitude toward China's OBOR initiative. To counter

this new trends in the region these countries moved towards the institutional and infrastructural developments in the greater Indo-Pacific region.

5.5 India's Multilateralism: An Analysis


Since, the independence of India, it considered Multilateralism is as a part of its foreign policy due to its bid for strategic autonomy in the International Affairs. It played a fundamental role behind the establishment of NAM to maintain the status quo between two great powers in the bipolar movement. However, after the disintegration of former USSR, India remained with its multilateral engagement with South, Southeast and African countries. To response the new dynamics in the region, it has adopted multilateral trends to fulfill its national security interests. Therefore, with the waves of regionalism and globalization, it has also moved towards the regional, institutional mechanism behind the backdrop of NAM. India has a leading position in some institutional mechanisms in the region. Indian institutional multilateralism is to engage with regional or extra-regional world organizations such as SAARC, MGC, BIMSTEC, IORA, SCO, WTO, UNO, IBSA, BRICS, World Economic Forum, G-20, and World Bank etc.

The classification of India's multilateralism can understand in the three such levels 1). India's regional, institutional based engagements 2). India's military and defense, diplomacy 3). India's UN peacekeeping programs. To the institutional levels, India is the champion of the NAM movement to carry the balanced approach between two rival entities during the cold war period. India was capable to carry its foreign policy within strategic autonomy to deal its foreign affairs. New Delhi with the waves of regionalism and globalization put its efforts to engage with regional and extra-regional institutions. In this process, India played the active role behind the establishment of regional or sub-regional institutions such as SAARC, MGC, and BIMSTEC, IORA to revitalize its cultural, economic, diplomatic and strategic engagements with its neighboring countries for regional cooperation and prosperity.

Further, it is also intensifying its extra-regional stance through engaging with ASEAN countries through active participation in the EAS, ARF, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (here-in-after ADMM-Plus) and more recently expanded with

ASEAN Maritime Forum (herein after EAMF). Nonetheless, there are other negotiating tables such as the ASEAN-India Centre (herein after AIC) established in 2013 to enhance the strategic partnerships and regular meeting within the think tanks from both sides. Currently, there is a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (herein after RCEP) agreement on the conciliation table may pass in November, 2018 for Free Trade Agreement (herein after FTA) between ASEAN and Asia-Pacific countries such as China, Japan, South Korea Australia New Zealand and India (Sajjanhar, 2018; Thakker, 2018). Therefore, India has increased its layers of engagements through the multilateral approach with regional, intra-regional and with world organisations. At the regional organizational level, India is playing the lead role in vibrant and active forms. The extra-regional and world organizational level, it has represented itself very responsible and active players. The figure no. 5.2 is showing the three basic layers of India's multilateralism.

Figure: - 5.2 Layers of India's Multilateralism



Source: Prepared by Researcher

Secondly, it also engaged with several countries in the Indo-Pacific region through the military and defence diplomacy. Military diplomacy is non-violent and peaceful efforts for the regional cooperation with other surrounding nations. It covers the defence

cooperation on the larger scale such as mutual security pacts, bilateral meeting, and intelligence sharing and naval exercises. Therefore, military diplomacy is supplemented to achieving the national foreign policy objectives (Muthana, 2011); Singh, 2015; Davar, 2018). Say, for instance, New Delhi is part of several mutual security pacts and naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific region through joining the Malabar Naval Exercises, MILAN, ADMM-Plus and other bilateral and multilateral military engagements in the region. The Indian Ocean Symposium (here-in-after IOS) is a new initiative by New Delhi to increase its multilateral platform in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, New Delhi also signed the several strategic and security pacts with Indo-Pacific littoral countries. It has signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (here-in-after COMCASA) under Indo-US 2+2 meeting with the US on September 2018. It deepens the more security and strategic ties and allows transferring the US high-tech technology to India such as arms surveillance drones to counter China's assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region (Jacob, 2018; Ali & Miglani, 2018).

It signed the maritime security pacts with regional powers such as Japan and Australia along with some ASEAN countries to increase its defence and military diplomacy to strengthen its multilateral approach in foreign policy. Thirdly, India also contributed in the UN peacekeeping missions in larger scale since its independence. Approximately, over 45 peace-keeping missions such as in Egypt, Lebanon, Korea, Congo, Haiti, Rwanda and more recently in the South Sudan peace-keeping mission India engaged in with positive and responsible role.

The Indian military is providing a world largest human peacekeeping force in the UN peacekeeping missions (Davar, 2018). The first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru adopted the humanist international approach through establishing the NAM as a representation of the third world countries. Later, gradually, it moved toward the multilateralism (Mohan, 2013). It also joined the WTO, World Bank, and more recently World Economic Forum (here-in-after WEF) to use the global platform to increase its multilateral approach. Hence, New Delhi is increasing its space for multilateralism with the rise of its economic, diplomatic and political developments in

the 21st century. It boosts its position in the international politics towards the defensive multilateralism to active multilateralism. It also benefits India to contain or balance the Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region. The multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region is a responsible and peaceful response to balance the Beijing assertiveness in the region.

5.5.1 Analysis

The evolving security arrangement within the IP-RSA has positive as well as negative implications for Indian security in the IOR. It depends on Indian leadership that how they respond to the gravity of this situation. However, in the IOR India still, an influential power which providing a net security in the region. There are other powers such as the US, China, Russia, Japan, and Australia are engaged in the region to increase economic, political and geostrategic reach around the maritime sea routes. Say for instance, William Lawrence S. Prabhakar stated that “there is major actors such as the US, China, India, Japan and Australia are actively engaged in the periphery of ASEAN countries. Along with these powers there are other external powers such as Russia and EU, also involved in the power politics in the IP-RSA (W. L. S. Prabhakar, telephonic interview, September 23, 2018).” Similarly, Rajesh Basrur also stated that “India has hopes to receive arms transfer to strengthen its military against China. And it wants its strategic partnerships to create a network that encourages China to act with restraint (R. Basrur, emailed interview, September 14, 2018)”. New Delhi’s Indian Ocean strategy is clear to increase the geostrategic partnerships with compatible countries to contain the China’s assertiveness in the region.

Furthermore, the argument also supported by Abhay kumar by referring the regional actors such as “South Korea, South Africa, Pakistan, Iran, Kenya and other external actors UK and France involved in the greater Indian Ocean region. He also supported the expanded version of broad security architecture in the region (A. Kumar, emailed interview, August 28, 2018).” Therefore, the Indian Ocean region is not yet a peaceful zone due to the maritime new great game in the region. The region is facing the new security dynamics due to appearance of major and regional powers

such as the US, China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Iran, France, UK and Australia. The IOR is the gravity of center of these powers due to its geostrategic position. Therefore, the evolving IP-RSA may vibrate India's maritime security arrangements in a positive as well as in negative shape. However, it depends on India's leadership that how they react on a new security dynamics in the IOR. Therefore the chapter has concluded with the investigation that the IOR is not remain a peaceful zone, considered as a center of great powers politics, whereby great and regional powers involved in the region including India.

Chapter – 6

Conclusion

The enhancing IP-RSA is new phenomenon, which is more debatable and popular among the academicians and policy-makers due to new power dynamics in the region. The construction of the word 'Indo-Pacific' is not a common establishment but it has more classification and implications in the regional security arrangements as well as international politics. The process of the Indo-Pacific construction has started with the social-cultural and economic implications, which is now shifting toward the political, and securitization process. Currently, the Indo-Pacific littoral countries are more comfortable with the conception of the Indo-Pacific region due to their interrelated cultural, economic, political and security interests in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Gradually, the acknowledgement of the term by the US, Japan, Australia, India and ASEAN countries, led to new securitization process within the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific littoral countries. However, there are already regional security frameworks are working such as ASEAN, IORA, SAARC, ARF, SCO, CICA in the region.

The regionalism and globalization process in the late twentieth century brings the new regional opportunities in front of Indo-Pacific littoral states to rethink their regional security within wider framework. Meanwhile, China's rapid rise and its assertiveness towards the Indo-Pacific region is another reason behind the geostrategic proximity among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. There are also common non-traditional security issues such as human trafficking, narco-terrorism, climate change, sea piracy and International terrorism among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries led to new regional security framework in the region.

The research investigated the new geostrategic and geopolitical developments to address the major research problems like construction of the IPRSA and its impacts on India's maritime security in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. To deal with basic research problems, the research has followed two fundamental hypotheses. The first hypothesis of the research considers new geostrategic and geopolitical developments as fundamental causes behind the construction of the IP-

RSA in the region. Second hypothesis also sets up to understand the impacts of the enhancing IP-RSA on India's maritime security in the IOR. To prove these hypotheses the research has addressed three fundamental objectives. The first objective is achieved in the third chapter, which investigated the geostrategic and the geopolitical factors behind the construction of new regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the new regional security construction has been identified through the investigative nature of historical, cultural and commercial activities from the Indus valley civilization to the British Empire. There were several empires in the Indian subcontinent which extended their boundaries and maritime commercial activities from the Malay world to the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, cultural, historical and commercial amalgamation helps to find out more basic or fundamental procedure behind the Indo-Pacific imagination.

The cultural and commercial amalgamation among the littoral countries of the region has constructed the basic structural framework behind the new securitization process in the region. Say for instance, the Hinduism and Buddhist civilizations are still playing a very decisive role in the region. There are such historical and cultural evidences, Angkor Wat Vishnu Temple in Cambodia, Ananda Buddhist temple in Myanmar and evidences of Champa Empire in the South Vietnam. However, later Muslim merchants have also enlarged more settlements in the Malay World. Furthermore, the Post-Gamen period and geostrategic foray of western colonial powers such as the Dutch, Portuguese, French and British strengthened their geostrategic position around the Indo-Pacific littoral region. Consequently, the study has used the existing theoretical frameworks like Mahan's notion of maritime sea power to recognize the notion of maritime sea power in the backgrounds of enhancing IP-RSA.

Mahan's theoretical framework helps to examine the extensive feature of maritime-based regionalism in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, Mackinder's Inner crescent region helps to understand the geostrategic and the geopolitical applicability of the Indo-Pacific region in the Asian political theatre. Nonetheless, Spykman's theoretical model is also helpful to investigate the geostrategic and geopolitical

significance of the Indo-Pacific region due to partial attached boundaries with land as well as sea routes. Spykman called it as a rimland region, which is a future lifeline of Asian politics. The present study examined the geopolitical and geostrategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region through understanding existing theoretical models.

However, the Copenhagen School of security study is center of entire research to understand the new regional security phenomenon in the Indo-Pacific region. The school has helped to draw the conclusion that conflict and cooperation can be understood within the regional frameworks rather than following the traditional security frameworks. Therefore, the present research has used four basic classified levels of Copenhagen school of security studies to understand the IP-RSC in the Asian political theatre. These four such levels are mentioned in the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver "Regions and Powers: the Structure of the International Security" (2003). These four levels help us to understand the nature of regional security complexes in the Asian security dynamics especially to understand the enhancing IP-RSC. Therefore, through revisiting Buzzan theory of RSC, the study investigated the nature of IP-RSC behind the background of new regional security dynamics in the region.

The ASC theory also brings the new assessments in the research to understand China's nature and its sphere of influence in such surrounding regional security complexes such as Southeast, Northeast and South Asia. Likewise, during the Cold- War period, the Northeast Asia and Southeast Asian regional security complexes joined the East Asian RSC. Same as South Asia, Middle East and Sub-Saharan African complexes are also joining hands with the East Asia RSC to strengthen the maritime connectivity to delimit the non-traditional security threats in the greater Indo-Pacific region. Further, China's rapid military rise and its boundary disputes with neighboring countries is also another root cause behind this new security matrix. There are four major assessments points behind the background of IP-RSC such as state vulnerabilities, intera-regional relations between the units, inter-regional relations with surrounding regions and external powers presence in the Indo-

Pacific region. Therefore, the study has explored these basic parameters behind the IP-RSC. The nature of evolving IP-RSC has been examined by understanding existing vulnerabilities in the Insulator states such as Afghanistan, Nepal and Myanmar in the region. Along with this, Thailand, North Korea, Sudan, Egypt and Somalia are other set of states which are also fluctuating the nature of regional security in the region. There are some CSC faced by Afghanistan and India created by Pakistan based terrorist groups.

Similarly, Syria and Iraq are also facing the combined security vulnerabilities from ISIS in the region. Secondly, Intera-regional relations such India's boundary disputes with China and Pakistan are other issues to understand the regional security parameters in the region. Likewise, China and its maritime disputes with some ASEAN countries are also fluctuating the regional security parameters in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific region. Thirdly, for mapping the inter-regional relations with surrounding regions, another level has used to understand the nature of IP-RSC. China's more assertiveness towards the Indo-Pacific region is constructing the new regional security calculations in the Indo-Pacific region. Say for Instance, the unification of the interests of the South and East Asian RSCs is a recent phenomenon among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries. Further, the middle powers coalition among India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam against the Chinese assertiveness brings the new regional security calculations in the Indo-Pacific region. The study has found some other pulling approaches adopted by the countries to attract the nearest RSCs as a part of an IP-RSC.

The last level of analysis is focused on the role of external powers such as the US, China, Russia and EU in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. It focused the nature of external powers and their geo-economic, geostrategic and geopolitical engagements with the littoral states of the region. Furthermore, the study has examined the supporting components among the Indo-Pacific littoral countries that bring them together to construct the new possibilities of the enhancing IP-RSA. The fundamental components such as historical and cultural components, economic components, ocean based maritime regionalism, middle powers coalitions and

common traditional and non-traditional security issues are fundamental factors behind the new regional security construction in the region. However, the study has also critically examined the enhancing IP-RSA through various parameters such as religious and ethnic diversity; ideological diversion; geographical factors; lack of grand economic mechanism and absence of leading players in the theatre of multiplex world order. These are some limitations, which bring some critical examination about the upcoming IP-RSA. However, the possibilities cannot be denied due to new power partnerships and alliances among the regional and great powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, new geostrategic and geopolitical dynamics are responsible factors behind this new regional security construction in which Indo-Pacific littoral countries are more active and conscious about their upcoming role in the region. The second objective has been achieved in the Forth chapter of the thesis that analyses India's perspective within three phases. The first phase has been divided into the 1947 to 1991, which focused India's traditional approach towards the greater Indian Ocean region in the Cold-War period. The second phase has inspected India's neo-liberal or Post-Cold-War approach towards South and South East Asian countries to secure its economic, political and maritime security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The third phase of enhancing IP-RSA is a prediction about India's future engagement as an extra-regional power in the greater Indo-Pacific region. However, India's approach from the Indian Ocean to Indo-Pacific region is a fundamental strategic shift in its regional to extra-regional aspirations.

The chapter introspected India's regionalism process through adopting the top-down and bottom-up approach. The top-down approach helps to understand India's after independence approach to deal with the regional issues within anti-colonial sentiments. However, India's bottom-up approach explored India's pivotal position towards the regionalism process with the waves of regionalism and globalization. The bottom-up approach of Indian regionalism has begun with the establishment of SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA and of course now moving toward the enhancing IP-RSA. The study examined the three tier layers of India's regionalism, such as regional layer, extra-regional layer and inter-regional layer of its regionalism. Therefore, due to growing layers of India's regionalism, its role in the theatre of the Indo-Pacific

maritime new great game has become vital. The IP-MNGG is a game of coordination among the regional and external regional powers along with insular and small island countries. It is game of coordination by the external powers such the US, China, Russia and EU with the regional and small littoral countries. The game of coordination is based on multilayer dimensions such as economic, political, strategic and maritime security collaboration in the region. The thesis focuses on India's geostrategic proximity by discussing the Prime Minister Modi's path breaking diplomacy, 'Act East Asia' policy and its security and defense partnerships in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Further, it examines India's perspective for a common maritime sea lifeline, social and economic convergence of interests with surrounding regions, comprehensive regionalism and its traditional and non-traditional security interests in the IP-RSA.

However, there are some challenges for India in enhancing IP-RSA. Say for instance, India's confusion about its multi-alignment policy with all great powers. Further, the enhancing IP-RSA is also creating the dilemma about its own regionalism process due to joining the larger partnerships with other regional and great powers in the construction of enhancing IP-RSA. India's active involvement behind the construction of the IP-RSA also increases dilemma about its strategic autonomy due to its semi alignment with the US and other regional groups. However, the Prime Minister Narendra Modi has said in 'Shangri-La-Dialogue' that India's vision for Indo-Pacific region is more inclusive rather than club of limited countries. This chapter, hence has explored India's sensitivities and its perspective towards the enhancing IP-RSA. The chapter has investigated India's vision for free and inclusive Indo-Pacific region for the upcoming years.

Further, the third objective of research has been achieved in the fifth chapter of the thesis, which examined the impacts of enhancing IP-RSA in Indian security in the IOR. The Indian Ocean region is the future lifeline of India's broader maritime interests. India's geostrategic position in the IOR is strengthening its geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic significance in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Indian policy-makers considers the Indian Ocean region as a vital maritime

region belonging to India not for other external powers. Therefore, study has explored India's several security components such as its coastal security, maritime sea line of communication, blue economy and the geostrategic presence of external powers to ensure the maritime governess in the region. The enhancing IP-RSA will bring new challenges for India in upcoming years, for instance regional security construction might challenge its unilateral position in the Indian Ocean region due to more interference of external powers in the region. There are also possibilities that active participation in the IP-RSA will affect the Sino-Indian maritime relations and will increase maritime competition between two fastest growing economies in the greater IOR. Further, there are other possibilities that enhancing IP-RSA will shift the nature of India's non-alignment policy towards the semi-alignment that would influence its strategic autonomy in the near future. India has begun this process by joining the quadrilateral dialogue with the US, Japan, Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. However, policies of the Quad are still not clear due to India's fractional views on the enhancing regional security construction in comparison to other members of the Quad.

In contrast to this there are Russia-China-Pakistan who have also initiated their regional proximity in the region. Even other regional powers such Iran and Turkey have also strengthened their geostrategic proximity with these powers. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific region is now a theatre of multiplex claims rather than bipolar rivalry. Lastly, the thesis analyzed India's reactive orientation to secure its maritime interests in the greater IOR. New Delhi has adopted the mixed response to counter the impacts of enhancing IP-RSA in its maritime security. It has increased its sense of responsibility as an extra-regional power to provide a net security to surrounding regions.

For this purpose, it has focused notably on capacity building, military diplomacy and assistance, direct military deployment of forces to provide aid and stability in the littoral countries. To face China's assertiveness, it has also begun to increase its ports and infrastructural development around the Indo-Pacific region. It is called as India's 'Golden Curtain' or 'India's Necklace of Diamonds' strategy. Further,

India has also started its naval modernization process to increase its wartime maritime abilities in contrast to Chinese maritime naval capacities. Nonetheless, in contrast to Chinese OBOR initiative New Delhi has also started the SAGC for regional connectivity in the south Asian region. To increase the intercontinental connectivity, it has joined hands with other Asian and African countries on AAGC initiative. It is also negotiating with the US on the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor proposal. Therefore, India is continuing with its multilateral approach to deal with the regional, extra-regional and global issues. Therefore, IOR is not remaining a peaceful zone, but centre of attraction for external powers such the US, China, Russia and other European powers. Therefore, enhancing Indo-Pacific regional security phenomenon is significant construction in the Asian political theatre, which increases India's more maritime security concerns due to its geostrategic location in the Indo-Pacific region.

6.1 Recommendations: Further, after achieving these three objectives, the thesis makes some following recommendations that will be helpful further to New Delhi's policymaking process.

- Firstly, India needs to deal with internal centrifugal forces such as naxalism, separatism and radicalism within the country. These internal security threats are restricting India's spirit of emerging economic as well as extra-regional power in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Gradually, to delimit its internal threats it need to nurture the regionalization process in the South Asian region. In addition, it needs to work continuously on the spirit of SAARC, BIMSTEC, MGC and IORA.
- India's horizontal or Indo-Pacific regionalization process towards its eastward and westward countries should be led by more active and visionary policies like China's OBOR initiative, rather than based on reactive orientations.
- India's Indo-Pacific strategy should base on its own thought of a line rather than follow the inclinations of external powers. To fulfill its own geostrategic and geo-economic interests India need to intensify its own sphere of influence

within its strategic autonomy rather than follow the other external powers maritime strategies in the region.

- The possibilities of the enhancing IP-RSA cannot be denied in the near future. Therefore, India should be ready to take over the gravity of the situation to overplay a balancing or leading role to legitimize its present geostrategic position in the region. It should continue with its multi-alignment policy with all great powers to peruse its economic, political, strategic and diplomatic interests.
- The enhancing IP-RSA has positive as well as negative impacts own India's maritime affairs in the Indo-Pacific region. To delimit the negative impacts of this particular regional phenomenon, it needs to understand consistent geostrategic and geopolitical background behind this new construction then respond to a particular issue or events rather than a conundrum on policy choices. Currently, it needs to align with all great and regional powers in the region and nurture its leadership role for upcoming years especially in the greater IOR.


Lastly, to understand the Indian stand towards the new regional security phenomenon, there are three dominant schools of thoughts in India, which have dissimilar approaches with each other at this pivotal point. The figure no. 6.1 is showing India's three fundamental schools of thoughts and their approaches to deal the new regional security issues at this crucial situation. The first school of thought examines that rising spirit of India and China led to both sides towards the maritime competition notably in the IOR. In response to China's maritime circle strategy around the IOR, this school favours the New Delhi's infrastructure and ports development strategy in the region.

The school also favors the New Delhi's approach to strengthen its geostrategic and diplomatic engagement with Indian Ocean countries such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. The school of thought believes that the Indian Ocean is related to India and its coastal territorial movements, not for any external powers claims. It favors that India should engage

with Southeast and West Asian countries to counter the Chinese vertical shift around the Arabian Sea, Indian sub-continent and SCS. The Chinese assertiveness in the region is raising the skeptic waves in nature of Indian policy-makers about India's maritime security in the Indian Ocean region.

The school favors India's new geostrategic alignment with the regional or great powers, notably with the US, Japan, Australia and other like-minded democratic countries from Southeast Asian region to secure open and free maritime routes in the region. New Delhi has also increased geopolitical and geostrategic partnerships with these countries, notably with the US, Japan, Australia and ASEAN countries. In this process, India has signed the LEMOA and COMCASA with the US. Further, there is emerging discourse on 'Quad', a new debatable strategy which remains uncertain but significant move by these countries in the region. New Delhi has also increased geostrategic and security proximity with other regional and great powers to counter Beijing assertiveness in the region.

Figure: - 6.1 Fundamental schools of thought within India



Source: Prepared by Researcher

In contrast to this, second school of thought considered that China's ports and infrastructure development around the Indian Ocean is not a threat for India. It is an opportunity for New Delhi to strengthen the geo-economic proximity with Beijing. Sino-Indian future destiny is in the same boat to achieve the dream of the Asian century. Therefore, the school focuses on cooperation from both sides to construct the new economic and diplomatic opportunities in the broader sphere of Indo-Pacific region. It also considers that both countries have potential to lead the Asian security architecture within win-win possibilities for the establishment of a multipolar world order in contrast of the US unilateral dominance in the world politics. In this favour, India has shown its aspiration through joining the SCO as a full member along with Pakistan in 2015. It is also a part of BRICS economies to establish the precision and balance economic order for a multipolar world order. This school also favors that India should join OBOR project excluding the CPEC to increase its future economic growth in the region. It also gives the further argument that OBOR initiative is an opportunity for New Delhi to build a new geo-economic proximity with China and other regions of the world. Therefore, the school supported Chinese new infrastructural developments around the circle of IOR as new economic, political opportunities in the favor of India.

The third school of thought favours New Delhi's mixed response to overwhelming geostrategic dynamic situations within its strategic autonomy. It opined that India should develop its own naval capabilities, increase the regional cooperation with ASEAN countries and intensify its sphere of influence as an extra-regional power to counter the Chinese recent developments in the region. India's NAM-2.0 or enhancing inclusive Indo-Pacific strategy is the leading substance of its strategic autonomy in external affairs. The school favours the combined spirit of India's mixed response over the Indo-Pacific strategy rather than to follow the US or China's led alliance system. The school favors the cooperation with all great powers to receive economic, strategic and military technological benefits from them.

The school also favours to develop the indigenous thought of line by reclaiming its historical, cultural and economic legacies in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific region. Currently India's recent developments and policies are influenced by both

schools. Therefore, New Delhi is adopting the mixed response of these three schools of thought rather than following the unilateral approach of one school. The Indian policy-makers are more conscious about direction of its foreign policy, notably in the Indo-Pacific region due to India's longtime maritime security interests in the broader sphere of Asian continent.

6.2 Way Ahead: The enhancing new regional security construction is providing the common platform for Indo-Pacific littoral countries to secure their traditional and non-traditional security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The first hypothesis of the research proved in the chapter third, that new geopolitical and geostrategic components in the region are responsible factors behind the new construction of the IP-RSA. Therefore, the absolute possibilities of the IP-RSA cannot be denied due to the geostrategic and the geopolitical appearances of regional and great powers in the Indo-Pacific region. India as a regional power has also same orientations toward the construction of the IP-RSA. Due to the new regional security construction in the region, India's role is going to be more constructive and responsible in upcoming years. The study has proved second hypothesis that India has strong maritime security concerns in enhancing new regional security architecture in the region. It has strong maritime security concerns especially in the IOR, which is its future maritime lifeline. The new Indian government has understood its important geostrategic position, reviewed its neighborhood policy through 'Sager Mala' and 'Act East Asia' policy in the broader sphere of the Indo-Pacific littoral region. Therefore, the thesis is concluding with these words that India's outreach approach of the regionalization process in the Indo-Pacific region is more viable and sound full in its foreign affairs rather than its earlier Cold-War foreign policy approach.

The way forward its selections is clear that its geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests cannot be fulfilled without its active participation in the Indo-Pacific region. Currently, India considered its maritime security same as its land security concerns due to over dependency over Indo-Pacific maritime routes. The Indo-Pacific region will decide India's upcoming destiny in the Asian continent. It is a region, which can increase New Delhi's inter-continental connectivity and its sphere of

influence in the Asian continent. The concluding remark of the thesis is that the Indo-Pacific region is not India's desired region, but it is India's necessity to secure its longtime maritime security interests around the maritime sea routes in the region. India, hence, has strong maritime security concerns in enhancing IP-RSA, leading to its constructive role in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

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Glossary

Questioner of Semi-Structural Interviews

Responded Address:

1).	Responded Name	
2).	College/ University Institution/Affiliation	
3).	Current Position	
4).	Area of Expertise	

Semi- Structural Questions Technique

1). Do you think there is existing security architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region?

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2). If not existing, then do you think is there any scope for new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region?

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3). If it is existing, then what are the Geostrategic and Geopolitical Factors behind the Emergence of the Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture?

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4). How Many major actors are involved in the construction of Indo-Pacific regional security architecture?

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5). Do you think there is a larger scope for regional security architecture in the upcoming years?

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6). Does India part of Indo-Pacific regional security architecture?

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7). If it is, then what are Indian Perspectives over Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture?

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8). How Indo-Pacific Security Architecture impacts the Indian Security in the Indian Ocean Region?

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9). What do you think India has the potential to lead the Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture in upcoming years?

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10). What are your critical remarks over India's role in the emergence of the Indo-Pacific Security Architecture in future Perspectives?

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Note: the interview based on the semi-structural technique. Therefore, responded is free to offer with a brief or long description of response for the same.

Name of Research Scholar

Shiv Kumar